Zelensky’s “Victory Plan” and Ukrainization of the Conflict

Vladimir ROTARI

Western partners half-heartedly accepted Volodymyr Zelensky’s “Victory Plan” presented in the Verkhovna Rada yesterday. But what were its real aims? And where is the conflict heading?

Victory Plan amidst defeats Yesterday, Volodymyr Zelensky presented his “Victory Plan” to the Verkhovna Rada, which he had earlier presented to Western partners during his trips to the USA and Europe. Some elements of the plan, according to the Ukrainian president, have secret provisions that have been brought to the allies’ notice. Most likely, it contains a nomenclature of specific weapons and contingents to be sent to Ukraine. The plan includes five points. First of all, it is to invite Ukraine to NATO before the war is over. Then a set of defense measures - expansion of military operations into Russian territory, common operations with European neighbors to shoot down drones and missiles launched from Russia, lifting restrictions on long-range weapons strikes on “old Russian territories”. Next, deterrence: deployment of some kind of “non-nuclear strategic package” in Ukraine, joint production of weapons. The fourth and fifth points represent the country’s advantages that may interest the West in the long term: joint development and use of valuable natural resources, as well as active involvement of Ukrainian armed forces in cementing the defense perimeter of the North Atlantic Alliance. The emergence of such an initiative is directly linked to Ukraine’s rather deplorable strategic situation at the current stage. Crisis manifestations are growing in almost all areas. Geopolitically, we can feel the fatigue of the Western allies, who seem ready to promote the conflict towards a peaceful resolution (we will return to this point). Militarily, there is evidence of army exhaustion: powerful fortifications are falling much faster than in previous years, Russian troops hold the initiative almost along the entire front line, and the area of captured Ukrainian territories is increasing – in the last two months Russians have captured 5.5 times more than during the whole of 2023. Domestically, there is growing public fatigue and distrust of the authorities, which is reflected, among other things, in the falling pace of mobilization, widespread cases of evasion and the declining morale of troops, especially recruits. Under the circumstances, Kyiv obviously needed to reverse the negative trend, strengthen the will of the population to continue the struggle and “cheer up” its partners. As it seems now, the August attack on the Kursk oblast and the “Victory Plan” were part of the same cycle of events. If we recall the forecasts of Ukrainian intelligence and analysts, the Russian offensive in Donbass was expected to run out of steam by the end of the summer due to depleting reserves. At that point, an attack on a poorly protected section of recognized Russian territory was supposed to lead to an operational crisis of the Russian defense, a hasty redeployment of troops and further counterattacks. Against this victorious background, the “Victory Plan” appeared, which under such circumstances could get at least partial support and understanding. Yet, the scenario turned out to be unrealistic: Russia’s reserves have not yet run out, its offensive is still ongoing and successful, and the Russian leadership has not succumbed to emotions, accepting the temporary occupation of part of its lands. And now, of course, Zelensky’s package of proposals looks flat and even somewhat detached from reality. No wonder it was half-heartedly accepted by Western leaders and criticized by the media. It is indicative that yesterday, just a few hours after the pompous event in the Rada, the United States, without much patience, once again clearly refused to satisfy Kyiv’s demands on the first two points of the plan, turning it into essentially empty paper. The irony is that the same evening the media were flooded with information about difficulties with allocating the promised G7 loan of $50 billion against the proceeds of frozen Russian assets. Thus, the Ukrainian authorities did a lot to try, conventionally speaking, to turn the situation around, but they failed. Even the use of the once effective “emotional diplomacy” did not help, as the attempts to influence their partners publicly, through the media, proved futile. The reasons for this are obvious strategic and tactical blunders, but most importantly the growing divergence between the interests of Ukraine and its allies. Why haven’t the allies stood by? The United States as the main sponsor of the Ukrainian resistance has long achieved its goals in this conflict. Europe is once again firmly tied to the United States as the main security donor, while its relations not only with Russia but also with China, with which the EU is embroiled in an economic war, have been spoilt. The controlled military-political bloc NATO has been updated and revitalized – not only has it acquired new states, but is also accumulating more member states’ budget funds for the defense sector. Energy ties have been strengthened in a favorable way, the US is reindustrializing, especially the military-industrial sector, which has orders for years to come. That is, the main profit has been reaped, but further prospects are not so obvious. A total defeat of Russia has apparently never been Washington’s goal, which looks at things pragmatically within the framework of the international system of checks and balances. Therefore, even after the war began, contacts at various levels were maintained, and in fact the sides tried to avoid crossing certain red lines. I think this is also the reason why Kyiv was prevented from winning the war back in the autumn of 2022 by sending a Ukrainian counterattack to Kharkiv oblast instead of Zaporizhzhia oblast. The U.S. would certainly be satisfied with a loss for Moscow, when it would leave the occupied areas, suffer great image damage and temporarily withdraw from the pool of great powers. But nothing more. Hence the rather strict strategic line of the Americans who methodically support the AFU in liberating Ukraine’s territories, but without adventures and escalation. Now the paradigm is changing. It is already obvious to everyone that Ukraine is unlikely to achieve its ‘1991 borders’ goals in the war, being hardly capable of seriously changing the situation on the battlefield in its favor, and moving on a downward trend, risking the loss of even more people and land. Hence the reluctance of partners to invest massively in an unpromising project: they will not give up aid completely, but its volumes, which have already been severely reduced, will be cut further. There is also an objective factor - the exhaustion of military reserves of the armies of Europe and even the United States, which have not been able to quickly revive their military-industrial complexes (although there are gains). All this together encourages the Western countries, rather weary of the Ukrainian conflict, to look at peaceful options for ending the war. But Kyiv, as if it does not realize this, continues to declare the complete liberation of the territories through the state propaganda machine. And even if they claim their readiness to talk to Russia through mediators as a concession, the existing goal-setting a priori makes such negotiations impossible in the current conditions, when the Russian Federation has a stronger position. What are Kyiv’s true goals? Can we consider that the Ukrainian leadership has lost touch with reality and inadequately assesses the situation? Hardly. Most likely, it understood perfectly well that the ‘Victory Plan’ would not be fully accepted by its partners. So why is it needed? There are three main versions.

