Sale of Moldova’s Giurgiulesti Port and Railway Is Nearing Completion

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Christian RUSSU
The ruling party is pushing the sale of Moldova’s main transport and logistics assets before the elections and amid changing regional conjuncture
The other the information surfaced about long-awaited changes in two strategic sectors at once: maritime and railway freight transport. First, the EBRD, which owns the company of the operator and tenant of the Giurgiulesti International Free Port, announced preparations for the sale of the asset. The case is presented with extreme pathos. It is said to have launched a “structured M&A process through an international tender” to identify potential investors who can support the long-term development of this crucial asset.  The EBRD press release makes a special mention of the regional importance of the port, well positioned for Ukraine’s future recovery. Government officials then announced the imminent completion of the epic division of the Moldovan Railway in accordance with the previously adopted code. The infrastructure will remain in the hands of the state, but the freight transport sector will be transferred to private hands. A few days later, the management of the Moldova Railway held talks with their Ukrainian colleagues, discussing plans to increase transit freight traffic through our country. In the meantime, they also mentioned plans to resume the summer passenger train service Chisinau-Odesa. The latter, however, fits rather into the electoral strategy of the ruling party, as the railway transport of passengers has no commercial component. The deplorable situation with trains in the direction of Romania only confirms this. Unlike the railway freight sector, the international port in Giurgiulesti has increased cargo handling volumes in recent years and brings its owners a stable income. Even the nearby passenger-cargo port, which is still under state administration, has more than tripled its cargo throughput in the last four years: from 256,400 tons in 2020 to about 800,000 tons in 2024. Thus, we are talking not only about the value and importance of these assets for our country, but also about their possible role in the further development of sea and rail logistics in the Ukrainian direction. In this configuration, their value rises exponentially. Of course, the pre-election factor is important, but the determining one in the fuss over the Giurgiulesti port and railroad was the change in the regional environment. The clarification of the prospects for developments in the northwestern Black Sea region, given the possibility of a grand bargain on Ukraine, is of interest to many foreign players. Control over transport logistics promises potential benefits for investors who will have time to invest in infrastructure on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast and Danube ports before peace agreements are concluded. Ukrainian officials, backed by the European Commission, have been actively pushing investment proposals for interested players in recent weeks. The fact that all these facilities and rail corridors to them are included in the Trans-European Transport Network TEN-T with financing until 2040 will almost guarantee their profitability. We should bear in mind not only commercial transportation, which will definitely grow, but also the use of infrastructure from a military and political perspective. The Trans-European network envisages the use of its components, including in military interests (military mobility program). Operational transfer and deployment of weapons and personnel in the northwestern Black Sea region is one of the key tasks for the European Union in the near future. In fact, Ukraine and Moldova were included in the so-called “military Schengen” of the EU as early as 2022, but only now it is implemented. The potential impossibility of using US logistics capabilities within NATO, given the changed policy of the new administration, will only push Brussels to accelerate the investment program for the development of TEN-T for military purposes in our region. It may be recalled that the Baltic States are now developing their military transportation infrastructure, and the transportation corridors between Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, which are planned for reconstruction, are part of the so-called “Baltic-Black Sea” segment. If the process has started in the Baltic States, it means that we are also in line. The plans to restore the railroad connection between Romania and Moldova on the Falciu-Barlad section is a kind of evidence of such activity in our country. It, along with the Leova-Bumbeta road crossing, which has been repaired nearby, will provide the connection to the Constanta port. Romanian officials have already confirmed that the logistics in the direction of Moldova is tied to this Romanian port, which has been of special military importance since World War II. The recently announced extension of the state port of Giurgiulesti at the expense of 61 hectares of land along the Prut clearly fits into the same strategy. There are cross-border bridges (railroad and road) nearby. It is planned not only to expand the berth, but also to allocate space for storage facilities for transit cargo. The additional 60 hectares can accommodate anything and anyone, including armaments, if desired. It could turn out to be a huge infrastructure facility if major players are interested. It is clear that both Ukrainian and our officials could have sold their port and railroad infrastructure two years ago, but the military and political uncertainty made these assets extremely risky and undervalued. The vested interest or, one could say, the “state approach” prevailed then. Now, given the changes in the international conjuncture, we are witnessing a new attempt by regional elites and oligarchic groups associated with them to make money. For Brussels in this regard, the only thing that matters is the loyalty of future participants of the project, because for a decade ahead, significant EU funds will have to be utilized. As for Moldova’s interests, we see that Brussels-oriented political forces interpret them exclusively in terms of transferring the country’s assets under external management with favorable conditions for themselves. The authorities both cannot and do not want to develop the national sector on their own.