Moldovan Church Under Pressure from the Government

Sergiu CEBAN

The pressure on the Moldovan Metropolis of the Russian Orthodox Church will only continue to grow, as both PAS and Brussels see it as one of the last remaining strongholds of Moscow’s influence in our country

Easter Week is the perfect time to reflect on the role of the Moldovan Orthodox Church, which has always held an important place in the life of our state. All domestic politicians understand this - even the current ruling elite, for whom the Christian spiritual tradition is something foreign and incompatible with modern European ideals. A clear sign that not all members of the current government take Moldova’s religious traditions seriously was a statement posted on the official page of the Ministry of Justice literally on the eve of the holiday. The justice system, now reformed beyond recognition and seemingly having lost its last traces of sound judgment, declared that “based on the results of discussions, it has been established: Easter is recognized as constitutional and beneficial to the public spirit, and the Holy Fire is recognized as a symbol of public interest and may be made accessible to everyone. In addition, judicial experts have carefully analyzed and confirmed that Easter and Easter cakes comply with EU legislation.” The ironically worded comment was later deleted, but Moldova’s justice system had already revealed its true face rather clearly. Meanwhile, according to one of the latest public opinion polls, our citizens place the greatest trust in the Church – 66% of respondents said so. It is followed by educational institutions, while government bodies, as one might expect, are at the bottom of the list. So, no matter how much some of PAS formal or informal leaders might wish otherwise, they will have to reckon with this reality and, gritting their teeth, continue attending church services while carefully hiding their atheist leanings. Despite being the most important religious holiday for all believers, the Easter days were overshadowed by several events that only reinforce the sense that humanity is on the verge of major transformations. One can only hope that these changes will not bring about great and tragic trials, and that those who hold power will have enough wisdom, as there is little hope for our politicians in this regard. For example, at the end of last week, Bishop Marchel of Balti and Falesti was twice unable to fly out of the capital’s airport to Jerusalem to take part in the Holy Fire ceremony and bring the flame back to Moldova. Marchel is, without a doubt, known for his pro-Russian views and his ties to certain figures who are not favored by the current leadership of the republic. But this kind of petty, frankly childish sabotage does nothing to boost the image of the ruling regime. On the contrary, it only reinforces parishioners’ belief that PAS is willing and ready to put pressure on clergy it deems undesirable. In addition, on Monday came the tragic news from the Vatican that Pope Francis had passed away on the second day of Easter. Many saw in this a sinister omen. At the same time, it also became clear that Kyiv and Moscow had failed to properly organize the so-called “Easter truce”, and fighting along the front line resumed with its previous intensity. In the lead-up to the celebrations, Maia Sandu once again chose to demonstrate her spiritual neutrality by holding separate meetings with Metropolitan Vladimir of Moldova and Metropolitan Petru of Bessarabia. In fact, however, this approach of equalizing the status of the two metropolises strengthens the position of the Bessarabian religious organization in particular, sending a message to parishioners that the authorities do not recognize the deep-rooted conflict between the two Orthodox churches. At the same time, everyone is well aware that both churches are competing for the same flock, and the further escalation of tensions is almost inevitable. By quietly siding with the Romanian Patriarchate, PAS is effectively tightening the space around the Metropolis of Moldova. In recent years, electoral considerations have somewhat toned down direct attacks by the authorities, but it is clear that this is only a temporary phenomenon, as the ruling party needs the support of all believers. It is worth recalling that in August of last year, PAS Member of Parliament Vasile Soimaru let slip plans to eliminate the Metropolis of the Russian Orthodox Church on Moldovan territory. Moreover, the MP did not shy away from clarifying that the authorities intend to act toward the canonical Orthodox Church in the same way Kyiv acted against the UOC. The hierarchs of the Moldovan Metropolis will, of course, try to convince their flock that it is too early to write them off and that they are still capable of turning the situation in their favor. For instance, on April 19, Metropolitan Vladimir received a deacon at his residence in Chisinau and handed him an official decree reinstating him into the canonical Church after a period spent within the structures of the Bessarabian Metropolis. It appears that the Metropolitan is thereby signaling to other defectors his willingness to reverse previous excommunication decisions, grant amnesty, and restore them to their clerical status. Moscow is surely aware that it has lost most of its tools for influencing the socio-political processes in Moldova. Realizing the risk of also losing its foothold in the country’s religious life – especially after Metropolitan Vladimir’s well-known letter to Patriarch Kirill – the Russian Federation has decided to reinforce the internal unity of the Moldovan Metropolis in an effort to strengthen its “soft power” over the Moldovan population. The steps the Kremlin might take in the future to increase the role of Orthodoxy in Moldova’s daily life can be easily gauged by looking at decisions being made on the left bank of the Dniester. In early April, the local “parliament” passed a package of draft laws in the first reading that expands the list of topics prohibited from promoting so-called non-traditional values. The ban may include references to the conscious decision not to have children, gender transition, and LGBT issues. In addition to purely religious objectives, the authorities in Transnistria are reinforcing a conservative traditionalist agenda, aiming to highlight the fundamental differences between the left and right banks. Realizing that the Kremlin intends to pursue its agenda through the clergy of the Moldovan Orthodox Church, our security services have begun to closely scrutinize the Church’s hierarchs. Over the past year, the pro-government press has published numerous articles and so-called “investigations” about clergy trips and pilgrimages funded by organizations linked to Russia and fugitive Moldovan oligarchs. Based on this, PAS concluded that such trips could eventually have political repercussions. As a result, dozens of clergymen were interrogated by law enforcement agencies, and some were fined for participating in or organizing pilgrimage tours to Russia. It seems that no one is particularly concerned that, for contemporary Orthodoxy, pilgrimage, interchurch communication, and canonical relations are an integral part of religious life and cannot be viewed solely in terms of political risk. But members of the ruling regime, who embrace not traditional but rather progressive liberal views, are unlikely to grasp these nuances. That is why pressure on the Moldovan Metropolis will only intensify, as both PAS and Brussels regard it as the last major stronghold of Moscow’s influence in our country.