Three Years of Fast-Track EU Integration: More Questions than Answers

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Sergiu CEBAN
The authorities call the last three years the time of Moldova’s “historic breakthrough” in the process of European integration. However, during this time, the country’s problems have only worsened, and geopolitical changes risk leaving us in limbo for a long time to come
Last week, the authorities celebrated three years since Moldova had applied for EU membership. On this occasion, the President of the European Council, Antonio Costa, visited us to confirm support for Moldova’s European path and to announce another aid package. A bit of hindsight: in 2022, Chisinau and Tbilisi followed the example of Kyiv, which asked Brussels to approve rapid accession amid the Russian invasion. The push towards the EU has been one of the most significant geopolitical processes in Eastern Europe over the past decade. Having obtained candidate status in June 2022, Moldova is on a path that requires profound political, economic and social transformations. And not only them – it requires to rethink its own place in the political geography of the post-Soviet space, as EU integration not only determines the country’s future, but also influences the balance of power in the region. Throughout its independence, Moldova, a former union republic, has been balancing between a pro-Russian and pro-European orientation, even after signing an Association Agreement with the EU in 2014. Despite major diplomatic moves towards the EU, corruption scandals, political instability and economic problems slowed down the rapprochement. The situation changed only in 2022, when the war in Ukraine created a completely different geopolitical reality, with fundamentally new needs and speed. Therefore, already on 23 June 2022 Moldova acquired candidate status, and a year and a half later the European Council opened accession negotiations, which officially started on 25 June 2024. In other words, in just two years, Chisinau got what it could have waited for many years, or even decades, under normal circumstances. Now, in order to move to the next stage, political reforms are needed to strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. In addition, it is necessary to create a functional market economy capable of competing on the European market. Finally, national legislation must be adapted to the so-called acquis communautaire with its more than 30 thousand legal acts. Corruption remains one of the main challenges on the way to the EU. The effectiveness of the institutions created to fight it is questionable, so the authorities plan to merge the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office and the Prosecutor’s Office for Combating Organized Crime and Special Cases into a single institution. Many experts criticize this decision, which was not agreed with the Venice Commission. Be that as it may, we have to admit that our country, even now and most likely in the foreseeable future, will not be able to ensure the independence of the judiciary and demonstrate real results in defeating the clans that control the justice system. An additional vulnerability is one of the weakest economies in Europe. Moldova faces high levels of poverty, unemployment and dependence on remittances from labor migrants. All attempts to carry out structural reforms, attract foreign investment and improve the business climate are failing. Tens of thousands of citizens leave the country every year in search of a better life abroad, and in recent years the “exit” migration flow has even intensified. The process of European integration is also negatively affected by the unresolved conflict. The unrecognized Transnistrian region is not only a serious challenge to territorial integrity and energy sustainability, but also a key security factor due to the Russian military and arms depots stationed there. It is also important to look at the level of public support, whether the ruling regime and its foreign policy enjoy internal legitimization. As last year’s referendum showed, although a significant part of the population supports European integration as a development project, a significant proportion of citizens (and the majority of citizens inside the country) are skeptical, and some of them hold openly pro-Russian views. In other words, three years later, the ruling elites have still failed to build a public consensus around the idea of joining the European Union. Next. Negotiations on the acquis communautaire usually take years before the EU can agree with all members on the possibility of signing a final accession treaty. Much will depend on the internal state of the Union and the larger geopolitical context, which is being reshaped literally before our eyes. In a pessimistic scenario, the community will face underlying crises that will not allow it to continue its policy of expansion and absorption of new countries at all. In a more optimistic scenario, geopolitical expediency may once again prevail in Brussels, and then Ukraine and Moldova have a chance of “early admission”. With some burdens, of course, but with the possibility of full access to all-union resources. In the usual scenario, we will be waiting for routine procedures of adaptation to the EU norms, and then the timeframe for gaining membership will depend on the pace of reforms, internal political stability and the foreign policy situation. In autumn, Moldova will have to pass a key electoral test, which will largely determine the country’s further historical fate and its chances of approaching the final negotiations with the European Commission at a relatively accelerated pace. The geopolitical background remains, perhaps, the main circumstance that can turn any situation in a completely opposite direction. The war in Ukraine has accelerated Western interest in absorbing Moldova and other EaP countries. However, its termination may carry no less risks, starting with a slowdown of European integration and up to its complete freezing. Over the past few weeks, we have been watching the European Union desperately resisting the rapidly approaching geopolitical storm, which started because of the rapprochement between the White House and the Kremlin. Against the backdrop of the new American administration’s actions, all attempts by Brussels to show its political principles have so far ended only in a series of failed summits. At the same time, the EU is transforming itself from an economic and political bloc to a defense one in a complicated and dull manner. On 6 March, EU heads of state agreed on an ambitious plan called Rearm Europe, the idea of which is that Europe should take care of its own security and no longer rely on the US. It is proposed to allocate up to 800 billion euros for this purpose. Thus, they want to spend four times the annual budget of the European Union for defense purposes. Undoubtedly, this will require a significant increase in the tax burden on European countries, as well as cuts in social and other expenditures common to ordinary residents of the community. For Moldova, such a strategic re-profiling of Europe is not the best signal, which means that Brussels will change its priorities and its attitude towards the Eastern European direction. And it is one thing when you are considered as a peripheral state within a large trade and economic space, and another thing when you are considered as a territory of potential military contact between two military blocs. Therefore, unfortunately, there are signs that our country will once again find itself between the geopolitical hammer and anvil, without ever tasting the blissful European life.