“Gas Start” of Parliamentary Elections in Moldova

Christian RUSSU

As if on cue, the opposition switched on the mode of criticizing the ruling party, foreshadowing the imminent start of the parliamentary campaign. However, the scenario of the upcoming “act of democracy” seems to have already been approved in the interests of PAS

Last week was marked by unprecedented activity of the ruling party and government structures. Entering the energy crisis this time did not look like a tailspin at all. Chisinau’s anti-Russian rhetoric was rather common, without the traditional hysteria, which in such cases speaks of confusion and the desire to receive financial support from Brussels. The dismissals of the energy minister and the head of Energocom happened so quickly that they took most oppositionists and journalists by surprise. Victor Parlicov had no time to be attacked, and Dorin Recean himself had already taken over his work. Although in the first days, many representatives of the right-wing political camp defended the minister who had returned from St. Petersburg, to which the Prime Minister only shrugged his shoulders insolently. After all, they themselves demanded to be tougher on offending officials. Here you go - eat it! Having woken up, the opposition rushed to criticize the authorities, and for good reason. This includes the very uncertainty with gas and electricity supplies, as well as the acute issue of compensation. Ion Ceban, the capital’s mayor, was one of the first to hurl belated reproaches, demanding the convening of the Supreme Security Council, not another trip to Brussels. The Together bloc, which has recovered from its post-electoral moping, demanded Recean’s resignation because of the “attack” on its colleague Sergiu Tofilat. Then another scandal was caused by Ceban, who called the court press “alcoholics and sycophants”. He was followed by the leader of the Civic Congress Mark Tkaciuc and many others. The Socialists stand out in this arrangement, who, one could say, guessed the arrival of the big wave and pushed through a vote of no confidence in the government in advance. However, their initiative does not find support among their colleagues in the opposition, and also threatens to turn into a public flogging in Parliament, where Dorin Recean is going to speak. Maya Sandu, on the other hand, continues to demonstrate her exclusive role as a communicator of Moldova’s political elite in Brussels and a key to European financial funds. Without the latter, the country’s budget will soon collapse with all the consequences for the ruling party. The government’s composure in making high-profile personnel decisions suggests the existence of a prearranged scenario, which has a whole set of tasks. The first and the main one is to achieve an acceptable result of the PAS in the parliamentary elections. And for this purpose, among other things, it is necessary to successfully pass the suddenly urgent crisis in the energy sector. The retention of Vadim Ceban, acting head of Moldovagaz, convenient for Gazprom, together with the expulsion of Sergiu Tofilat, who irritates the Russian corporation, is a bright step towards Moscow. The formation of a non-toxic Moldovagaz board and quite businesslike relations with Gazprom cannot be ruled out. The synchronization of the organizational arrangements for the declaration of the state of emergency between the authorities in Chisinau and the administration on the left bank is also suggestive. Despite the existence of mutual claims and reproaches, there is a noticeable harmonization of many activities on both banks. For example, the decree of the regional leader Vadim Krasnoselsky, after its publication on 9 December, was supplemented the next day with a wording on the possibility of exporting electricity if there is a gas supply. In other words, the Transnistrian “authorities” initially set themselves up for a complete absence of gas supplies and an autonomous mode of operation of their energy system, but after a request from the capital, they quickly amended it. This episode already proves that behind all the latest conciliatory rhetoric of Chisinau (the same promises of help and support to our citizens across the Dniester) there is nothing substantial. It is not Tiraspol that actually needs help and support, but Chisinau, but the latter actively exploits this issue in the media space with a clear understanding of its goals. In case of a successful coping the new energy crisis - and as we can see, there are reasons to believe so - on 1 January, Dorin Recean will be able to personally show an example of “effective management” and give the ruling party the necessary electoral impetus. This can be presented both as a response to the long-overdue public demand to get rid of the corrupt Andrei Spinu and his schemes, and as the ability of PAS to respond flexibly to changes in voters’ preferences. Recently, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain a sufficient level of popular support through the European integration. The confessions of Brussels officials that after 2030 Moldova will reach 2031 without any promises force the authorities to look for new opportunities to strengthen the image. The issue of reintegration has long been in the background, including because of a lack of understanding of how to use it for own purposes. Now everything fell into places. At least if the energy crisis is overcome, Chisinau will be able to loudly declare another success in the process of the country’s reunification. And there is practically nothing to be done in this direction. It can even be assumed that in the coming months not only a question of maintaining the current tariffs for electricity, but also a possible reduction of tariffs for gas will be considered. This provides the ruling party with an opportunity to get involved in the parliamentary campaign in advance, without waiting for the legal calendar, or even to change the latter. Snap elections, which are called for by many opposition political forces, may be quite appropriate for PAS and its potential coalition partners. Another factor in favor of accelerating electoral processes in Moldova is the past elections across the Prut. For Brussels, after the unpleasant “Georgescu mishap”, it would be crucial for it to prove the existence of stable control on the easternmost fringes of its sphere of influence. Our political leadership realizes its value to the European bureaucracy and, to all appearances, intends to take full advantage of the appeared window of opportunity. But the fragmented opposition in Moldova risks to be again on the margins of the ongoing processes, even if there is sufficient public demand.