Should We Expect Clarity on Ukraine?

Sergiu CEBAN

Trump’s desire for quick results to freeze the conflict by pressuring Russia and Ukraine may be met with active resistance from both warring sides

The Russian-Ukrainian confrontation remains a key factor in our regional space. Since Moldova’s geopolitical fate directly depends on its further development, we continue to closely follow both the developments in the neighboring country and the rapidly changing foreign policy environment. The current events on the front, as well as the whole year 2024, are unfavorable for Ukraine. Russian troops are slowly but surely seizing strategic defense lines like the settlement of Velyka Novosilka. After it, there are practically no serious fortifications in the steppe areas from the western border of the Donetsk oblast to the city of Dnieper. The Russian army is attacking several directions, but the pace of advance is relatively slow, with no deep breakthroughs into Ukrainian territory. For this reason, its troops have never found themselves in a serious operational and tactical crisis, which allows Kyiv to demonstrate control over the situation. Nevertheless, military experts do not rule out that under the current circumstances a crumbling of the front could still occur. There are indications that Moscow’s plans include attempts to develop an offensive in the flatlands of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as in the east of Dnipropetrovsk oblast. One of the main reasons for the difficult situation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is the growing numerical advantage of the Russian forces amid failed mobilization in Ukraine. As a result, the rate of replenishment of Ukrainian combat formations is minimal and does not even make it possible to replace losses. Moreover, a significant part of the new arrivals is barely trained and poorly motivated, which is why they often leave their positions and prefer the absence without official leave. Thus, it is clear why the new White House administration wants to stop the war as soon as possible and focus on its priorities. Among Donald Trump’s first decisions was the announcement of a large-scale audit of spending on international aid, including Ukraine. As a direct consequence of the resources’ streamlining, an executive order temporarily froze funding for all US programmes abroad for 90 days. It is possible that in this way Washington is testing the possibility of transferring military and financial aid to Ukraine onto the shoulders of European countries. However, the European Union is no longer consentient with regard to the Ukrainian-Russian war and, conventionally speaking, has split into two blocs. Britain, Germany and France consider it necessary to continue fighting and supporting Kyiv in the same or even increased volumes. In order to ensure that Ukraine and, of course, itself a strong position in future negotiations, this group of states is showing its willingness and ability to replace the United States if necessary, as well as to maintain geopolitical boundaries with the help of “peacekeeping projects” along the entire line of contact. The alternative camp includes such countries as Hungary, Slovakia and Italy, which want a cessation of hostilities and are in favor of finding compromises with Moscow, mainly at the expense of Kyiv’s concessions. At the same time, they do not offer any specific settlement models, waiting for the official presentation of the American plan. Despite his loud statements during the election race, Donald Trump is in no hurry to make any drastic steps. Nevertheless, every week the White House speaks more and more loudly about its intention to bring the hot phase of the war to a halt and help conclude a long-term peace agreement. Immediately after taking office, Trump instructed the special envoy for Ukraine and Russia to find a solution to the protracted conflict within the next 100 days. At the same time, Trump claimed that he had already even spoken on the phone with Vladimir Putin on the issue of ending the war in Ukraine. Moscow evaded comments on this matter, but in general made it clear that contacts at various levels are ongoing and with high activity. So, even though the United States and Russia are not yet publicizing the details of their communication, the start of the behind-the-scenes negotiation process is already evident. As the U.S. administration unfolds its diplomatic efforts, the Kremlin, in turn, is adopting a more cautious tactic, hoping to achieve not a ceasefire, but a credible all-encompassing agreement, the so-called ‘Yalta-2’. This, perhaps, is the main divergence in the positions of Moscow and Washington, which expects only a quick freezing of the conflict. Russia, on the other hand, sees the temporary suspension of hostilities as another trap, depriving it of the opportunity to agree on such strategic issues as European security, NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe, the delimitation of spheres of influence, etc. Meanwhile, the Americans are moving ahead with their plan, and this week promises to be a crucial one in terms of determining Washington and its allies’ final stance on the war. A large US delegation will arrive in Europe in the coming days, including Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Special Envoy Keith Kellogg. The annual Munich conference is expected to act as a contact platform, including for a meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky. With U.S.-Russian negotiations almost officially declared confidential, Kyiv faces a very difficult task: to formulate a position that does not run counter to the Trump administration’s strategic vision. Zelensky and his entourage are obviously not enthusiastic about the plans to freeze the war, but are forced to gradually soften their rhetoric, for example on negotiations with the Russian leadership, in order to synchronize with the political goal-setting of their overseas partners. Meanwhile, even despite repeated signals from the White House, Zelensky still insists on Ukraine’s admission to NATO or the provision of reliable security guarantees from the United States. If we do not attach much importance to the Ukrainian leader’s public requests on this topic, the minimum conditions from which Kyiv will presumably proceed are keeping Ukraine within the sphere of geopolitical influence of the West, preserving its military potential and the current domestic political configuration with maximum isolation of Moscow within the territories it occupies. The US is likely to act within its logic, which is dictated by post-election inertia, among other things. For Trump, amid successful pressure on Canada, Mexico and Colombia, as well as the completion of another phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is important to look like a winner in the eyes of the electorate. Therefore, judging even by the 100-day deadline, the White House is not in tune for long diplomacy and careful resolving the tangle of problems in relations with Moscow. Instead, it is planned to organize an accelerated freeze and trilateral ceasefire talks with a pompous media presentation. Incredible as it may seem, this line of Washington’s behavior and the desire to achieve quick results by putting pressure on Russia and Ukraine, which will only increase as Trump’s 100-day deadline expires, may be met with active resistance from both warring parties. As a result, the U.S. will face a difficult choice: either increase support for Ukraine and take the “Biden war” upon itself, or restore relations with Moscow by negotiating the whole package of strategic issues, which will inevitably lead to the formation of a new geopolitical reality in the post-Soviet space. It is easy to guess how this or that scenario will turn out for Moldova. The only question is how ready we are to accept the possible challenge.