PAS Cleans House – Party Discipline or Pre-Election Panic?

The ruling party is entering the electoral race by shifting to the right and losing its most prominent figures

Anton Svec The parliamentary elections scheduled for early autumn are predictably becoming a key factor shaping Moldova’s domestic political agenda and the actions of the pro-presidential PAS party, which is striving to maintain its dominance in the next parliamentary term. The lackluster results of the presidential election and the referendum on constitutional amendments are now starting to weigh on the electoral chances of the current parliamentary majority. The PAS faction in the top representative body is exercising its powers in an extremely irrational manner, effectively excluding representatives of the parliamentary opposition from dialogue and the decision-making process. Controversial legislative initiatives are pushed through with an iron fist, disregarding the input from other parliamentary forces. Requests to hear from government representatives on any pressing issues are blocked by the PAS faction, and attempts to initiate votes of no confidence against executive members have long devolved from a governance tool into a mere information tactic. The ruling party is firmly refusing to engage with its rivals or share responsibility, a stance that will complicate any future coalition talks, except for situational alliances. Meanwhile, opinion polls suggest that PAS has a slim chance of securing 51 seats in the upcoming parliamentary term. Worse still, the authoritarian system built on the dominance of the PAS faction in the legislature and the symbolic figure of Maia Sandu as president, who enjoys strong EU support, has failed to deliver the expected stability, frequently being embroiled in scandals and exposing incompetence. PAS is addressing these challenges not by transforming its platform to align with the needs of voters and the state, or through dialogue with society and potential political partners, but rather through aggressive media presence, financial consolidation built on questionable schemes, and ousting any figures that could potentially form internal opposition to the regime. Veronica Dragalin, former anti-corruption chief and daughter of one of the ruling party’s main sponsors, who facilitated communication and support through the U.S. Democratic Party, was removed from her position through political and legal manipulations and effectively expelled from Moldova. Now, tension is growing between her and Maia Sandu’s team, which once promoted her to the position without following all legal procedures. This standoff threatens to escalate into a media clash and a war of kompromat, which could harm the government’s approval ratings. In April, the ruling party had a falling-out with one of its most prominent members, MP Olesea Stamate (12th on the PAS list in the 2021 elections, ex-minister of justice, and presidential legal adviser). She had already stepped down last year as chair of the parliamentary committee on legal affairs, appointments, and immunity. At the time, Olesea Stamate positioned herself as part of a team working ‘to build a justice system in the interest of the citizen and the state, not in the interest of the corrupt, criminals, and lobbyists’, while expressing gratitude to all committee members regardless of their political views. It is clear that already back then she believed some of PAS’s decisions were not legally sound, and that the de facto shutdown of any meaningful dialogue was undermining the democratic balance in the country. Subsequently, this stance was reflected in practical actions such as her refusal to actively campaign in the referendum or to support certain regime initiatives, including the merger of crime-fighting prosecutor’s offices. Olesea Stamate never openly criticized her colleagues, but she consistently approached any bill with principle and broad view, reasonably explaining her position in the media. Apparently, such actions rattled the party leadership, promoting a swift effort to remove her while pinning on her the scandal over the release of life-time inmates. Igor Grosu and others thus solved two problems at once: they found a scapegoat for yet another disgraceful episode in Moldovan justice and governance, and at the same time got rid of an inconvenient party member whose principled stance had won her growing public support. Olesea Stamate was expelled from the PAS faction and is now being urged to give up her parliamentary mandate. Earlier, the ruling party had already ‘cleansed’ itself within the government, with Andrei Spinu, Dumitru Alaiba, and Victor Parlicov stepping down from their ministerial posts. While the first two simply failed to fulfill their duties turning into the frequent targets of opposition criticism, which negatively impacted the government’s approval ratings, the former minister of energy could not find common ground with prime minister Dorin Recean and has already voiced his political ambitions: “If you’re too smart to engage in politics, you will be ruled by people dumber than you”. This statement is clearly a direct challenge to Moldova’s ruling team. PAS is currently focused on tightening party discipline, where any dissent can become grounds for exclusion from the ranks of the so-called ‘good people’. The party has developed a classic authoritarian style of governance, in which breaches of subordination, personal opinions, and individual initiatives are no longer acceptable. It is likely that the party leadership views this transformation as a protective step to preempt new scandals and political crises. In reality, however, these moves signal anxiety stemming from declining approval ratings and no clear strategy to win over the missing votes. PAS is degenerating into a bureaucratic, sluggish, and anti-democratic structure, which inevitably limits its political potential and makes it highly vulnerable to criticism. The situation strongly resembles the state of the Communist Party of Moldova prior to the April events of 2009. Though this degradation aligns with the troubling trends across the European Union and is unlikely to reduce Brussels’ support, it may spark strong discontent among voters, who will have their say as early as September.