Transatlantic Split: EU, NATO and the New Security Reality

Sergiu CEBAN

The crisis of the transatlantic solidarity triggered by the controversy between the US and the EU raises concerns about NATO’s future forcing European countries to think about self-defense

Yesterday marked three years since Moldova applied for membership in the European Union. During this time, our country has managed to make some headway on the path of rapprochement with the EU. On the other hand, the realities of today bring to the fore fundamental security issues, without which any economic integration is meaningless. The acute internal crisis between key Western allies (US and EU) has put Europe’s political elites in a state of semi-shock. They are gradually realizing that the EU will have to provide for its own defense. Therefore, summits of European leaders are organized almost on a weekly basis, although the results of these meetings with strained faces do not promise much in the way of prospects. The Pentagon chief’s unequivocal statement that the fifth article of the NATO charter will not work if one of the bloc’s members decides to deploy its national contingent abroad has stumped some European capitals. They thought they could count on the alliance’s patronage if they needed to provide urgent military assistance to their closest allies. We can recall the recent words of Emmanuel Macron, according to whom Putin may attack Moldova and even Romania if he is not stopped in Ukraine. Probably on the same occasion, before yesterday’s summit in London, acting Romanian President Ilie Bolojan visited Chisinau to discuss a few sensitive issues with Maia Sandu in private. In fact, if the US turns blind eye, which is really feared in Europe today, Moscow could conduct a series of operations that may seriously harm the EUэs interests, especially its enlargement policy. Perhaps the only one of the whole set of “frightening” measures that Brussels can still demonstrate as a tool to counter the Kremlin is to invest money in strengthening defense capabilities. In fact, this is why the President of the European Council, Antonio Costa, visited Chisinau yesterday - to pompously announce the allocation of another 60 million euros for the development of our military potential. Yet, it is “too little too late”. This is not about Moldova, but about the death of NATO itself, if not of transatlantic solidarity at least. At the beginning of his presidential career Macron once said that NATO was in a state of “brain death” and, as they call it, caused trouble. Not earlier than yesterday, the French president got candid again and spoke another truth: Europeans can no longer rely on the North Atlantic Alliance as before, as Trump’s position has weakened it. The actions of the new American administration have indeed put the fate of NATO in very serious doubt, if not in jeopardy. The notorious Elon Musk has several times voiced far-reaching criticisms of the alliance: either about the need for its radical restructuring or about the possibility of leaving the organization. Given Musk’s influence and status as one of Trump’s closest advisers, who is in charge of optimizing US government spending, his words should be taken seriously, which is apparently what most European politicians are doing. Formally, no serious steps have yet been taken by Washington in relation to the European NATO members. The whole story is developing more in the media and without much specificity. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Trump supporters do not like modern NATO, so sooner or later they will act decisively (if they have not already done in off-the-record conversations in the Oval Office). There are several reasons for this. The military bloc has become an anachronism, since it was created as a defense bloc at the height of the Cold War, in the context of two systems claiming world hegemony. The risks of that time were far from illusory, given the potential of the Soviet Union. However, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and then the USSR, NATO’s raison d'être became rather vague. It was only after the annexation of Crimea that the alliance doctrinally consolidated the old-new goal of deterring Russia. However, both the previous and especially the current U.S. administration consider China, with which the European members of NATO trade and cooperate quite well, to be its main geopolitical adversary. In other words, there is an obvious imbalance in the strategic goals of Washington and Brussels. In terms of budgetary contributions, the US covers about 70% of the alliance’s entire budget, which goes to confronting nominal enemy No. 1 - the Russian Federation. So, from the Republicans’ point of view, it is more logical to redirect these resources to the Pacific region and support of their allies in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia, i.e. where the existential threat to the United States is concentrated. Instead, out of inertia, U.S. securitized assets are concentrated on the European continent. Another important reason for Trump supporters’ skepticism towards NATO is that the military alliance has become another globalist project with very low efficiency and capabilities to really project the power and strength of the West. Throughout the war in Ukraine, Europe has never been able to restart its military industry and provide uninterrupted supplies of arms and ammunition to Kyiv. This is, in fact, the clearest indicator of the EU’s total inability to engage in defense policy, let alone participate in military operations to protect its interests in other parts of the world if, for example, the US demands it. Trump is unlikely to be able to simply dissolve NATO as USAID, nor will he be able to reassemble it into something new in a few years. It is also doubtful that the Europeans will be able to organize something adequate out of the remnants of the military bloc if the US leaves it. At the same time, the Americans will not leave Europe completely. We think that Washington may go the way of concluding alliance agreements with individual members of the alliance, which looks much more attractive in terms of manageability and efficiency. This would allow the U.S. to retain those military bases on the continent that it considers really necessary, and to redirect the freed resources to priority areas. The bottom line is that the US is rapidly withdrawing from the Ukrainian game, while the EU is increasingly aware of its strategic loneliness and growing risks amid weakening protection from its senior American partners. And European politicians will not be able to solve fundamental security issues immediately. It takes time, resources, and a common vision among member states. This is hardly achievable in the current split of transatlantic alliance. It is certainly important for us to understand what place Moldova will be given in the emerging restructuring of the pan-European and transatlantic security institutions. We strongly doubt that we have our own understanding and plan of action in these rapidly escalating events. It is possible, of course, to resist and deny the new reality, in which there will be less and less predictability and more and more challenges. But, as the example of Ukraine shows, in international politics one should not confuse persistence and perseverance with trite stubbornness.