Sergiu CEBAN
No matter how this war ends, it will influence much the future structure of the world order
The Russian-Ukrainian war has passed another time milestone of a thousand days. Probably when the conflict first began, neither Moscow nor other capitals could have imagined that the hostilities would become so fierce and drag on for such a longг time. At the same time, alas, there is still little reason to say that the situation is moving towards peace.
During the entire confrontation since 2014, Russia has occupied about 111,000 square kilometers, that is, more than 18% of Ukraine’s territory. At the peak, in February-March 2022, it was even more, but the Ukrainian armed forces have managed to liberate some of it over the past two and a half years. At the same time, the dynamics of territorial seizures in recent months has taken on the most threatening proportions. Last week alone, Russian troops occupied approximately 250 square kilometers, and military experts’ forecasts indicate that Kyiv’s rapid loss of control over Donbas and other regions will only intensify over the next few months.
Since the second half of the year, the Russian Federation, having significantly increased its reserves, has changed its combat tactics and has increasingly conducted operations to encircle settlements and enemy groups in order to banish them out of their positions. The refusal of head-on attacks brought the front into motion, and at the same time the losses of personnel and equipment on both sides were significantly reduced. However, the constant forced retreat to new and often poorly prepared positions greatly demoralizes the AFU formations.
As far as the line of contact is concerned, it is increasingly acquiring the features of a wave-like front with an ever-increasing risk of the formation of so-called “cauldrons” and “mini-cauldrons” into which Ukrainian units predominantly find themselves. Among the main targets of the Russian army for the coming months are the towns of Kurakhove, Toretsk, Kupyansk, Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar. In addition, there are grounds for speculation that the Kremlin may intensify its winter military campaign with an offensive from the south in order to further occupy the entire left-bank part of Zaporizhzhia oblast.
If ceasefire negotiations are not launched early next year, it is possible that in the next phase of the military campaign Moscow will set its troops the goal of approaching to Zaporizhzhia and Dnieper (city), which are key links of the Donbas industrial belt. Once a strategic threat to the two large cities has been created, it is highly likely that more stringent demands can be imposed to Kyiv.
Meanwhile, fighting continues in the Kursk oblast, the territory of which has become almost the main section of the front for Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff has thrown its best-trained units here and is constantly deploying new reserves, expecting to occupy this bridgehead for as long as possible. Thus, Kyiv hopes to strengthen its negotiating position by keeping a part of internationally recognized Russian territory under its control. However, judging by the general course of hostilities in this area, the Ukrainian armed forces will have to leave the occupied perimeter in the medium term.
Of course, supporters of ending the war are holding out certain hopes about the election of Donald Trump, around whom the euphoria, unsupported by anything concrete but buzzwords, is still visible. In fact, the new US president will be able, if not to bring the war to an end, at least to seriously change its course so that it does not move to an even higher level of worsening with poorly foreseeable consequences.
But as recent days have shown, the outgoing US administration is ready to lay the last “escalation cards” on the table to make it more challenging for Trump to solve an already difficult geopolitical equation in which the conflict in Ukraine is only one of the unknowns. Besides, it is far from certain that when attempts to bring the parties to the negotiating table are exhausted, the new head of the White House will not escalate the situation himself.
Meanwhile, neither Moscow nor Kyiv are ready to accept any of Trump’s publicly known plans or settlement ideas. The Russians categorically reject any option for a freeze along the battle line, regularly recalling Putin’s June conditions. In addition to the withdrawal of the AFU from the territory of the four oblasts, they also include ensuring Russia’s security by stopping NATO’s eastward expansion and resuming negotiations on pan-European security, which were interrupted due to the war.
Today, Volodymyr Zelensky spoke in the Verkhovna Rada and introduced the “Plan of Ukraine's Internal Resilience”. The document will consist of 10 points, which mainly deal with such issues as the front, defense and industrial complex, energy, finance, regional policy, information sphere, cultural sovereignty, hero policy, etc. It is obvious given the actual failure of the previous “Victory Plan”, the Kyiv authorities are trying to mobilize society and the remaining resources to enter the expected phase of diplomatic settlement as a unified and subject state mechanism.
After a thousand days of war, the main conclusions are as follows. Neither side has achieved the goals it set for itself at the beginning of 2022. Moscow, with the exception of new territorial gains and damage to the neighboring country, has not obtained a loyal political regime in Ukraine, has not pushed the AFU beyond the administrative borders of four regions, and no one even remembers about demilitarization and denazification.
Kyiv has resisted the pressure of one of the world’s largest armies and has united virtually all the countries of the global West around itself. But at the same time, for six months now, the strategic initiative on the front has belonged to the Russian army. And the general trend of hostilities indicates that it is highly probable that Ukraine will not be able to reach its constitutional borders, and the post-conflict period will be no less serious for it than the multi-year war with its eastern neighbor. All this is aggravated by the fact that almost a third of the country’s territory is uninhabitable, half of the population has dropped out, and Ukraine has essentially lost its status as an industrialized state.
As lofty as it may sound, the 1,000 days of conflict have divided the world into two blocs of countries. The former joined the Big West supporting Ukraine, while the latter supported Russia, either explicitly or implicitly, after which the term Global South began to appear increasingly often in expert parlance. Therefore, no matter how this war ends, it will inevitably have an impact on the international situation and will undoubtedly contribute to the future structure of the world order.