Chisinau Blackmails Moscow with the Seizure of Gas Assets Again. Why?

The authorities want to impose external management on Moldovagaz to prevent the resumption of direct Russian gas supplies to the right bank and the breakdown of established enrichment schemes

It was with cautious optimism that many reacted to the reports that since early October negotiations have been underway to continue the Russian gas transit through Ukraine to Moldova after 31 December. And the key point here is not only the growing potential for normalizing relations between Moldova and Russia in the energy sector. The main pain in the neck of Moldovagaz management since July has been the search for ways to organize the export of blue fuel to the left bank after the expiration of the contract between Moscow and Kyiv. The Moldovan-Russian company took up the technical problem of how to maintain minimum gas supplies to the Transnistrian region being actually deprived of the possibility to operate the main networks on the right bank. There seems to be no one to prevent this. The Russian Federation is interested in an uninterrupted supply to Tiraspol for humanitarian and political reasons. Chisinau has its own objective interest in this, as there are no alternatives for reliable import of electricity at a giveaway price. It’s highly desirable for Ukraine to have even minimal volumes of Russian gas in its main network, no matter how harshly its leadership speaks on this issue. This not only financially fuels the deeply deficit budget, but also ensures greater stability of the entire gas transport system, especially during cold seasons. Potential transit volumes, which are only 2 billion cubic meters for 2025, do not cause any irritation to anyone and do not give any reason to fear strengthening of Russia’s position. The current context of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation favors this scenario, where there is a mutual understanding of the need to stop the destruction of the energy infrastructure. The ongoing negotiations on certain tracks are likely to bring only temporary results, but even the stable situation during the heating season for thousands of families in the conflict-affected region will be an unambiguously positive development. A deeper insight shows that finding a way to continue supplying Russian gas to the narrow strip of land on the left bank of the Dniester next year may form the basis of potential agreements with other consumers. There is interest in this, and the reason is the price. Already in November, the contract price of blue fuel from Russia for Moldovagaz will be about 120 dollars cheaper than the TTF futures. In December and January, this difference will only increase, creating problems for the enrichment scheme perfected by party functionaries from Maia Sandu’s team and their Romanian partners. For six months now, Moldovagaz has been forced to buy gas for the right bank through tenders at the Romanian Commodity Exchange branch in Chisinau, which are constantly won by the state enterprise Energocom. In order for this system to function, the interested participants have repeatedly artificially lowered the prices in order to prevent purchases from Gazprom, but everything has a limit. Back in September, foreseeing such scenarios, the energy minister admitted the possibility of returning to Gazprom should the price be attractive. Formally, it is challenging to resume such supplies in 2024 and, therefore, to be able to reduce tariffs for end consumers even if Gazprom is ready to supply the necessary volumes exceeding the consumption on the left bank. Moldovagaz has already purchased gas until the end of December. Therefore, we can only talk about the next year. According to media reports, in the first quarter of 2025, the Russian monopolist can supply about 294 million cubic meters to right-bank Moldova at a rather lucrative price. It’s easy to guess that the ruling party intends to oppose any attempts to boost the position of the enterprise with Russian participation, even if it reduces tariffs and the financial burden on the population and economic agents. Moldovagaz was led to bankruptcy and the main networks were taken away not for this purpose. A legal stick can always be used as a tool to retain the monopoly in gas schemes. At the same time, there is little faith in the populist scenario, under which sanctions will be imposed against Gazprom and gas supplies from Russia will be legally banned. Such harsh decisions would also make imports to Transnistria illegal, depriving Chisinau of cheap electricity. Therefore, in order to reinforce its negotiating stance, the ruling regime is considering the option of raiding Moldovagaz through external administration. The election of a new management board is blocked, which formally deprives the only authorized person, Vadim Ceban, who negotiated with Gazprom in early October, of financial operations for gas purchases. This argument is used by the authorities to prove the “insolvency” in which the company will allegedly find itself from the 1st of January 2025. To prevent this, it is planned to introduce external management, which, according to the developed scenario, will be appointed by the local regulator represented by the National Agency for Energy Regulation. Fortunately, there is experience of granting such unprecedented powers to ANRE. All this can be expected immediately after the presidential elections, which have so far prevented MPs from returning to parliament and passing the relevant bill. No doubt, this is blatant blackmail. Chisinau demands Moscow to change the management of Moldovagaz in order to gain control over the company and to set up new schemes for the personal enrichment of ruling party functionaries. If Gazprom does not agree to replace the current management through internal regulatory procedures of Moldovagaz, it will be done by force. In case the Russian gas monopoly refuses to cooperate in the imposed format, Moldova even demonstrates its readiness to completely stop gas supplies to the left bank. Thus, the government’s multi-page action plan for emergencies in the gas sector, adopted yesterday, identifies the suspension of gas transit to the left bank of the Dniester and the impossibility to receive gas at the border with Ukraine due to the destruction of infrastructure on the Russian or Ukrainian territory as among the most probable negative scenarios. In practice, it’s the same – scenarios that do not formally depend on Chisinau’s actions, but for which it is demonstratively preparing.