A Peace Proposal for Moldova: Accept or Decline?

Sergiu CEBAN

Ending the war in Ukraine promises to be a complex and long process. Therefore, the growing need to display mutual “constructiveness” may spur the U.S. and Russia to project joint cooperation elsewhere  

Yesterday we recalled the outbreak of the conflict on the Dniester, which unfolded almost simultaneously with independence. It is clear that the causes of these tragic events had both internal and external origins and, in many ways, still weigh on the country to this day. So, the prospects for its territorial and civil integrity depend on the sum of compromises, including geopolitical ones. In recent days, experts and media have been discussing Volodymyr Zelensky’s scandalous visit to Washington. There is a variety of assessments and versions of whether everything happened deliberately or whether it was just a coincidence. But the fact remains that Kyiv has publicly disagreed with the terms of peace offered to it by the White House. And while the Ukrainian authorities in London, together with the leaders of Europe, are forming a coalition of resistance, the United States of America continues to signal its firm determination to end the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, albeit with significant concessions from Ukraine. Whether the notional “European alliance” will have enough forces and capabilities to further confront Moscow is rather a rhetorical question. Many of the London summit participants left it with a clear feeling that without the United States all these meetings have no real sense. Therefore, sooner or later, the Europeans will have to convince both themselves and the Ukrainians to engage in negotiations alongside the cessation of hostilities. Our authorities, having a known political background, expectedly solidarized with other European leaders in their support for Zelensky after the incident in the Oval Office. As a result, with a subtle stroke of Maia Sandu’s pen, Moldova was enrolled in the anti-Trump alliance of the “Sword and Ploughshare”. The USA hardly noticed Moldova’s principled choice, so it will have no immediate consequences. But in the medium term, the ruling regime’s inability to stop and keep its distance from big geopolitical games will probably play a cruel joke on it. By the way, just last week, foreign minister Mihai Popsoi said that “Moldova and the USA continue to maintain strong partnership relations” and that Chisinau will do everything possible to “raise awareness of the American partners about the realities in our country”. But over the past weekend, it turns out that the President’s Office has significantly changed the initial data for establishing cooperation, so we would still recommend our politicians and diplomats not to hurry up with official trips to the United States. Right now is a bad time to draw the attention of the United States, as this could lead to completely unpredictable ramifications. We do not have a clear understanding of the exact plan Washington was offering to the Ukrainian leadership. However, let us assume that conceptually it looked completely different from what was previously imagined in Kyiv and other European capitals. It is not the coincidence that high-ranking American officials regularly say “the attitude has changed”. The sharply changed approaches and attitudes can be applied to anything or anyone. Undoubtedly, a Ukrainian settlement will be a complex and long process. But the growing need between the White House and the Kremlin for an early manifestation of mutual “constructiveness” may prompt them to project joint geopolitical cooperation in any region of the world, especially where the counter-currents are least acute. And it would be good to remember the West’s past attempts to ease tensions with Moscow in the security sphere. The example is the Russian-European memorandum of 2010, signed in the German town of Meseberg. The Transnistrian issue was included in that document as a “pilot project”. That is, the parties were supposed to go from solving a “minor” conflict to general securitization problems. It cannot be ruled out that now the Americans and Russians would not want to test their diplomatic capabilities on Moldova to determine its strategic status, at the same time resolving the Transnistrian issue. Of course, we do not know the plans of the USA and the Russian Federation for Moldova, but our analytical and intellectual potential allows us to assume what basic principles a “peace proposal” for our republic may consist of. First and foremost is to change the status of Moldova as an arena of constant confrontation between major international players. The starting point concerns the achievement of geopolitical balance, mainly through an internal/external political course that would not be antagonistic to either the West or Russia. Given today’s realities, the U.S. does not need to increase its presence, but Moscow needs to regain its position. Consequently, it is likely that Chisinau will be offered to restore the size of the Russian embassy and lift restrictions against Russia in order to allow openly pro-Russian forces to participate in political life. This will inevitably be followed by the resumption of Russian media broadcasting, as well as the restoration of other forms of Russia’s “soft” influence. Further, the status of neutrality, both military and foreign policy. That is, refusal to cooperate with NATO and/or other military-political blocs, which sooner or later will start to form in case of an aggravation of the security crisis in Europe. Besides, we do not exclude that in our case Washington and Moscow will be ready to jointly guarantee the defense and territorial integrity of Moldova in the new geopolitical framework. And finally, the Transnistrian settlement, which can happen as quickly as possible given the increased diplomatic pace. And regardless of whatever word one may call the status of the region within Moldova, it will have to be accepted as it is, with all its structures, identity specificity and the right to special relations with Russia. The key issue is the status of the Russian language, which Chisinau will have to resolve. After all, it will entail not only the physical reintegration of the left bank, but also its inclusion in the political processes of the reunified country. These are only some common points that can form the basis of the political reassembly of our country. Of course, the above described will seem something absolutely fantastic and unfeasible, or even simply dangerous for the state and society, to those who are used to the current state of Moldova, which exists only in the categories of European integration. However, there will certainly be those to whom the potential US-Russian deal on Moldova will seem like a historic chance, opening new opportunities for the development of relations with various centers of influence.