Moldova in 2025: From Domestic Problems to “Black Swans”

Sergiu CEBAN

In the coming year, Moldova will potentially face an even wider range of various problems and threats, both from outside and inside the country

The eventful 2024 is finally over. The next twelve months will be no less exciting. Judging by the dashing pace of world events, humanity is entering another long period of fundamental transformations. They will inevitably be accompanied by escalating conflicts, economic upheavals, pandemics and new social experiments. To what extent Moldova will be able to stay afloat in the coming era of the global storm depends on our politicians, who should decide in whose favor they make decisions - in the interests of the country or transnational groups. If we talk about the coming year, the situation in Moldova, to put it simply, will be shaped by a set of external and internal factors. Alas, due to our geographical location, resource, economic, social potential, we are in a very unstable position, subject to the constant influence of various circumstances and stressors, which makes the modern Moldovan statehood rather fragile. The external contour will be formed on the changes in the international environment that will occur after Donald Trump takes office. With the arrival of the new American president, Washington’s attitude towards certain foreign policy areas is expected to be revised. Among them is Europe, which is largely governed by leaders close to the globalist camp opposing Trump. If under the influence of the White House the conservative trend in European countries strengthens and right-wing populists continue to come to power, the chances of the Party of Action and Solidarity to hold on to its positions in Moldova will begin to rapidly decline. The prospects of our European integration also depend on how Europe will be shaped after 2025. Now this process is in a “stand by” mode. The fact is that full-fledged negotiations can begin only after the parliamentary elections, which will determine the internal political structure of the republic for the next four years. Or, on the contrary, the outcome of the vote will be a prologue to another protracted post-election crisis, which in 2019, for example, led to a total political reset of the country. The defining moment of 2025 will be what place Moldova will have in the dialogue between the United States and Russia. There are many predictions about the future of US-Russian relations, but all of them are very ambiguous. The reason for this is the hard-bitten and unpredictable nature of the elected American leader, who is capable of many things, if not everything. It is important for us to understand whether the weak and poorly protected post-Soviet state bordering Ukraine will become a new point of tension between the West and Moscow or, on the contrary, a cooperative territory where local compromise solutions can be tested. Of course, Moldova remains prisoner of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as of the upcoming peace process. Many, tired of this protracted bloodshed, are sincerely hoping for Donald Trump, who once promised to stop the war in 24 hours. But the closer we get to the inauguration, the more ornate and less concrete the rhetoric of the new US president becomes. Perhaps Trump and his entourage are gradually coming to realize the underlying causes of the conflict, which are linked to the deep, difficult to overcome contradictions between the US and Russia. Therefore, we assess the chances of achieving a freeze and moving to a diplomatic phase with very cautious optimism. On the other hand, a failed attempt, followed by a severe escalation, looks much more plausible. The internal situation will be impacted by the main political event of 2025 - parliamentary elections. In the first half of the year, as in the previous two years, Moldova will continue to be in a continuous electoral campaign, which makes the entire political landscape mobile. At the same time, it will naturally intensify external interventions aimed at shaping the electoral preferences of the voters. Like last year, the main party interested in changing the political regime in Moldova is Russia. It is using considerable forces and resources to weaken Maia Sandu and PAS, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to embed forces loyal to itself into our state system. I think that Moscow realizes that in the current internal political situation, the ruling party has all the necessary levers in its hands to achieve, even by non-democratic methods, the necessary number of votes and to get an obedient partner for the future coalition into the parliament. However, it seems that the Kremlin has learnt lessons from the 2024 campaign, so we can expect much more decisive attempts at influence. The beginning of the year and the energy crisis that broke out on both banks of the Dniester is a convincing confirmation that the “struggle for Moldova” is taking on completely different features and that there are no longer any restrictions on the use of certain instruments. Most likely, in 2025 Russia may pay even more attention to Transnistria and Gagauzia, which continue to be the strongholds of Russian influence in Moldova. Speaking of autonomy, it is worth noting how separatist sentiments and centrifugal aspirations of Comrat are growing with the aim of increasing the legal standing of this region. The Kremlin’s future electoral tactics will be adjusted based on how exactly the central authorities will counteract these claims. The scenario of energy shortages in the Transnistrian region at the height of the cold season is also far from accidental. It is hardly connected only with provoking a sharp increase in tariffs on the right bank of the Dniester as a pretext for further stirring up social and political discontent. In addition, our authorities are testing the crisis situation in this way, finding out at the same time to what extent Chisinau is really ready to take on the Transnistrian burden. After all, if we believe the long-standing accusations against the Russian Federation, it is the latter that maintains an unconstitutional regime on the left bank and thus hinders peaceful reintegration. In the course of the year, the Transnistrian issue will make itself felt many times again, primarily, as we believe, to induce Chisinau to formulate a clear vision of the status and prospects for the region. But this, in turn, is fraught with severe division of society on the eve of the decisive parliamentary elections. Moldova should be especially wary of the so-called “black swans”. Against the backdrop of international and regional uncertainty, they have lately often made undeclared “raids” on politically unstable countries. A vivid example of this is the same energy crisis, which, despite the considerable amount of time, literally popped up in December. Both internal and external environment can easily generate such unexpected case in advance. But the main thing is that these unforeseen cataclysms will lead to an uncontrolled by the authorities adjustment of the socio-political agenda and, as a consequence, changes in future electoral arrangements.