Opinion: “Moldova Does Not Fit into Modern Trends”

The start of negotiations on Moldova’s EU membership was the result of a confluence of geopolitical circumstances. However, the situation is obviously changing, and the PAS regime, which is plunging the country into the chaos of economic crisis, clearly does not have time to get ready

Anton ŠVEC, RTA:      The authorities observe the whole set of written and unwritten rules established by the Brussels bureaucracy for EU candidate countries, acting diligently and with the maximum ideological focus. Unlike frontline Serbia, Chisinau fully supports Ukraine in the logistical and propaganda sense, is not a stranger to anti-Russian sanctions and almost does not allow contacts with Moscow on a serious level. Even the visit of the Energy Minister to St. Petersburg for conventionally economic and commercial negotiations polarized the public to the maximum extent possible. They do not unilaterally introduce the euro as a national means of payment, as in Montenegro, which is still criticized by the European Commission for this decision twenty years ago. We are not engaged in hostilities as in neighboring Ukraine. And, of course, Prime Minister Dorin Recean, unlike his Georgian counterpart, has certainly not announced a four-year freeze on European integration. On the contrary, a special Euro-integration deputy prime minister has been appointed and equipped with the appropriate apparatus, the preamble and articles of the constitution have been amended to include an irreversible course towards EU accession, legislation is being screened, and even methodological manuals for negotiations with Brussels are being published. The regime has fully opened the country’s politics, economy and territory to the EU bureaucratic presence and, in addition, to the establishment of the western military and logistical infrastructure. In addition, the sale of agricultural land and the transformation of our republic into a testing ground for the European Commission’s migration experiments are being considered for the future. Moldova’s troubled experience is not unique. Something similar is happening in federative Bosnia and Herzegovina, which faces identical internal obstacles due to Republika Srpska. Our country has a highly internationalized and still unresolved Transnistrian issue and a relatively institutionalized in the legislative sense conflict with Gagauzia, whose population massively supports pro-Russian parties and even voted for integration into the Eurasian Economic Union in its own referendum in 2014. In contrast to Sarajevo and some other Western Balkan countries, our prospects seem somewhat bleaker. The thorny but largely routine negotiations’ path, which had barely begun, could have taken a wrong turn even this autumn, when Maia Sandu almost lost the presidency and the referendum, designed as a political technology, was on the verge of a resounding failure. It turned out that the people were not so much against European integration, but did not support it at all costs, and were disappointed by the economic crisis and the authoritarian behavior of the PAS party. It cannot be ruled out that the European Commission and the taxpayers of individual EU countries will still have to rescue the failed PAS government in terms of economic management, including finding ways to secure energy supplies so that the population does not simply freeze in the winter. Despite the mellifluous speeches of the Western supervisors of the incumbent regime, who guise the dubious internal legitimacy of the PAS government, Brussels immediately warned that Moldova will not become a member of the EU under the current mandate of the European Commission, i.e. until 2029. In fact, this position is not particularly related to the imperfection of the legislation and local political practices that are subjected to long screening. The vast majority of areas have been harmonized much earlier, and screening and adoption of laws does not take five or more years. At the same time, it is pointless to set deadlines for justice reforms, since they only determine how many times the notorious reforms will fail, regardless of the executors. Brussels will willingly turn a blind eye to the disaster in the judicial system, the deficit of energy independence and even, if necessary, to the uncertainty of the situation with Transnistria, where local legislation is in force, not to mention the presence of Russian and its own security forces, if a principled decision is taken to annex Moldova. The issue of accession to the European Union has been and remains geopolitical and, in a sense, institutional. Both factors depend solely on the intentions of the bureaucracy in Brussels. It is difficult to imagine the EU’s ability to accept a significant number of new members without a certain reform of the governing bodies and the model of country representation, as well as normalization of migration legislation and practices. The key role in this will be played by global developments. And we clearly do not fit into trends that we can hardly influence. The agenda is being radically transformed in and around Ukraine: Volodymyr Zelensky admits the failure of mobilization, the deteriorating situation on the front and hints at a readiness for territorial compromises with Russia. The so-called “peace plan” of Keith Kellogg, whom Donald Trump sees as a special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, which has appeared in the public domain, is also based on such a message. The document envisages the de facto transfer to Moscow of the captured territories along the line of contact and the postponement of Kyiv’s membership in NATO. In their turn, the Russians will insist on the federalization of Ukraine and obstruct its Euro-Atlantic integration in every possible way. Events are taking place in Georgia that resemble in their technological content the coups of the early 2000s, but at the same time look extremely unexpected. Although not unprecedented - the Ukrainian disaster also began with Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union. Georgian Dream announced the suspension of negotiations on accession to the European Union, even if no one recalls that the prime minister’s rejoinder was a response to Brussels’ initial decision to freeze. This sparked days of protests in Tbilisi and other major cities. If Georgia’s ruling party holds on to power and is able to appoint its president in parliament, we can talk about a unique case of a post-Soviet state building relations with the EU from the standpoint of a sovereign and pragmatic policy. The expected changes in Ukraine and Georgia may result in the loss and bankruptcy of the PAS regime in Moldova, which in fact has no intrinsic value for the EU and NATO. Of course, we are moderately useful to Brussels as a “cog” in the pro-Western security construct and as a factor of deterrence against Russia, but the outlet is fully formed only in conjunction with Ukraine and Georgia in the form of final deconstruction of the Russian (Soviet) empire’s legacy. Without eliminating the Russian presence and drawing functional Ukraine and Georgia into the Western orbit, Moldova, even taking into account the Transnistrian issue, where the West is focused on limiting the Kremlin’s potential, risks not fitting into the logic of confrontation, on the contrary, becoming part of a deal for a temporary normalization of relations between Moscow and the Euro-Atlantic community. Such an arrangement automatically deprives the PAS regime of any meaning and pushes it out of power.