No Change in PAS Leadership

Anton ŠVEC

Expected reshuffles in the government have in fact turned out to be both minor and nominal

The political course of the PAS regime did not undergo any specific transformations as a result of the election campaigns. The authorities ignored the unambiguous popular demand for change, deciding to limit themselves to minimal personnel changes without adjusting the basic vector of the state. Maia Sandu, who has lost national legitimacy, announced ministerial replacements in an apparent panic between the two rounds of presidential elections. However, after her victory on 3 November at the expense of a dubious diaspora vote, it became clear that there was no real readiness for change at the top of the current government. And the PAS team itself does not have enough human resources to restart the government. As a result, we have purely nominal changes: the post of Minister of Infrastructure, vacant after Andrei Spinu’s departure, was taken by Vladimir Bolea, whose activity as Minister of Agriculture, especially recently, was constantly accompanied by protests of agricultural producers, who unceasingly demanded his resignation. Bolea was replaced by Ludmila Catlabuga, Prime Minister Recean’s appointee, who has virtually no relevant experience. The head of the Interior Ministry, Adrian Efros, also resigned. He was put in charge of alleged electoral corruption, as well as for the murder in the center of Chisinau. However, his deputy Daniela Misail-Nichitin became the new minister, which can be construed as a rejection of significant changes in the law enforcement system. The issue of resetting the anticorruption structures is also stalled, with no concrete prospects. Thus, the internal policy of the country, even despite the results of the elections and the referendum, will be the same, which will quickly lead to the disappointment of citizens, including even those who voted for Maia Sandu. This trend may become especially dangerous фьшв a difficult heating season and the rising cost of utility bills, while consumer inflation and low wages and pensions persist. At the same time, the opposition camp, especially Sandu’s main rival in the recent elections, Alexandr Stoianoglo, shows no desire to force socio-political transformations. The team of the former Prosecutor General is obviously losing momentum. It is still unclear how he will use his high rating to continue the political struggle: there is no information about launching his own project or uniting the left wing under his banner. Although the opposition, which has been relatively successful in this electoral round, could be the leading force of the country’s internal political transformation by winning the majority of seats in parliament in the coming year. The passivity of competitors allows Maia Sandu and her entourage to change nothing in principle in their notorious methods of solving important state issues. In domestic politics, they develop an authoritarian style of governance, far from European democratic practices; in foreign policy, they continue, contrary to the opinion of half of the population, a radically anti-Russian course and even test a “window of opportunity” with regard to the neutrality enshrined in the constitution. Statements were made at the ongoing Moldovan Security Forum that the neutral status played a role in preventing the country from joining the CIS military bodies, but now it is unnecessary as it prohibits strengthening relations with Western countries, including the NATO bloc, or defending the territory. At the same time, Russia, which has a military presence in Transnistria, has been designated as the only violator of Moldovan neutrality. According to NATO, Moldova is a testing ground for hybrid actions of the Russian Federation, and some speakers continue to predict an attack of the Russian army. In turn, the country’s leadership maintains the line of unconditional support and logistical assistance to Ukraine. The fall of unmanned vehicles on the territory of the country, which has become quite routine (the fourth during November), while not a direct threat, still excludes the possibility of diplomatic normalization with Moscow. Moreover, it seems that the Kremlin will be declared responsible for the “mining” of polling stations in the Transnistrian region and in foreign countries on 3 November. The new Russian ambassador, who has not even presented his credentials to Maia Sandu yet, has already been summoned to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There are no signs of change in Chisinau’s relations with the regions that are problematic for it - Transnistria and Gagauzia. With the latter, apparently, the block on mutual contacts with periodic application of punitive measures will be maintained, and in addition, the public discussion on the necessity of liquidation of the autonomy will be supported in order to keep Comrat in check. As for the left bank, yesterday the so-called political representatives of Chisinau and Tiraspol met for the first time in six months. Judging by the media reports, the meeting took place without excesses, but one can hardly expect the unfreezing of the conflict settlement process. It is still unclear whether the authorities will support the Transnistrian initiative to conclude some kind of peace declaration and whether the growing contradictions in the relations between the two banks will be resolved. Maia Sandu, no longer constrained by the need to think about re-election for a second term, does not show any willingness to communicate with the Transnistrian leader. Much, of course, will depend on the international situation, and first of all on the course of the Ukrainian conflict, where the future head of the White House Donald Trump will try to insist on a deal with Moscow, which will hypothetically include the Transnistrian issue. Thus, a couple of weeks after the end of the electoral cycle, we did not see any real symptoms hinting at the recovery of the socio-political and economic situation in Moldova. On the contrary, the regime has stalled, which was absolutely expected. In such a situation, public discontent becomes inevitable, to which the ruling elite, which has retained full power, will respond with another tightening of the screws and belt-tightening. The last chance to reverse the process of the country’s self-destruction remains the parliamentary elections. If PAS, as part of a coalition or on its own, retains a majority in the legislature, any hopes of improving the situation for the better can be considered exhausted.