“Pseudo Autonomy”: Chisinau Brings “Discipline” to Gagauzia

The central authorities continue to pursue the strategy of de facto abolition of the Gagauz autonomy and, consequently, of the political agreement with the local elites concluded in the early 1990s

At the end of 2024, Gagauzia celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the adoption of the Law on Special Legal Status. In the early days of state formation, Chisinau and Comrat showed remarkable foresight, refusing to continue confrontation and finding a mutually beneficial compromise. As a result, the Gagauz gained their legal entity, and Moldova took a step towards preserving its integrity by preventing a second frozen conflict on its territory. But three decades later, relations between the center and the autonomy seem to be at one of the lowest points. Both Chisinau and Comrat take completely irreconcilable moves that push them further apart with each passing month. This may eventually lead to drastic consequences. For instance, yesterday, the Constitutional Court, at the request of Prosecutor General Ion Munteanu, recognized Article 21 of the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia on the Prosecutor’s Office of the autonomy, as well as Articles 25 and 26 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office, according to which the candidate for the position of ATU chief prosecutor is proposed by the People’s Assembly, as inconsistent with the basic law. As a result, the local authorities were essentially excluded from the procedure for appointing the region’s prosecutor. The Gagauz people took the news with concern, but nothing more: in fact, none of the local politicians has the power to influence such decisions of Chisinau. We think this was a first crack of the central authorities to make sure that neither the regional elites, nor the autonomy inhabitants, nor external players intend to seriously oppose the government’s systematic policy in any way. The recent arrest of the Gagauzia leader, with all the nuances, is also an unprecedented step by the country’s leadership, even if it was not easy. According to some insider information, not everyone in the ruling regime agreed with such radical measures. As a matter of fact, for this reason Chisinau was forced to eventually retreat a bit. We will not put it down to Moscow, which sort of responded to public and written appeals of the bashkan, but it is quite possible that the court’s decision to place Evghenia Gutul under house arrest was taken, among other things, because of diplomatic pressure. According to our information, some embassies described the arrest and placement of Gutul in a detention center as “too much”. Though the stakes have slightly reduced, Chisinau still continues to seek to force the Gagauz elites to remove her from office and make a deal. So far, there are no visible signs of a split among local political groups or any readiness to sacrifice the current head of the autonomy. It seems to us, the Chisinau strategists are betting on a gradual political fragmentation in Gagauzia, which, in turn, will undermine its potential as a springboard in the upcoming parliamentary elections. In general, as far as these elections are concerned, Gagauzia is indeed perceived by the PAS as a source of serious risks, especially in terms of mass bribery of voters. According to some evidence, in an effort to curb the spread of Russian cash payments that remain widespread in the autonomy to other districts, law enforcement agencies have increased the frequency of household raids throughout the region. People are brought to administrative responsibility for passive electoral corruption. Some estimates show the number of executed protocols has already reached 25 thousand. Over the past few years, relations between Chisinau and Comrat have seen multiple episodes of sharp aggravation, and the negative trend, alas, persists. This proves that the central authorities do not have full control over the situation in Gagauzia and are trying to restore it by repressive and forceful measures. And we wonder to what extent it is appropriate to talk about the integrity of the country in relation to the ATU and to what extent Gagauzia is reintegrated into the political and legal field of the republic. Tiraspol is obviously keeping an eye on the developments, aware that it will ultimately have to negotiate its status and legal relations with Chisinau. Given that after three decades Comrat’s autonomous competences are gradually narrowed and its leader is presented exclusively through the prism of criminal proceedings, it is unlikely that dialogue with the left-bank elites will become any easier. Of course, one can blame Moscow for Chisinau’s marginalization and for leaving it with virtually no options for soft political engagement in one of the most difficult regions of the country. Yet, even with the Russian factor, the main reason for this state of affairs was the policy of strategic self-disengagement from internal affairs in the autonomy and the lack of a long-term vision for the ATU. By now, Gagauzia has turned into a politically closed territory, where the main processes are managed remotely from Moscow, and the central authorities are literally and figuratively forced to bypass the autonomy, as Maia Sandu did last autumn. In the early 90s, it seems that the government expected that Gagauzia would manage the autonomy on its own, while Chisinau would take care of more important things. Gagauzians did their best, but not in the way the capital had expected. As a result, having neither resources nor possibilities to turn everything back, the current PAS regime found no better way out than to follow the path of progressive deprivation of powers and reaching a pseudo autonomy. The next step of the government may be to change the electoral procedure in Gagauzia in order to elect a politically moderate bashkan and a loyal People’s Assembly. So far, voting in the autonomy takes place not in line with the Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova, but according to local laws adopted by the local assembly. The fact that the elections will be conducted by the Central Electoral Commission does not guarantee any fundamental changes, but at least it’ll allow someone in the government to assert that Chisinau has gained control over the Gagauz electoral processes. Certainly, this situation did not emerge in recent years, but is a consequence of Chisinau’s policies over many decades. The abolition of de facto autonomy and, consequently, of the political agreement with the Gagauz elites, concluded in the early 90s, is in a sense a very risky and unpredictable decision. Probably, the Chisinau strategists believe there are no politically active groups left in the region capable of organizing mass discontent of the Gagauz and posing a serious challenge to the center. We’ll see.