Fast-Track Breakup. Why Is Chisinau Threating Moscow Again?

Christian RUSSU

Against the backdrop of the election campaign, the ruling regime is once again resorting to geopolitical demarches against Moscow, thus trying to cover up its insolvency in the energy sector

A string of events in late March and early April shed light on the results of experimental gas management by the ruling party, and determined further prospects for gas supplies to the country. As early as 21 February, the Ministry of Energy of Moldova prepared a draft law on the next, fifth in the last 4 years, amendments to the law on natural gas. At that time, the government announced plans to change the gas regulations again citing the extraordinary circumstances with gas supplies at the beginning of the year and the need to ensure energy security. There is no need to mention who Chisinau stigmatized as the culprit of the crisis and who was praised as the savior. For national gas market participants, the main concern was not the struggle against the Kremlin’s machinations propagated by the authorities but the failure to meet obligations to liberalize the gas market undertaken as part of the European integration process, or implement the Third Energy Package requirements, etc. Starting from January 1, 2025, consumers have no opportunity to choose their own gas supplier. Moreover, Moldovan companies that decided to play into market relations were jammed up by law enforcement agencies and special services. In response references were made to some of Moldova’s obligations to the EU under the Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience signed on February 4, 2025, which outlines the country’s pledge to “finally eliminate any form of dependence on Russian natural gas and accelerate the country’s integration into the European energy market.” As part of the authorities’ renewed gas strategy, a decision was made to once again amend the law regulating the capacity of Moldovagaz as the major supplier on the domestic market to supply blue fuel to large consumers. If previously such consumers had the right to demand a switch to regulated tariffs, the new rule would prescribe a complete ban on further cooperation with this enterprise from October 1, 2025. Through this clumsy approach, the authorities sought to curb Moldovagaz, which, despite all previous restrictive measures, gave competitors only 7% of its market share, retaining 90% of Moldovan consumers. Of course, the left bank of the Dniester was considered one of the major gas consumers, to which only Moldovagaz was the sole energy supplier. To secure the removal of the region from the custody of the Moldovan-Russian enterprise, the entire government was set to be involved in designating a new gas provider to the left bank. Given the large-scale nature of this and many other related changes and innovations in the draft law, numerous approvals were made, which resulted in the authorities tempering their initial ambitions. In the amended provisions of the new draft law, the previous deadline of October 1, 2025, was removed, replaced by a provision granting the consumers, except for household and small enterprises, “as an exception, the right to receive natural gas from contractors who supply natural gas under a public service obligation.” Apparently, the authorities were under considerable pressure from Moldovagaz consumers, who viewed these plans as serious risks to the stability of gas supplies at the start of the heating season. There was little trust in the Energocom, given its involvement in various dubious schemes. It is worth recalling that even our domestic TPPs, which had gained experience working with competitors of the Moldovan-Russian enterprise, eventually rushed back. The public disclosure of Energocom’s audit by the Court of Accounts set an unfavorable setting for the new stage of gas market redistribution. On February 27, the state auditor held the meeting to review the compliance report on the management of state property and financial resources of JSC Energocom in 2021-2023, noting several deviations from regulatory standards in gas procurement, reserve stock management and the setting of unregulated prices. The Court of Accounts confirmed that natural gas purchases were carried out in complete secrecy through the working group of the Commission on Emergency Situations, in violation of any market rules. Moreover, the statement was made considering the secrecy surrounding the purchases, with auditors only able to access part of the relevant documents. However, the most notable finding of the audit was the acknowledgement of the failure of the authorities’ scheme to purchase gas through Energocom. The company was clearly running at a loss. Neither the lack of competitors, nor high tariffs, nor the established branch in Romania, nor the efforts of all government agencies, nor the support of European advisers could rectify the situation. It would probably require significantly higher costs for consumers to keep the Energocom afloat, but the ruling party did not dare to completely ignore the electorate’s mood. We do not know for sure what factors had influenced the authorities, but they chose to shift the clash with Moldovagaz from a purely practical legislative issue to a geopolitical narrative with potential media gains, an approach the authorities have skillfully used in recent years. On April 2, the new energy minister and namesake of the prime minister, Dorin Junghietu, assured the state media that Energocom would continue its offensive against Moldovagaz, but the strategy of the new battle would be determined not by the government, but by the National Agency for Energy Regulation. The agency came to light only on April 8, when it announced a sharp revision of the Moldovagaz unbundling deadline bringing it forward by more than a year, from September 30, 2026 to July 1 of this year, while threatening to revoke the license to supply natural gas and appoint another license holder to fulfill the obligation to supply natural gas to consumers at regulated prices. The reason behind this decision was not the objective situation on the gas market, which ANRE could see within its powers, but all the same “commitments undertaken by Moldova to the EU,” according to which the authorities pledged to “finally eliminate any form of dependence on natural gas from the Russian Federation” and “accelerate the country’s integration into the European energy sector.” That is, the ANRE’s decision is purely political imposed by higher authorities. The move has created a high-profile media narrative. Until 1 July, when parliamentary elections can actually be held, the ruling authorities have secured its leading role in dismantling Moldova-Russia gas ties. Of course, anything can happen after 1 July. ANRE may prolong its threat, but in reality consumers will continue to receive gas from Moldovagaz. Perhaps by that point, political expediency will push gas market consumers to look for new options, but for now the party in power has created a cushion of time. Naturally, the authorities have not abandoned their plans to legislate a scenario to limit Moldovagaz activity on the national market. Only now ANRE has been asked to set a schedule by the beginning of next year for restricting the access of end consumers to the services provided by the current monopolist. Unable to create a viable alternative to the Moldovan-Russian enterprise, the authorities chose to focus on simple raiding tactics seeking to capture the uncontrolled financial flows.