Western Projects in the post-Soviet Space Are Facing Crisis

Sergiu CEBAN

The results of the elections in Moldova and Georgia show the bright but distant dream of becoming a member of the big European club notably fading, which in contrast to previous periods is now associated with great geopolitical risks for the candidate states

The next two weeks are full of important elections, the results of which will determine the situation in the post-Soviet space. The Eastern Europe region is a priority for us, where high geopolitical risks have sharply decreased the planning horizon and directly affect domestic political processes. The US presidential election will undoubtedly be crucial. After that, Washington will redefine its attitude to major regional problems and conflicts, including Ukraine and other former Soviet states. According to some experts, no matter who sits in the White House, the United States will have to overcome one of the most difficult foreign policy crises in its history and still have to accept some weakening of its position in the international arena. In just a week we will see who will become the head of state in Moldova, unless, of course, the post-electoral period goes according to the conflict scenario. So far, everyone agrees that our referendum, although it gained a minimal margin in favor of amending the Constitution, nevertheless, it failed, revealing an extremely reserved attitude towards joining the European Union, especially of citizens who live and conduct their business directly in the republic. It is also worth mentioning the parliamentary elections in Georgia, which are difficult to consider in isolation from the geopolitical dynamics in the larger post-Soviet space. The ruling party has become even stronger there, and Tbilisi is likely to continue its course of strengthening its independence and statehood. Curiously, even without waiting for the official results, the governments of Germany, Canada, Ireland, Italy, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and Ukraine issued a joint statement that they would not recognize the results of the elections in Georgia. This, by the way, is one of the variants of how Western countries may react to Alexandr Stoianoglo’s victory. What do such results of the citizens’ will mean? In fact, the members of the Association Trio, who are actively seeking to join the EU, have somehow stalled badly. Georgia has decided to insulate its domestic and foreign policy without concerning about comments and threats from Brussels. Ukraine is mired in war, European integration is hardly ever mentioned, including in Zelensky’s notorious “Victory Plan”. Well, and in our country, despite the promises of 1.8 billion euros from the head of the European Commission, citizens have spoken about their European future in such a way that a small margin in favor of ‘For’ looks increasingly doubtful. All this testifies to the noticeable fading of the very bright but distant dream of becoming a member of a big European club. People are tired of waiting and hoping, they live here and now. Therefore, if the EU really intends to expand, it will have to consider the counter demands of potential members, because promises and calendar forecasts about joining in 5-10-15 years only irritate. In addition, the electoral cycles in Moldova and Georgia demonstrate a significant rethinking in the post-Soviet elites and masses of the idea of a European integration center, which for a long time had a non-alternative significance. It should be understood that earlier joining the EU was attractive and tangible solely due to geopolitical conjuncture. In the current conditions, even despite the unprecedented openness of the European Union against all statutory and procedural documents, the adaptability of the European course does not look like a quickly achievable goal. European integration was different thing in the 90s and 00s, when the European Union was on the rise and its enlargement did not meet any serious obstacles. Growing economies combined with the gravity of the big West made it possible to absorb entire regions of Europe. In addition, given the vacuum of ideas and the lack of alternative development models, joining the EU allowed to develop the states, their legal and political systems and, consequently, to multiply economic and modernization effects due to a large market and a substantial stock of resources. However, we can see that the situation has completely changed over the last 10 years, and the “old European integration” has become an internal political factor in modelling conflict situations. It is no longer an instrument of development, often being used by part of the elites as a political lever of pressure, which inevitably leads to splits within society. This danger was realized by the Georgian authorities and, apparently, also by our voters, who revealed Maia Sandu’s attempt to exploit the pro-European referendum as a way of holding on to the presidency. Previously, the path to the European Union and NATO was not only a matter of prestige for the state, but also a guaranteed way to gain security, prosperity and stability. Nowadays, such a vector is fraught with significant geopolitical costs that can easily provoke a crisis of security, territorial integrity and domestic political cohesion. As a consequence, the US and the EU possess objectively reduced opportunities to promote Euro-Atlanticism as a positive development scenario, without having, mainly, the ability to guarantee the safe implementation of such a course without compromising one or another candidate state. As a result, a certain part of society and the ruling class realize that European integration is becoming not a long-term development project, but a source of fierce internal political confrontation and crisis of statehood. In addition, it can be accompanied by catastrophic consequences for the country, if the geopolitical battle between major players goes beyond diplomacy and turns into an armed conflict. In fact, even the interim electoral results cast doubt on the ability of the U.S. and the EU to successfully expand the boundaries of their geopolitical influence and form the corresponding moods in the elites and among the population. By the way, the example of Georgia directly points to the cumulative strengthening of the influence of Russia, China, Turkey and Azerbaijan, which, if not stronger, is certainly not inferior to that of their Western opponents. The story of the Moldova’s referendum outcome has already caused unpleasant irritation in the West, and the defeat of Maia Sandu may cause a painful blow to our development partners. Of course, our country is not among the major US foreign policy priorities, but the current administration of the White House and the EU leadership themselves have labelled Moldova, with the PAS regime, as the flagship of Western influence among all post-Soviet states. Therefore, the failure of the incumbent president in the elections will be another alarming signal for the West. Washington and Brussels have made a serious mistake in working with the dossiers of specific post-Soviet states. Alas, for now there is no basis for any geopolitical compromise. Therefore, if the influential Western capitals are not ready to cede positions in the post-Soviet space to Moscow, Beijing and other actors, they should at least undergo a deep rethinking of their policy in this area. The methods and tools that were effective in the previous decades do not work in the current conditions and do not lead to the desired results.