What Does the Start of the Finnish OSCE Chairpersonship Promise?

Anton ŠVEC

Finland is heading the OSCE this year, promising to work closely on the Transnistrian settlement. But the current state of affairs is such that it will be extremely difficult for it to make real progress alone.

We should point out right away that the minimum is required from Finland on the Transnistrian track. All the previous annual OSCE chairpersonships have failed to achieve any positive results in relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, setting a very low bar of expectations. Malta’s chairpersonship last year can be considered completely futile. The situation in the Transnistrian conflict settlement has been on a negative trend for a long time. In 2024, things continued to deteriorate: the sides engaged in regular squabbles over sectoral issues and failed to agree on even a seemingly innocuous declaration of commitment to peace talks. Chisinau was concerned about the worsening situation of schools administered by the education ministry, including the increase in utility tariffs and the levying of fees on farmers in Dubasari district. Tiraspol was extremely dissatisfied with the unexpected imposition of export-import duties, the blockage of banking transactions and shipments of local industrial products. Both sides regularly accuse each other of human rights violations: at the end of the year, Tiraspol even handed out to the participants in the negotiation process a multi-page document listing the facts of oppression of Transnistrian residents by the central authorities. All this is taking place against the background of the fading dynamics of the meetings; for example, the chief negotiators met only three times in 2024. At the same time, the 5+2 format remains paralyzed, and the idea of organizing “top-level” meetings promoted by the left bank administration is not seriously considered. Against this background, Finland will be able to credit even the mere preservation of some channels of communication between the two banks of the Dniester in the coming year, as well as the avoidance of armed confrontation and serious provocations (such as the terrorist attacks, due to which Tiraspol continues to extend the so-called “yellow code” of terrorist threat). If it manages to make some minimal progress, for example, to alleviate some of the parties’ concerns, the deeds of the chairpersonship will be assessed neutrally or even positively. In this sense, Helsinki took an ambitious approach by appointing a new OSCE Special Representative for the Transnistrian conflict. Thomas Mayr-Harting, who had held this position for five years without any particular achievements, has been replaced by the German diplomat Thomas Lenk, who had previously been in charge of Moldova and Ukraine in the German Federal Foreign Ministry. Apparently, Tiraspol was satisfied with the changes: criticism of Harting has only been growing lately. And it is not surprising that Mr. Harting was received with a farewell visit only on the right bank, and on the left bank he either by his own reluctance or because of refusal never came. Finnish Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairperson for this year, Elina Valtonen, accompanied by Lenk, visited Moldova already on 9 January, symbolically confirming her country’s seriousness and interest in the Transnistrian issue. However, such an early visit eventually got lost due to the growing energy crisis. Obviously, the planned visit could not imply any ready-made solutions for the settlement of the conflict, let alone the resumption of gas supplies, which was expected by the general public. A little earlier Finland together with the other countries of the so-called North-Baltic Eight adopted a special statement in which Moscow was held responsible for the energy crisis. This pleased Chisinau very much, but was negatively perceived by some other participants in the negotiation process. The calls to buy gas at commercial prices on Western markets, which in many respects echoed the rhetoric of the central authorities, were predictably ignored in Transnistria. Instead, they convinced the Finnish minister that if the 5+2 format were functional and the parties trusted each other, they would be able to find ways to avoid the crisis in advance or deal with its most painful consequences in solidarity. Finland itself, apparently, has not yet decided on its position on the trajectory and formats of future negotiations. As Elina Valtonen said, the 5+2 format has been suspended and it will be very difficult to resume its work, but Helsinki itself is quite ready to participate in its activities and at the same time calls Chisinau and Tiraspol to engage in direct communication. The OSCE mission is probably already trying to organize a meeting between negotiators Oleg Serebrian and Vitaly Ignatiev, although the parties may see its agenda very differently. At the same time, while in the capital, Valtonen for some reason made a striking proposal to Moldova to consider NATO membership. It is clear that the bloc discipline (Finland joined the North Atlantic Alliance two years ago) implies its needs, but such a decision clearly does not fit into the framework of our country’s positioning as a neutral state and will certainly not help the Transnistrian settlement. Further promotion of this narrative will only provoke additional problems in the dialogue, which is already burdened by a long-term deficit of agreements and “strong” solutions, as well as by the authorities’ European integration plans. As a result, the first visit of Finnish diplomacy can hardly be considered a success. As a result, we have a lack of concrete initiatives of the minister during her voyage to Moldova, her contradictory statements, not quite successful humor at one of the press conferences when she ostensibly couldn’t remember the name of the Transnistrian leader. However, Finland has a whole year ahead to try to bridge the gap between Chisinau and Tiraspol. It can adopt a conservative and cautious tactic, helping to resolve minor issues on the current agenda and revitalize the existing negotiating platforms. There is another way - to believe in the idea of “an open window of opportunity” and try to wait for the Transnistrian issue to be integrated into a broader deal between Russia and the West. However, in such a case there is a great risk of achieving nothing, and if such a scenario unfolds, Helsinki’s role in this process will, of course, be purely decorative.