Chisinau’s Role in the EU’s New Military Strategy

Anton ŠVEC

The EU has updated its military-strategic doctrine and is starting to implement it, focusing on enhanced security through partnerships and considering Moldova as a “like-minded country”

On 19 March, Brussels published the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, a document that sets out the EU’s new course in the field of security. Its main elements are strengthening military capabilities, removing bureaucratic barriers, forming bloc discipline, and improving cooperation between member states and with external partners. Russia is seen as the fundamental and largest direct threat to Europe, which, if it achieves goals in Ukraine, will extend its territorial claims to Moldova, the Balkans, Transcaucasia, Asia, as well as threaten the borders of the European community. Ukraine has a special place in the new document. It is described as the frontline of European defence, “the world’s leading defense and technology innovation laboratory”, which provides expertise for the development of the EU’s defense industry and military capabilities. Brussels plans to continue providing weapons and technology, finance and intelligence (received, among other things, via commercial satellites) to Kyiv, as well as to train Ukrainian military personnel and produce drones and air defense systems. The threats include China’s military buildup, developments in Africa, competition in the Arctic and the Middle East, and hybrid threats such as disinformation, sabotage, cyberattacks, migration, competition for access to strategic resources and the global science and technology race. Cumulatively, the bloc is stating the high-intensity changes in the world order on a scale not seen since 1945. The EU aims to ensure growth in defense spending through a 150-billion-euro loan mechanism, unrestricted defense spending by member states, earmarked budget financing, involvement of the European Investment Bank and private investments. The bloc aims to increase the production of armaments and equipment, diversify suppliers of raw materials and components, form a single market for military products and boost innovation at the interface between military and civilian technologies. Military mobility is among the priorities. Brussels intends to develop it through 500 urgent projects to modernize railway tunnels, strengthen roads and railway bridges, expand ports and airport terminals, including for the transfer of equipment and weapons. It is noted that the military corridors should extend into Ukraine, which will be an additional defense against “future aggression”. Moldova is also included in the mobility programme from 2024. The country is becoming an important “transshipment point” for supplies to its eastern neighbor and a final point for armaments from European countries. In 2024-2025, France, Germany, the UK, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Norway and Lithuania supplied weapons. But the key partners are the US and the EU, mainly through the “European Peace Facility”. According to the assessment of the head of the EU Delegation Janis Mazeiks (statement of November last year), over 4 years the EU has allocated military aid to Moldova in the amount of about 137 million euros, making it the second largest (after Ukraine) recipient of such support. The White Paper separately mentions Moldova as a territory where Russia fueling tensions and instability, and also as a promising security partner. NATO remains the cornerstone of the EU’s collective defense, with some reservations about transatlantic ties. The UK, Norway and Canada are cited as important allies. Moldova (along with Albania, Iceland, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and Switzerland) is a ‘like-minded country’ with which mutually beneficial cooperation should continue in order to “ensure peace, security and stability on the continent”. Last May, Moldova signed a security and defense partnership agreement with the EU. The document is rather general in nature and may be revised as the situation changes. At the same time, both sides have demonstrated intentions to contribute to Moldova’s sustainability, to increase arms deliveries through the European Peace Facility and to ensure the country’s participation in the EU’s mobility programme and rapid deployment instrument. The agreement also envisages cooperation in combating hybrid threats, cyber security, countering information manipulation, terrorism and extremism. At the same time, both Moldova and the EU support a rules-based international order and condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine by establishing a defense and security coordination framework. Platforms for this include the Association Council, the annual high-level political dialogue, the security dialogue at the level of the European Commission’s Heads of Directorate, and thematic consultations. In January, the government approved an updated individual partnership programme with NATO until 2028, with a focus on combating cyber-attacks and disinformation, as well as training for civil servants and gender equality. Military cooperation with the EU is being strengthened step by step. In March, a decision was taken on the delivery of equipment worth 40 million euros. Chisinau had also requested lethal weapons, anti-aircraft batteries worth 20 million euros, but the decision on them was postponed. Many experts are now switching from the USA and NATO, as Moldova’s main security partners, to the European Union. This is due to Brussels’ desire to become a counterweight to Russia and its willingness to cover Moldova with its “umbrella”. It seems that last thing to do is to convince the public that the Kremlin’s geopolitical ambitions include Moldova, and under the pretext of this threat to utilize EU funding. Especially since the current government is clearly not interested in normalizing relations with Moscow, which is demonstrated whenever possible. However, there is a catch – the country’s constitutionally enshrined neutrality. If the EU is actively arming itself, seeking to play an important role in NATO and increase arms production, as well as to create a network of anti-Russian (and to a lesser extent anti-Chinese) partnerships on the continent, to what extent will cooperation with Brussels be in line with this principle? The questions are numerous. Will Chisinau have to reconsider the principle of neutrality amid negotiations on EU membership, with EU clearly stating its intention to create a “defense union” (but not a pan-European army)? Will these steps not be the very reason for confrontation with Russia? Will the population favor military scenarios? How will these transformations affect relations with Transnistria? Now the left bank declares that Moldova is not preparing an attack and confirms this by the work of the peacekeeping mission, but still comments on the supply of weapons to Chisinau in a negative way. How will the situation change if Chisinau intensifies its demands for withdrawal of Russian troops and transformation of the peacekeeping operation? How will Moscow and Tiraspol respond to all this? And what exactly will Brussels be ready to do in case of aggravation?