Romania’s Presidential Election Shifts Further to ‘the Right’

Sergiu Ceban

The shift in Romania’s political landscape will complicate relations with Moldova, given the views of right-wing conservative politicians toward our country

On April 3, Romania launched its presidential election campaign, which will last for 30 days. The first round of voting will take place on Sunday, May 4, within the country. Citizens living abroad will be able to exercise their voting rights on one of three days—May 2, 3, or 4—at any polling station opened abroad. Following the review of submitted documents, the Central Electoral Bureau registered 11 candidates and denied registration to Calin Georgescu, the winner of last year's annulled first round. At the end of 2024, Romania’s High Court annulled the presidential election results over suspicions that Moscow may have meddled—interference that allowed a non-mainstream candidate to surge ahead of his rivals and come dangerously close to winning the runoff. This time around, the government has introduced stricter campaign regulations, hoping to curb the rise of right-wing populists. But as the current political climate in Romania suggests, the ruling establishment may have missed one crucial detail: protest voting isn’t about personalities. It’s a faceless force—and any candidate who dares to openly defy the system stands a good chance of claiming a reliable 30% of the vote. In fact, the latest public opinion polls have confirmed what is now an almost indisputable reality. George Simion, who stepped in to replace the disqualified Georgescu, immediately gained around 35% support among decided voters. He is followed by former Prime Minister and now independent candidate Victor Ponta, with approximately 21%. Close behind is Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan, polling at 20%. The candidate from the ruling coalition, Crin Antonescu, came in fourth with just 16%. Elena Lasconi, who made it to the second round of last year’s election and received open support from Maia Sandu, is polling at just over 4%. Thus, in simplified terms, the pre-election landscape can be outlined as follows. The two leading candidates are seeking to rally voters who are deeply dissatisfied with the current government, as well as those who support a significant shift in Romania’s domestic and foreign policy. Their closest competitors, on the other hand, are working to mobilize their traditional pro-government electorate—voters who, in principle, advocate for preserving the status quo and favor an evolutionary approach to reforming the state system. Among the main electoral motivations driving voters to support George Simion are a strong desire for change and an anti-establishment stance. In addition, this segment of the electorate is marked by a high level of determination—87% of his supporters have stated they will definitely turn out to vote. At the same time, according to preliminary expert assessments, although the right-wing-backed candidate George Simion has a strong chance of winning the first round, sociological modeling of second-round scenarios currently shows him losing to his opponents. As is well known, Simion has a complex political biography. In particular, due to his radical statements and active involvement in ultranationalist projects, he has been declared a persona non grata in both Moldova and Ukraine. Among the main reasons cited by Chisinau and Kiev for this decision are suspicions that the Romanian politician may be working for Russian intelligence services. In February 2024, our General Inspectorate for Migration confirmed that the restrictive measures against Simion had been extended for another five years. Following Simion, Victor Ponta, who holds moderate but still right-conservative views, is undoubtedly another significant challenge for the ruling Romanian elites. Ponta has already stated that he expects to face Simion in the second round. At the same time, he has promised that, if he wins the presidential election, he will order the halt of Ukrainian grain exports through Romanian ports on the Black Sea to protect local farmers. Additionally, the former prime minister supports the current radical changes in the United States and has promised to pursue a similar political course in Romania. Notably, unlike Simion, who is a staunch advocate of the reunification of Moldova and Romania, Ponta supports Moldova’s EU accession, which he believes will bring the two neighboring states closer together. Meanwhile, in Chisinau, according to yet unconfirmed reports, Maia Sandu and PAS are planning to openly support one of the candidates, namely Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan. This is despite their partnership agreement with the National Liberal Party, which, along with the Social Democrats, is in power and has nominated Crin Antonescu for the presidency. In principle, given that Moldovan media close to the government have already begun actively promoting Dan in our information space, the fact that the ruling party Action and Solidarity has made its choice is, in essence, a done deal. On one hand, Maia Sandu is counting on continued support for Moldova’s partnership with Romania, and it seems this is where the focus should be, waiting to see how the election race unfolds. At the same time, however, the head of state, seemingly ignoring the advice of her advisors, allows herself to make excessively frank statements, particularly about how ‘it will be bad if our partners in Bucharest start taking instructions from Moscow’. The implications are quite clear, so the question remains how Sandu plans to maintain Moldovan-Romanian relations going forward if, hypothetically, the elections do not end the way Chisinau expects. The scenario in which one of the establishment politicians reaches the second round and defeats Simion is consciously left unaddressed, as it implies the preservation of the current political dynamics and power balances, with no significant political changes for either Romania or the broader regional space. A far more intriguing scenario is one where, by the end of the election race, the main favorites for the second round are Simion and Ponta. Essentially, this would mean that the maneuver by Romania’s deep state to neutralize the Georgescu phenomenon was a futile endeavor. As the saying goes, ‘the best is oftentimes the enemy of the good’, so ultimately, the Romanian elites may find themselves with a president holding far-right political views and a very unique agenda. Or, at best, it could be the relatively moderate sovereignist Ponta, who is equally determined to take decisive action regarding the political system. Whoever among the two mentioned candidates wins the election, it does not bode well for the ruling coalition and the current government. It is clear that both Simion and Ponta will attempt to appoint their own prime minister, and the complex negotiations with political parties will plunge Romania into a protracted political crisis. It cannot be ruled out that, in the end, Simion himself may opt for early elections, accusing the old political class of sabotage. It is also quite possible that opportunists from the major parties will sense the ‘direction of the wind’ and be ready to cooperate with the new government. The shift in Romania’s political landscape will most likely deal a painful blow to the European elites in Brussels, who will gain yet another controversial figure in the European Council, making it even more difficult to reach principled decisions at the EU level. Ukraine, aside from Poland, will be virtually surrounded by a belt of countries advocating for the suspension of military aid to Kyiv, as well as the swift initiation of negotiations taking into account Russia’s territorial and political demands. Relations between Moldova and Romania will also become more complex, considering the views of right-wing conservative politicians on our country, as well as the blatantly provocative behavior and overconfident interference by our leadership in the electoral processes of our neighbors.