Anton ŠVEC
Protest actions in the country - by political parties and movements, trade unions and farmers’ associations - are only met with the mundane indifference of the PAS regime
Moldova is turning into a country in which protest is becoming a form of expression of position without its core meaning - as a method of political struggle, achieving political change or at least influencing the actions of the government. Recently, the Socialists and Communists went on strike, dissatisfied with fraudulent vote counting in the referendum and presidential elections. Characteristically, these parties, which form a single faction in parliament and have a direct historical relationship, rallied separately and even with different slogans. This can be explained both by PCRM’s quite rational resentment towards Igor Dodon, who actually saved the PAS regime with his call to boycott the referendum, and by the fact that both parties did not expect any “output” from the rallies.
Representatives of the Victory bloc regularly take to the streets. Usually, they accompany court hearings, by which the PAS regime pressurizes Ilan Sor’s appointees and him personally. The fugitive oligarch and politician already has a verdict on his arrest in absentia with a sentence of 15 years, but the struggle has not heated up. On the contrary, Ilan Sor continues to finance the population in the conditionally mandated regions - residents of Gagauzia, Orhei and Taraclia will receive 1,000 lei each month as compensation for utility bills, which will objectively reduce the protest mood in some parts of the country.
Teachers’ protests will continue this week, demanding a 35% increase in average salaries. The existing salary increases are lagging behind inflation and, in fact, teachers today have incomes lower than in 2020. Nevertheless, members of the government and parliament have already made it clear that there are no budgetary funds to meet the stated demands. And even if the money appears, it will go to anyone - deputies, judges, ministers, police officers, but not to education workers.
The sluggish protest movement of the Farmers’ Power Association, which insists on a multiple increase in support for agriculture, including a fair distribution of resources provided by the European Union, continues. But in this area, the government has simply abused the opinion of the agrarians - the criticized minister Vladimir Bolea has been promoted to the highly resourced portfolio of Minister of Infrastructure, and his place has been taken by Ludmila Catlabuga - the appointee of Prime Minister Dorin Recean.
Meanwhile, the international aid funds in demand continue to be distributed mainly to farmers close to the regime. The notorious diesel fuel from Romania has not been fully utilized, and the government does not take any measures to protect the interests of producers and the domestic market. Even the regular communication, which, despite all the difficulties and mutual offences, Vladimir Bolea used to have with the agrarians, has now been suspended.
However, the regime, which usurped power against the opinion of society and is supported by the West, is rather indifferent to any form of social discontent. Maia Sandu does not react or comment on sensitive internal Moldovan issues, being completely enthralled with the country’s foreign relations. The government somehow follows sociology and responds at the level of a spokesman to individual questions, but in general it also adheres to the principle of “the dog barks - the caravan moves on”.
To a large extent, this “insensibility”’ is due to the limited protest potential at the current stage. Absolutely all key opposition political projects fought against Vladimir Plahotniuc’s regime, with fairly solidary support from the West and East - Maia Sandu, Andrei Nastase, Igor Dodon and Renato Usatii marched in the same column. Despite Moldova’s relatively stable socio-economic situation and administrative resources, such protests became a serious factor and, in the end, were doomed to success. If the democrats had persisted longer, using police methods, ritual sacrifices would have had to be sought, but the outcome would have been similar.
Today the situation is completely different - the protests have no leader(s), there is no permanent support of political parties, there is a complete lack of external legitimacy. And the actions themselves are sporadic, no revolutionary movement has been formed, slogans imply only sectoral issues. Alexandr Stoianoglo is not in a hurry to “cash in” his political capital, which he acquired as a result of a solid presidential campaign. The former Prosecutor General seems to be quiet in his search for an optimal strategy for entering the parliamentary race and is losing momentum. The parliamentary elections in 2025 also affect the tactics of the Socialists, Communists, Renato Usatii’s Our Party, and Ion Ceban’s MAN party. Everybody fears radical steps and reactions of the authorities and are primarily interested in preserving (re-establishing) themselves as a parliamentary force, regardless of the quality of their role.
And certainly no one in the West will support the “crusade” against the system built by Maia Sandu, because PAS Moldova plays its anti-Russian geopolitical game with maximum dedication, including the renunciation of sovereignty.
With the lack of coordination, common goals and slogans (the whole society cannot unite around important, but still narrow corporate interests of financial well-being of teachers or saving the agricultural industry), the prospects of such protests are maximally limited. They cannot influence both the composition of power and its course and individual decisions
A clear indication that the regime is not afraid of the street was the recent purely formal reshuffling of the government, with only Andrei Spinu dismissed. This, in fact, allowes this confidante of Maia Sandu to get involved in the campaign for the parliamentary elections.
Even artificial indrawal of the country into an energy crisis for political purposes and to demonstrate loyalty to Brussels will not be a full-fledged threat to the PAS regime’s rule. This topic will predictably be taken up by Igor Dodon, who is ideally suited to be a sparring partner for the current government, which always has the possibility of returning to the criminal cases against him and his family. The protests must have a real leader not seduced by the regime. Or the people will have to take over, which seems highly unlikely, even under the economic and energy crisis scenarios.