On the Threshold of the First Round of the Presidential Election

RTA analysts look into how the election campaign was unfolding, what awaits us this weekend, and how events may develop after the first round of elections

Anton ŠVEC: Despite the traditionally geopolitical nature of the presidential election campaign and multiple violations involving the regime’s use of administrative resources as typical features, this vote is significantly different. Maia Sandu’s team has accepted the unattainability of the first-round victory, although a few months ago this was the most optimal option for the government. The fact that the controlled CEC and courts haven’t removed any of the 10 competitors of the incumbent head of state suggests that the main battles will unfold after the weekend. This scenario plays into the hands of the opposition, which has thus solved its main task – to impede Maia Sandu’s relatively high rating from turning into a convincing victory. The second round will see a contest of anti-ratings, which offers a chance to alternative candidates. After all, only Igor Dodon could compete with the favorite in terms of the level of the population’s distrust, but he agreed to “recuse himself” on Moscow’s recommendation. Now the main question is not how many people will vote for Sandu, but how many will vote “against” her under any circumstances, i.e. for any of her rivals in the second round. It will be challenging for the PAS team to play the geopolitical card, as all serious candidates generally support European integration, but, so to say, with no excesses. Besides, the referendum ploy can’t be repeated in a fortnight. By November, the issue of the foreign policy vector, but actually of the right of the parliamentary majority to independently dissect legislation without regard to the constitution, will have been resolved. And the ruling party may have difficulties in re-mobilizing its supporters. Therefore, it is psychologically crucial for Maia Sandu not just to win in the first round, but to win confidently, overcoming the 38-40% of votes. It is possible to build on this result by trying to attract voters to her side by some candidates like Octavian Ticu and Tudor Ulianovschi, also known for their maximum loyalty to the West. Up to 3-4% can be fished out in the so-called “electronic voting” and due to the difficulty of counting diaspora votes. But these figures will not necessarily be decisive. If the current president fails to win significantly more than a third of the votes, and Renato Usatii does not oppose her in the second round, it will be a disaster for the authorities. And of such a scale that she may even decide to cancel the vote and declare a state of emergency. If Sandu falls below 33%, there will be no second round, although this is unlikely. It is obvious that Maia Sandu’s competitor in the second round will significantly improve his/her initial result, as the majority of candidates will support him/her. The most promising candidate is Alexandr Stoianoglo, who has a real chance to cause her problems in the next round. It is highly likely that he will be directly or indirectly supported by Irina Vlah, who has a stable electorate in Gagauzia, and other electoral participants. But Renato Usatii once again possesses one of the “golden shares”. Should he be defaming Maia Sandu’s rival during the two weeks after the first round, the opposition will have little chance to succeed. Another, perhaps even a key factor, is that the profile of voters in the first and second rounds may differ greatly. Firstly, because there will be no referendum in a fortnight, and those who are boycotting it this Sunday will come to the second round, while those for whom only geopolitics is important, on the contrary, may stay at home. The government has trapped itself in the referendum, because the idea was needed precisely to ensure the rapid victory of Maia Sandu, and the referendum only harms her prospects in a protracted battle. Secondly, the solid results of one of Maia Sandu’s competitors in the first round may not only mobilize all opponents of the PAS regime, but also raise the issue of “Transnistrian voters”. The incumbent president has bad relations with both the leadership and the population of Transnistria, and she is the only to blame. It is possible that the Tiraspol administration, either on its own or with a hint from Moscow, may want to play this game in the second round, especially since there will be no more risks of participating in a referendum contradicting the course of the region. And tens of thousands of votes from the left bank may also eventually become a factor in the voting. Christian RUSSU: So, one of the most tedious presidential campaigns in our history is coming to a close. It is tedious because it has lasted for more than a year. The ruling party had to use this time to decide and then adjust its tactics to re-elect its informal leader. It was the PAS, with its interest, invested resources and the added referendum, that gave the current elections the pretense of a crucial and almost historical event, although, as we know, in a parliamentary republic like ours, the president has only representative functions. It should be noted that in many respects PAS succeeded in achieving its goal. External partners once again took this fancy bait with geopolitical overtones, which domestic politicians have successfully exploited many times. The bets were placed. For the Brussels bureaucracy, which has taken the Moldovan leader under its wing, they are sky-high, but this is not even a forced measure to protect its investments: the long-term and strategic nature of the EU policy in Moldova, as well as the simple geography exclude any risks of losing control. Hence, we have one of the most censored campaigns ever. The authorities, backed by their Western partners, had to stir the entire local expert and journalistic community, which over the past decade has spent more than one million from the pockets of European taxpayers, in order to form a winning camp. Dissenters were shut down or barred from further fight to preserve the remnants of pluralism of opinion. A clear example of the fall of the remnants of journalistic arbitrariness’ stronghold was the closure of the Fourth Powe project of Gheorghe Gonta, who was “asked” to cancel several productions of the programme before the elections. It was worth watching the televised debates in the public and commercial media to see that the journalists were merely developing the narratives of the authorities about the opposition candidates who decided to use this opportunity to communicate with the electorate. Not only did the incumbent president avoid any of the face-to-face bouts, but the presenters acted as exposers of the impropriety of her competitors. On the public TV station Moldova 1, the propaganda machine showed its full glory. There, after every debate, biased journalists and fictive experts in prime time revealed “fakes” in the statements of Sandu’s rivals. The work of public authorities is of special attention in this election campaign. All structures, from the SIS to the CEC, were mopped up in advance and filled with crony experts. The result is obvious. And it is not only the actual exclusion from the elections of the Moldovan diaspora in Russia and CIS countries or the opening of exclusive postal voting only for overseas countries, although this grossly violates all European principles and standards, including the inadmissibility of changes in electoral legislation during the pre-election period. The hallmark of this campaign was the demonstrative use of administrative resources, when all party and near-party officials and deputies were by a willful decision sent to distribute newspapers. For this purpose, the work of the parliament had to be suspended, and the government was left with the task of taking prompt measures to corrupt the electorate: one-off payments to pensioners, education workers, etc. One could say that the educational process in the country was also partially suspended, because even minors were involved in the campaign. All these abuses were obvious, but few dared to speak out against them, and the few appeals of opposition candidates to the CEC were expectedly rejected. Paradoxically, even with such total control and the cleansing of opposition media and political projects, the election campaign has further exposed the failure of the PAS government. There are gaping holes in the “Potemkin” Euro-villages, and an unsightly picture emerges, largely as a result of property redistribution and corrupt deals. There is no doubt that the candidate of the ruling party will go to the second round with a solid margin, and the referendum will be held, so there was no need to remove opposition politicians from the race. It is important for the current government to show that Maia Sandu has undoubtedly won in a fair fight even with the Kremlin-backed “criminal” elements. And then all tools and contingency measures can be used, from fraud and emergency “cancellation” of a counter-candidate up to rejecting the voting results, especially since the ground for all this has long been prepared.