Moldova Is Politically Confused

Anton ŠVEC

PAS, which has retained its dominant position for the next six months to a year, has many risks ahead due to regional and global uncertainties as well as its own limited resources

Giving in to the panic mood between the first and second rounds of the presidential election, Maia Sandu provoked a reshuffle in the government, the content of which will become clear in the very near future. Of course, it would be much more rational to restart the executive branch closer to the vote for a new parliament, in the summer or autumn of next year. This would allow blaming individual ministers for the inevitable problems that will arise in the country due to the unstable external environment and the heating season, as well as public disappointment with the failure to fulfil the election promises of the head of state. Now, thanks to Maia Sandu, Moldova will enter the extremely difficult winter season with a renewed government team, which is needed not only to balance the financial, economic and corruption interests of the elite, but also to help the state cope with a whole host of acute internal and external problems. In international relations, the current regime persistently does the same thing, expecting the opposite result. Just after the election results were certified, Sandu travelled to the fifth summit of the European Political Community in Budapest, where she fought “Russian disinformation” and influence with a meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky and further assurances of strong support for Ukraine. As a result, two attack drones without a payload landed on Moldovan territory over the weekend. As usual, Russia was blamed for the incident, but they claimed that they were not involved and hinted at a Ukrainian operation. Chisinau has also been included in the Russian intelligence reports against the background of the attempted hijacking of an MI-8 electronic warfare helicopter by Ukrainian security services and the opening of an office of a Ukrainian firm engaged in procurement for the needs of the AFU. In fact, we are already talking about Moldova’s concrete participation in the confrontation with Russia and strengthening Kyiv’s intelligence and operational capabilities. Simultaneously with the presence of NATO, the USA, Romania and the European Union in Moldova, a conditionally safe (physically) hub for the coordination of anti-Russian measures aimed at organizational and informational confrontation with Moscow is emerging. Maia Sandu and her regime have neither choice nor desire to choose. We are mandatory embedded in an anti-Russian adventure from which there is no conflict-free way out. This is why hysteria and tension continue to grow: the Russian ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Ministry, yet he has not even presented his credentials, but has made it clear that the drone provocation would be of no practical use to Moscow. Relations with Russia are gradually destroyed, although the population made it clear by voting on 20 October and 3 November that it does not support the foreign policy and military-strategic line in favor of the West and Ukraine. Moreover, Moldova has enough   areas of common interest with the Russian Federation that it would be rash to lose: this includes cooperation with the Russian contingent in the peacekeeping mission in the Transnistrian region, and gas supplies, which generate the bulk of electricity consumed in the country. The issue of the new composition of the Moldovagaz JSC management bodies, which cannot be formed without the votes of PJSC Gazprom, is also acute. Many producers, especially in the agrarian and food industry, need the Russian market and mineral fertilizers imported from there. It is not clear how to solve these problems without normal communication with the Kremlin. The situation may be further complicated by the results of the American elections, if the deal on Ukraine announced by Donald Trump comes true. In such a case, Chisinau will have to revise the content of its reintegration policy hastily, thinking over specific models of conflict resolution, status and distribution of powers with Tiraspol. Moscow’s opinion, especially given its influence on the Transnistrian elites, cannot be neglected. Meanwhile, no obvious successes are expected in foreign policy, which is shaped in line with Western interests. The Prime Minister of once friendly Georgia is openly mocking our elections, calling for an investigation into violations, which even led to the invitation of a diplomatic representative of that country to the Foreign Ministry to express “severe disappointment”. The candidate for the post of European Commissioner for Enlargement Policy publicly excludes the very possibility of finalizing negotiations on Moldova’s accession to the European Union during his mandate (which will be a year longer than that of Maia Sandu, who claimed to be the sole promoter of the European integration course). The Romanian presidential elections will soon take place with the organization of voting on our territory. The president’s office and the government will in any case have to build relations with the new leader, and probably realize the collapse of the coalition between the Social Democrats and the National Liberals. Berlin remains an important partner for Moldova, having delegated several influential advisers to supervise the PAS regime. In Germany, however, disaster struck with the so-called “traffic light coalition”. Now the technical government led by outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz will plunge into preparations for early elections, which are planned for February. It is not quite clear who the Maia Sandu regime will rely on in the short term. Of course, the European Commission and international financial institutions will provide aid, but now on their own terms of operational payback. Washington will not remain uninvolved either, but the Moldovan issue has been and will be handled for many years by appointees and sponsors of the Democratic Party. And how that will work with Donald Trump in the Oval Office is also a tricky question. Thus, the PAS regime enters a phase of foreign policy and strategic turbulence with a partially renewed team, whose competence is yet to be confirmed by concrete actions. The situation is complicated by the pressure because of the understanding that any blunders and crises may lead to the loss of power in the parliamentary elections next year.