Escalation in Ukraine: Threat to Moldova’s Security and Chance for the Ruling Regime

Despite the positive messages from Moscow and Washington, there are no real prerequisites for a ceasefire and a diplomatic settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. This situation benefits the PAS, as it prepares for the autumn parliamentary elections

The ruling party had no peaceful and constructive agenda before, nor does it have such now. On the contrary, PAS persistently justifies its failures and abuses in state management, as well as current attempts to dismantle the Gagauz autonomy by the war in Ukraine. In addition, the Ukrainian tragedy is used to demonstrate solidarity with the Western course and to obtain resources from Brussels. Chisinau’s relations with Moscow are so damaged that it’s virtually impossible to restore them under the current configuration of power. Any radical transformation of the PAS policy and a request for alternative points of view could finally destroy the regime’s constantly shrinking electoral base and lead Maia Sandu’s team to electoral deadlock and defeat. In this sense, the authorities are watching the Russia-Ukraine standoff closely, fearing significant changes in the next 3-4 months. Steve Witkoff’s meeting with Vladimir Putin (as well as his aide Yuri Ushakov and Kirill Dmitriev who recently visited Washington) was supposed to push the peace process forward; at the very least, this is what the US hoped for. However, events on the front, driven by their own logic, leaму little room to hope for serious progress in the negotiations. The moratorium on energy facilities strikes expires on April 18. Moscow has accused Kyiv of violating the agreement almost on a daily basis and may resume attacks on Ukrainian substations and infrastructure the other day. In addition, Russian representatives did not participate in Ankara talks on safe navigation in the Black Sea. The Ukrainian armed forces are not abandoning their attempts to invade the Belgorod oblast, a small part of which has fallen into the so-called “grey zone”. The Kremlin will definitely reject a suspension of hostilities until the Ukrainian military is completely dislodged from the border regions. In turn, Russia continues its offensive operations in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia, and the pace of advancement this month compared to March has increased significantly. The tragedy in Sumy, when Russian missiles killed not only military personnel but also dozens of Ukrainian civilians, provoked a sharp escalation. Kyiv responded with a massive drone attack on Kursk, in which civilians were also injured. Chisinau, represented by its political leadership, expressed unequivocal support for Ukraine and condemned Russia’s actions, as did the European Union. The military-strategic situation in the conflict zone forms rather unfavorable background for peace talks, especially given the nature of the Kremlin’s demands (full control over the regions, which Russia has included in its own constitution, prevention of deployment of NATO or Western military personnel in Ukraine). The president’s office will not agree to them a priori, as the armed units of the Russian Federation, in fact, are not capable of seizing Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration by military means in the near term. Kyiv is also postponing decisions on the resource deal with Washington in every possible way (the Americans’ appetite for managing strategic facilities in Ukraine has increased, including even the main gas pipeline and seaports, but the US is still not ready to provide security guarantees) and on holding the presidential election. On the contrary, Volodymyr Zelensky initiated the extension of mobilization and martial law for three months in the Verkhovna Rada ahead of schedule. The situation on the battlefield and the approaches of Ukraine and its allies make any Washington peace initiatives unrealistic and impractical. Russia is maintaining the dialogue with the United States in an effort to find solutions to its own issues (unblocking of some bank transactions, restart of embassy and consular relations, resumption of direct air traffic, strategic security), but at the same time it is ready to continue the war in the mode of conditionally controlled escalation avoiding excessive mobilization of resources, to secure better terms in the future truce (or a full-fledged deal). Steve Witkoff’s optimism is not supported by all the tops of the US administration. Vice President JD Vance remains irritated with Kyiv, but according to media reports, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Special Envoy Keith Kellogg are advising Donald Trump to increase pressure on Moscow, including tougher sanctions against Russia’s fuel and energy sector. Tellingly, the EU is also preparing for war, trying in every possible way to step up arms production and security coordination. Criticism of individual EU members has little influence on the mainstream. Moreover, according to media reports, about six European countries have expressed their readiness to send their troops to Ukraine as peacekeepers who will guarantee an end to hostilities. Ukraine is in dire straits, but it is not defeated at all; its military economy is generally functioning due to international funding and supplies. It is obvious that Kyiv will not be able to regain the territories on its own, as Zelensky recently publicly admitted. However, the calculation of Ukrainian strategists, who are not ready to accept the final loss of some areas and the prospect of NATO membership, is to escalate and expand the conflict. Only through the involvement of neighboring countries or NATO can the Ukrainian president’s office seriously expect to defeat Russia militarily. Ukraine’s own demographic and mobilization resources are clearly insufficient for this. Brussels, with bureaucratic delays and through the stigmatization of dissenters, is consistently preparing for exactly this scenario. In particular, France and Germany are considering a possible war with Russia in the next five years. In this case, Moldova instantly transforms from a frontline zone into a theatre of military operations, as the EU is strengthening its defense capabilities and military mobility for this very purpose. The risks are multiplied by the decentralization of the republic, with the Transnistrian conflict simmering and the Chisinau-Comrat relations marked by constant tension. Involvement in a direct conflict would be fatal for Moldova. Back in 2022, Dorin Recean personally admitted the ability to hold out for 72 hours, and it seems unlikely that the country has made significant progress in its military potential since then as it still cannot even control its airspace. Meanwhile, the current state of affairs maintains the dominant influence and stability of the PAS electorate, as well as the coveted geopolitical divide over the views on the war, Russia and its president. Nor is PAS faced with difficult questions that would arise from a potential deal on Ukraine, with relevant precedents and push for the start of political negotiations on Transnistria. In fact, Chisinau would likely prefer the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to persist at least until the parliamentary elections, as it would allow the government to avoid changes to its electoral programme and rhetoric, to secure continued funding and political support from the European Union, and to justify its own mistakes and authoritarian rule with regional instability.