The Transnistrian settlement will lead to a significant political and legal reset of the country
Sergiu CEBAN, RTA:
One of our
articles last week focused on how the authorities intend to send the most loyal members of their team to secure diplomatic positions. Judging by as yet unconfirmed reports, the two embassies will be replenished with former and current deputy prime ministers for reintegration in the near future. We will not speculate much on this issue, but the prospect that Vlad Kulminski and Oleg Serebrian will head the foreign embassies looks very realistic.
While PAS is distributing the ambassadorial seats, it’s important for those who remain here to understand where the Transnistrian settlement will move amid negotiations between the USA and the Russian Federation, which are already entering the discussion on the Black Sea area and its infrastructure, and consequently on the Black Sea region. The weird silence of our authorities speaks rather of internal tension than of confidence that the situation on the banks of the Dniester is not going to change drastically.
Whatever the outcome of the US mediation in the Russian-Ukrainian war, even a minimal result with a ceasefire and truce would affect Moldova in one way or another, not to mention the fact that Kyiv and Moscow could begin to negotiate a lasting peace. It is not yet clear how exactly and by what means the ceasefire will be monitored, but, based on the length of the front line, it is likely to be monitored by technical means.
Given that Kyiv has completely closed the border in the Transnistrian section due to certain risks, it cannot be ruled out that technical surveillance will be organized here as well. In addition, the ceasefire process presupposes the restoration of navigation in the Black Sea and the unblocking of Ukraine’s economic activity. In other words, we can expect the gradual restoration of checkpoints on the central segment of the border with the eastern neighbor.
Along with the pace of dialogue on Ukraine, the chance of the final Transnistrian settlement, which nobody is going to leave frozen for several more decades, is also growing. The exact parameters within which the issue of the region’s status will be resolved depend on the general configuration applied in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the recent statements of one of the special envoys of the American President Steve Witkoff referring to the quasi-referendums organized by Russia in certain Ukrainian regions are, to put it mildly, a bad signal that should cause serious concern in Chisinau.
Noteworthy is also the news in the Russian media late last week that the internal political bloc in the Kremlin has expanded its area of responsibility. Its tasks now include not only the occupied Ukrainian regions but also Moldova and the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The first deputy chief of staff of the presidential administration of Russia, Sergey Kiriyenko, is in charge of this area.
In the meantime, Chisinau and Tiraspol show no signs of preparing for a change of situation and move on inertia. Last week, experts from the two sides examined issues related to the planned changes in the gas legislation to guarantee supplies to citizens and companies on the left bank. At the same time, representatives of the Transnistrian administration expressed their concerns to the head of the OSCE mission about the intention of the central authorities to introduce new gas supply terms. We would like to believe that, given the solid experience of January and February, ways will still be found to avoid another energy crisis.
Despite the relative stability of blue fuel supplies, there appears to be no clear agreement between the banks on the supply of energy resources to industry. This was confirmed by government threats to introduce special tax instruments for products exported from the region if it is confirmed that the Moldova Steel Works and the cement factory in Ribnita have resumed operations.
Apparently, the head of the EU Delegation decided to go there to see for himself how things were going on the left bank. Brussels must be watching closely how, to whom and in what volumes gas is supplied, especially since Tiraspol has refused a grant for the purchase of energy resources until the end of the heating season. Keeping the region in an economically suspended state seems to be necessary in order to make the local administration more compliant in the process of European integration.
Although there is still some energy uncertainty, the operation of the Joint Control Commission, for example, has shown a positive dynamic, which will result in the signing of a final protocol allowing the body to restart its work. One of the main driving motives behind this was the dismantling of the posts that Tiraspol set up in the spring of 2022.
Nevertheless, the military factor in the Transnistrian issue is still in place. The law signed recently by Volodymyr Zelensky, which allows Ukrainian army units to stay abroad during martial law to defend and repel aggression, has alarmed the Moldovan population and generated a lot of interpretations. At the same time, our authorities continue to maintain a total silence instead of reassuring the public on both coasts, including amid supplies of weapons for the national army needs.
While the capital was pompously reporting about the resumption of broadcasting of the first national channel in the Transnistrian region, the initiative to establish a Russian-language state television channel was met with extreme hostility by civil society. The attempt to launch such a platform is perceived as self-exposure of the authorities, who recognize their failure in working with a part of the audience. In fact, this category of fellow citizens is oriented exclusively towards Russian-made content, access to which is virtually impossible to block in today’s technical circumstances. But the question is different: how it will be possible to reintegrate a country with such a strong dislike for the Russian language among the active part of society, since the language issue is likely to be one of the milestones in determining the formula for the final settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.
The statements by MPs that Moldova is moving towards the cancellation of Russian-language schooling, following the example of Estonia, are hardly conducive to higher trust in Chisinau. All this sounds against the background of complicated relations with Comrat, as well as Tiraspol’s claims to the content of the new history textbook. If someone in PAS is determined to complicate the negotiation process as much as possible and to achieve a division on the Dniester, he will do it elegantly and consistently.
By the way, it is also worth paying attention to how an externally imposed settlement that is not based on compromise and mutual respect of interests is crumbling after several decades with the risk of turning into another armed conflict. We are talking about the crisis of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s statehood, which is by and large an artificial entity created as a result of the peremptory projection of the US will in the Balkans.
This is what we have at the start. Where the curve of history will turn and what place we are destined for in the future geopolitical arrangements is unknown yet. Actually, not only the further development of the state, but also its future constitutional and territorial framework depends on it. Even the current initial data make it clear that the Transnistrian settlement will lead to a significant political and legal reset of the country. Whether this is a challenge or an opportunity – let everyone answer for themselves.