Political Consolidation Before Parliamentary Elections

Anton ŠVEC

The fall elections may initially bring three major forces to the parliament, representing, on average, the entire political spectrum of the country

Romania is facing perhaps the most intense political crisis since the country’s accession to the European Union due to the cancellation and postponement of the presidential election in May. The disqualification of alternative candidates, most notably Calin Georgescu, was necessary to preserve the country’s political system and maintain consensus on a number of strategic issues, including military and infrastructural commitments to the West. Significant transformations at the current stage could lead to excessive unpredictability and risks for NATO, the EU and the notorious “deep state”. In a sense, Romania was artificially removed from the trends through political-legal coercion (with questionable legality and contrary to the request of the voters) and, consequently, set back in its evolution. This is how the opportunity to adapt and take the most of the start of Donald Trump’s presidency was missed. Yesterday, Klaus Iohannis left the post of the head of the neighboring state, which he had occupied not quite legally for several months (although for the macro-region countries this setup is no longer a surprise). Against this background, protests and confrontations persist that bear the features of a constitutional crisis, when old parties with plummeting ratings cling to power through coalition collusions. Meanwhile, internal problems do not prevent neighbors over Prut from playing a unique role in Moldovan affairs - another “Romanian gambit” in Chisinau is currently in full swing. The MAN party leader, Ion Ceban, who regularly visits Bucharest and relies on the institutional and informational support of local social democrats, is expanding his influence as the parliamentary elections approach. The refusal to participate directly in the presidential race proved to be a justified decision. It allowed him to maintain its dominant centrist position and pragmatic relations with all external forces, including PAS sponsors, not to get defeatist baggage before the key electoral campaign and not to get unnecessarily involved in geopolitical disputes and the war of kompromat, keeping the material base of the capital in own hands. Today, Ion Ceban is seriously aiming to enter power on a national scale, but MAN rating has been stagnating since the beginning of the year, which required non-trivial maneuvers. The creation of the Alternativa bloc did just that, having nothing to do with ideology or values, but solving a number of related political problems. Firstly, Ceban urgently needed a rating donor to ensure electoral growth - in this sense, the involvement of Alexandr Stoianoglo, who accumulates protest votes, was a good move. The former prosecutor-general will theoretically benefit either, as he lacked the financial and time resources to organize an independent project, but now he is guaranteed to be in parliament. Secondly, the configuration of the bloc allows claiming to win centrist votes in full. In fact, it is possible to collect the sympathies of voters on the right flank from among pragmatic supporters of the European course, not belonging to the Unionists and dissatisfied with the excesses of the PAS regime. Hence the statements of the Chisinau primar in support of Moldova’s membership in the European Union, criticizing Russian aggression in Ukraine, and on the language issue. Other pro-European forces, such as former prime minister Vlad Filat, or even the European Social Democratic Party, may eventually support the bloc. Thirdly, the bloc’s organization addresses the applied tasks of the election campaign and subsequent administration of the country. Thus, Ion Chicu’s party will act as a donor of competent administrators with experience at the central level. Mark Tkaciuk will try on the most suitable role of a media killer, who will rhetorically destroy competitors from both flanks, as well as make promises of a general and unrealistic nature, the fulfilment of which he will not be able to influence due to the frankly minority character of the Civic Congress. Fourth, the new and, for some, unexpected members of Alternativa may become a kind of negotiators with other future parliamentary parties and their sponsors. Tkaciuk is obviously still in touch with the Communists and actively cooperates with Martin Sieg, who has his own cabinet in the government and direct influence on the activities of Dorin Recean and Maia Sandu. Through Chicu it is easy to hold contacts with the Socialists and Vladimir Plahotniuc, both in terms of political cooperation and access to resources. If necessary, Ceban can independently communicate with the PSRM, of which he is a member. It is not excluded that Igor Dodon, for whom Alexandr Stoianoglo, with his departure to Ion Ceban, has actually cleared the left flank, will follow a similar path of creating an electoral bloc. The former president may become the head of the formation consisting of socialists, communists and the party Heart of Moldova of Irina Vlah. This will make it possible to secure for both blocs the electoral potential of minority parties, which without the figures of Igor Dodon and Ion Ceban would hardly qualify for parliamentary seats, and to prevent the redistribution of mandates in PAS favor. Thus, as a result of the autumn elections, three major forces, covering on average the entire political spectrum of the country, may initially appear in the parliament. Because of this, PAS will already begin to radicalize, increasingly targeting the Unionist segment. At present, the Our Party prospects remain rather uncertain. Like four years ago, it will be difficult for Renato Usatii to project his personal rating on his party. If sociology does not give him significant hopes of overcoming the electoral threshold, Usatii will also try to join one of the blocs in order to guarantee his parliamentary immunity. Such cooperation could be of some interest to the Alternativa, provided that it has full control over the politician’s media activity. In any case, his role, measured either in a minimum number of independent mandates or in an insignificant place in the bloc, will be peripheral and will not affect the overall balance. In theory, Ion Ceban will hold all the cards at the end of the elections and this is the point of the Romanian gambit. It is difficult (though possible) to imagine a coalition between PAS and the Socialists at the central level because of the ideological contradictions between them and their sponsors, aggravated by mutual attacks in the spirit of the criminal prosecution of Igor Dodon’s brother and past bad experiences. Yet, Ceban will be able to choose his coalition partner in conditions where both will fight for his consent as a more natural partner. It is even possible that the Socialist Bloc or PAS will be offered the role of junior partners, although this will determine the specific distribution of votes. But in any case, the mayor of Chisinau will aspire to the position of prime minister, control of key ministries and parliamentary commissions. PAS needs to come up with something of its own urgently, because if the current trends persist, the chances of an acceptable coalition, and even less of winning a majority in future elections, are constantly decreasing. At this stage of historical development, PAS will not be allowed to lose power and go into opposition by its sponsors (and it is simply legally unsafe for many representatives of the regime involved in violations). If no breakthrough ideas emerge, Maia Sandu and her team will have to fulfil most of Alternativa’s demands or cancel the elections, as there is already a formal reason and a precedent.