Is Chisinau Wary of Ukraine’s Aid?

Sergiu CEBAN

There is something that makes our authorities stay away from Kyiv in the situation of energy crisis and solve crucial issues without its involvement

The unfolding energy crisis has brought to the forefront a variety of topics, which in the current moment begin to sound completely different. Something similar, for example, can be said about Moldovan-Ukrainian relations. Although Chisinau demonstrates sincere solidarity in every possible way, one cannot escape the feeling that our authorities are still trying to “keep their distance” and not to get dangerously close to Kyiv unless insuperable circumstances demand it. In fact, Ukraine is also distancing itself: for example, it has not sent a new ambassador to Chisinau for a year now. The previously nominated former head of the National Security and Defense Council, Oleksiy Danilov, seems to have reconsidered his personal plans and is no longer willing to go to hospitable Moldova. The current Ukrainian Foreign Ministry representative for the Transnistrian settlement, Paun Rohovei, is now being considered for the post of embassy head. The situation with personnel decisions is rather weird. Traditionally, states try to maintain the closest relations directly with their neighbors. It is therefore still a great mystery as to what is behind such a long “vacancy” in the ambassador’s post. But there is definitely no intent or intrigue on the part of our leadership in this situation. Perhaps the reason for this is the large-scale and protracted staff rotation in the Ukrainian diplomatic corps. If we talk about the content of bilateral relations, in addition to mutually beneficial cooperation, a significant number of problems have accumulated there. Some of them require the involvement of the top government. The prudence that our high-ranking officials show towards contacts with their counterparts in Kyiv suggests a disappointing conclusion. Had the Ukrainian ambassador been in Chisinau a few months ago, the current energy crisis could have been prevented or at least mitigated. Recall that just back in December, representatives of the Moldovan government said that it was ethically unjustified to address Ukraine about the rapidly approaching “energy tsunami”. Apparently, having finally realized the weakness of such a position, last week Dorin Recean for the first time voiced something concrete about Kyiv’s assistance. Among other things, he said that the authorities would not object to Ukrainian support aimed at preventing catastrophic scenarios in the Transnistrian region. It later became clear that these statements preceded a telephone conversation between Maia Sandu and Volodymyr Zelensky. Apart from the traditional phrases “we agreed to look for solutions”, the Ukrainian leader put forward a concrete offer: to supply coal to the MoldGRES in exchange for electricity generation for Ukraine’s needs. Just yesterday, Zelensky again spoke about his offer, to which, according to him, the Transnistrian administration had not yet responded. We can draw an additional conclusion that Kyiv is keenly interested in resuming full operation of the power plant, since the president is making public reminders. Obviously, Tiraspol wants to restore the lost status quo with Russian gas supplies and is unlikely to accept Ukraine’s help. And even if it did, MoldGRES, which is under the control of Russia’s Inter RAO, would hardly agree to generate additional megawatts to cover the electricity deficit in the Odesa oblast. At first glance, this is the end of the story. But such an outcome could further tighten the knot of the energy crisis. For example, if Moscow decides to supply gas by reverse method, but Kyiv puts forward preconditions before agreeing to the new format of supplying the left bank of the Dniester. Ukraine’s involvement in this whole gas case is not only due to subjective interest. They realize that if Moldova falls politically under the Russian onslaught, it is unlikely that they will be able to count on the same level of loyalty. Instead of PAS, anyone can come to power: openly pro-Russian forces, or even pro-Europeans, but with a neutral and conservative programme fitting into the “pro-Trump” trend that is gaining speed. Today’s Moldova for Ukraine is not the biggest or most influential partner, but a very popular buffer zone with military transport potential. In addition, our country provides its neighbor with a relatively reliable rear, helps to dampen logistical difficulties that periodically arise due to hostilities, and allows Kyiv to use alternative land corridors for transit, including Ukrainian agricultural products. Therefore, if Moldova ends up under Russia’s influence after the parliamentary elections, even if only partially, and the West loses its monopoly political position, this will seriously affect Kyiv’s national and regional interests. This forces it to act proactively and try to lend a hand to the current leadership of the country. Ukraine has tense relations with its neighbors. The Kremlin has already succeeded in creating a geopolitical barrier on the country’s western borders, as exemplified by the attitude of Hungary and Slovakia, which are sabotaging the common policy of the European Union and the West with regard to support for Ukraine. Sunday’s events in Bucharest suggest that Romania is also on the way, where the main presidential candidate has publicly spoken of neutrality and the inexpediency of building NATO military bases. Kyiv, of course, has long understood the strategic intentions of the Russian Federation and is trying to counter them to the best as far as its neighbors are concerned. For instance, with Poland, the Ukrainian authorities made the difficult decision to allow the exhumation of the victims of the Volhynia tragedy. Moldova is supported by emergency electricity supplies and recent “coal initiatives”. And this is not only about the humanitarian component, but also about a long-term political investment. If adopted, it could increase Kyiv’s influence both on the left-bank region itself and on the process of determining the final parameters of conflict resolution. In our opinion, Kyiv’s energy proposal will have the opposite effect and will accelerate the Kremlin’s decision to resume gas supplies to Transnistria. Although, most likely, Moscow wanted to stir the situation in Moldova to the necessary condition, but will be forced to go ahead in order not to let the Ukrainians intercept the initiative and not to strengthen their positions at the expense of potential substitution of Russian energy resources. Chisinau is certainly dissatisfied with the possible strengthening of Kyiv, even if the country can significantly approach the long-awaited reintegration in tandem with Ukraine. But, apparently, something forces our authorities to keep a certain safe distance from Kyiv and not to involve it in issues crucial for the state, which is why, in fact, they do not want to ask Ukraine for anything.