Expert: Chisinau Has No Plan to Handle the Crisis in Transnistria

The authorities do not take decisive actions amid the difficult situation in the Transnistrian region, shifting the responsibility for solving the problem to Russia. In the long run, this may cause great damage to the country’s reintegration policy

Sergiu CEBAN, RTA: For almost a week now, Moldova has been experiencing the first waves of the impending energy storm. We have not yet passed the peak of the crisis, and it is bound to affect not only the parliamentary election campaign, but also other more fundamental issues for our country. Let us not dive into the long-known financial and energy nuances on both banks of the Dniester. Let us only say that it seems that once again we are approaching a turning point. To begin with, let us share our observations of what is happening in social networks and comments on news about the situation on the left bank. To our surprise, there is almost no “proletarian solidarity”, which is expressed by the government in the hold-on-we-are-with-you style. The long-standing policy of low tariffs in Transnistria, unfortunately, has only irritated the inhabitants of right-bank Moldova. Therefore, in the current circumstances we do not see unity before the common misfortune of the country’s inhabitants, but on the contrary - comments with the general message of “serves you right”. Therefore, the question of whether the energy shock has brought the banks of the Dniester closer together is unequivocally answered - no. The right bank has so far been much less affected by any power drops or shortages. However, tensions are still rising amid daily reports about the purchase of the necessary megawatts. The absence of a long-term contract keeps the country, one could say, on the edge of the abyss. After all, the slightest loss of capacity in Romania or Ukraine will instantly lead to the need for rolling blackouts to reduce the load. In this sense, the Transnistrian left bank has already felt all the “charm” of gas and electricity shortages. In addition to the cessation of centralized heating in the cities, as well as the disconnection of private households from gas supply, the region has been experiencing rolling blackouts for several days. There are also reports that, given the level of consumption of the existing stockpiles, the MoldGRES will have enough coal only until the end of January, not for 50 days as previously announced. In the event of a shutdown of this energy hub, problems could arise throughout the macro-region. Despite Moscow’s attempts to deal a targeted blow to the political positions of the current regime in the run-up to the parliamentary elections, the Transnistrian region has so far borne the brunt of the crisis. At the same time, there was a noticeable revival of the topic of settling the status of Transnistria. Whether this was the Kremlin’s main intention or an unforeseen side effect remains to be seen. So far, no one in the Russian capital or in the West has voiced any official assessments in this regard. Nevertheless, the European media is already trying to discern in Russia’s actions a deliberate pressure on Moldova in order to cause an even deeper confrontation between Chisinau and Tiraspol, and to stir up the energy crisis. Many experts believe that the right bank has a choice: either to show real readiness to help and assume additional expenses for the maintenance of the region, or once again to recognize that the left bank should remain under the protectorate of the Russian Federation, and its inhabitants can rely only on Russian financial and energy assistance. So far, judging by the statements of our responsible officials and parliamentarians, it seems that Transnistria is recognized as a beholden territory of Russia, which it should supply with energy resources. At the same time, Chisinau is only patting Tiraspol on the shoulder in a partner-like manner and promising to be always ready, but supporting it not with deeds, but with “comforting words”. Admittedly, we thought that the policy of reintegration and rapprochement of the two banks of the Dniester should look, to put it mildly, different. For example, as decisive actions in the interests of ensuring the territorial integrity of the country, but not vice versa. For the time being, they try to convince us that the authorities are doing something and have not let the events take their course, only with reports that allegedly a few weeks ago Tiraspol was offered a series of anti-crisis solutions such as purchasing gas on regional markets, in Bulgaria and then in Romania. But the Transnistrian administration refuses, mainly for price reasons. We don’t know who this is aimed at: apparently, at people with bad memory who can’t surf the web. For some reason, we are sure that the left bank also considered the worst scenarios, including the possibility of buying gas reserves at least for the winter. But we can recall the experience of the same company NordGaz Furnizare, which planned to deliver cheaper energy resources to Gagauz consumers in 2023, but eventually lost its license for this reason. It seems that Tiraspol would hardly be able to make such a deal on its own. By the way, Chisinau itself missed good prices last spring, and to allow someone in Transnistria to operate on international markets is a bit far-fetched. After all, it is not coincidence that our government approved in September a fiscal monopoly until the end of 2025 for Energocom and the state enterprise Moldelectrica on the electricity market. Obviously, this was also done to prevent the Transnistrian administration from entering the regional energy markets. It is also weird that in Tiraspol’s attempts to accuse Chisinau of unwillingness to negotiate with Moscow, which Chisinau itself accuses of failing to fulfil its contractual obligations, no one thinks of publicly suggesting to the left bank administration to negotiate with the Russians. It seems that our authorities don’t care how and what kind of gas gets to the region. But, apparently, someone in our country is seriously afraid of direct legally formalized gas agreements between Moscow and Tiraspol with the political blessing of Chisinau. And it makes sense to remind that the current contract between Gazprom and Moldovagaz expires next year. The probability of its prolongation is rapidly tending to zero. Consequently, Moscow is probably already wondering how and on the what basis supplies will be conducted in 2026. While the Russians are threatening early termination and lawsuits, our government is considering the possibility of nationalizing Moldovagaz and filing counterclaims. One way or another, the current restriction of gas supplies is just a precursor to a much more serious crisis if a solution is not found in advance. In fact, these whole intricacies with both banks plunging into a hopeless crisis first of all denounce Chisinau, exposing a shameful fact: neither the authorities nor the opposition have any urgent force-majeure solutions or a clearly understood plan for the Transnistrian problem. Although our state has been in the zone of the heaviest military and political turbulence for three years and, in theory, should be ready for any sharp geopolitical turn. But in fact, everything remains the same as before. Perhaps this is precisely the fixation that Moscow has been seeking as it prepares for the forthcoming negotiations with the new White House administration. We will not rant about how Chisinau’s attitude actually looks from the outside, especially when our politicians almost insist that the Russian Federation should resume supplying free gas to Transnistria, thus supporting its status and its political goals. But such calls and the official position of the authorities may be perceived in Western capitals as a de facto rejection of claims and accusations of Russia in illegal support of the unconstitutional regime. And at the same time as a recognition that a settlement of the conflict is possible only if the principled conditions of Tiraspol and Moscow are taken into account.