1. The plan is just a request. Roughly speaking, “ask for as much as you can to get something”. And its main task is to force the American administration to authorize the use of long-range weapons for strikes deep into Russian territory, as well as to give a clear prospect of NATO membership, which, with possible territorial compromises, could save the political career of Zelensky and his entourage.
2. The plan is designed only to be rejected. This in turn will allow the military-political leadership of Ukraine to lay all the blame for losing the war on the West and under this justification to enter the peace track with inevitable concessions.
3. Increase the degree of involvement of allies in the war with Russia up to full-fledged participation in hostilities. Many points of the plan have such potential: from long-range weapons strikes, under which Russia has long drawn a “red line”, to a “deterrence package” that would certainly involve strengthening the AFU’s missile component and/or stationing NATO contingents on Ukrainian territory.

We will know soon enough which option is the right one (or none of them), because according to Western media reports, Zelensky gave his partners only three months to adopt his plan. But one can assess the desperation of Ukraine, which already has to offer itself as a freelance country and trade its natural wealth for Western support. The population is hardly inspired by such proposals from its elites, but for the sake of a “positive” outcome of the war, it is likely to be willing to accept both. Meanwhile, there are no signals that even such offers will change the mood in the West, where they are ready to gradually shut down the conflict. I repeat, no one will completely withdraw support from Kyiv, but its scale may be quite different. Some experts are already drawing parallels with the Vietnam War, when the Americans, after years of exhausting and futile fighting, were forced under public pressure to withdraw and take a course on the so-called “Vietnamization” of the war. There are signs that the conflict in the neighboring country may also be moving towards “Ukrainization”. First of all, this is a very strong tightening of tax legislation – extremely unpopular, but apparently vital to cover the budget deficit, which was formed, among other things, due to the decrease in Western aid. There is also a noticeable increase in mobilization processes coupled with talk about the need to lower the age of recruits – again referring to the allies, who allegedly insistently recommend conscripting more young people (the average age of AFU soldiers is about 40). As we see, Kyiv may very soon face a choice – either to move towards peace on less than favorable terms (although in such a case the West will provide all possible diplomatic patronage to compensate for the unfortunate state of affairs on the ground), or to fight on, but mostly on its own with minimal external assistance. One can only imagine the frustration of a neighboring country that considered itself the “shield of the Western world”. With a fifth of its territory lost, millions of dead, wounded and left abroad, having lost entire sectors of industry, including major factories, thermal generation and de facto capacity (virtually the entire social sphere relies on foreign aid), Ukraine now risks being left alone with its problems, should it opt to keep fighting.