Expert: EU Needs a Fresh Eye on Its Eastern Europe Policy

Moldova and Ukraine’s integration into the European Union is one of the most important political processes in Eastern Europe. However, with the ongoing war in Ukraine and the EU internal divisions, it’s clear that previous policies and strategies are no longer effective

The Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 was a defining moment in the perception of Russia as a geopolitical threat, sparking the narrative of an “aggressive Russia” across Europe and prompting Brussels to revise its Eastern policy. The Eastern Partnership programme, launched in Prague at the initiative of the foreign ministers of Poland and Sweden, came into being exactly 16 years ago as a response. It was designed to bring six post-Soviet states, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, closer to the EU with the prospect of further integration. It was already clear at that point that these countries diverged significantly in terms of their aspirations, domestic politics and relations with the European Union. Over time, especially after 2014 and the escalation of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the differences only became wider. By 2017-2018, there were calls for the Eastern Partnership to be divided into groups: some sought full EU membership, while others sought pragmatic cooperation without integration ambitions. The establishing of the Association Trio consisting of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, which signed association agreements with the EU, was the logical outcome of this division. However, even this format does not stand the test of time and the current geopolitical reality. Each of the countries, by and large, has pursued its own way – primarily, Georgia. Therefore, we can say that both the Association Trio and the Eastern Partnership have finally lost their relevance turning into a “white elephant” – still formally in place, but no longer taken seriously. Recent months have seen a new round of changes. European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos said that Brussels is considering separating the accession processes of Moldova and Ukraine, as the latter is opposed by Hungary. In a fresh example, last year the EU kicked off accession talks with Albania, leaving North Macedonia behind, caught in bilateral disputes with Bulgaria over minority rights. Meanwhile, Chisinau and Kyiv publicly continue to declare their shared commitment. In a joint press conference, deputy prime ministers Cristina Gherasimov and Olha Stefanishyna reaffirmed that Moldova and Ukraine intend to continue marching towards the European Union “shoulder to shoulder”. Words of solidarity, gratitude to Ukraine for Moldova’s security and assurances of political and humanitarian support were voiced. This was followed by some softening of the EU stance: Marta Kos posted on social media that the accession talks could start simultaneously, with the first cluster block. But, as they say, this is not set in stone – after all, the final decision is based on the collegial principle and the common position of all member states. Still, the very idea of splitting the process into separate “Moldovan” and “Ukrainian” tracks, especially voiced by a high-ranking official in Brussels, is already a serious signal. Whether this was a preemptive political move to test Kyiv’s reaction or a worrying sign of disunity among the EU members over the start of negotiations with Ukraine will become clear soon. Judging by remarks from Ukrainian officials, they view the EU’s readiness for a differentiated approach almost as a betrayal. The reason for the growing skepticism about Ukraine within the European community may be that the EU, which sees itself as a geopolitical actor, is now overshadowed by the US and Russia. Washington and Moscow are actively negotiating on the Ukrainian issue, openly competing for influence and resources, while the EU risks being left “offside” without access to Ukraine’s mineral base, logistics, infrastructure and post-war reconstruction projects. Without firm guarantees on investment and cost recovery, European elites are unlikely to take on the role of Ukraine’s main donor. This factor strengthens the position of those European politicians who support gradual removal of Kyiv from the fast-track integration. Under such conditions, Moldova is objectively becoming a potential favorite of Brussels. Our country, unlike Ukraine, does not pose strategic risks or increased economic difficulties for the EU, which makes it a more convenient candidate for accession. This is the reason for Brussels’ signals about the possibility of rapid progress on the consent of Chisinau’s application by the member states. If the ruling Action and Solidarity party wins the autumn elections, then, in a favorable scenario, we can expect accelerated negotiations according to the “Baltic scenario”: two years for negotiations and another two years to complete necessary procedures. Although Moldova may turn into the “foreign policy prize” for the EU in its geopolitical battle with the Kremlin, Brussels will continue to face great challenges on its eastern flank amid the uncertainty of the conflict in Ukraine. The obsolete Eastern Partnership programme should already prompt the EU to reconsider its regional strategy. The current configuration of the Eastern Partnership has institutional and semantic limitations, embedded in the founding documents. This concerns the lack of adaptability to changing geopolitical realities, which limits the potential for effective risk management and promotion of sustainable development in the region. Therefore, the key point in shaping the EU’s new Eastern policy should be the search for rational solutions capable of ensuring more stable ties with the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. It would probably be worth trying to move away from a confrontation towards détente through pragmatic regional cooperation in such areas as trade, infrastructure, energy and the environment. Together, these steps would not only reduce tensions but also promote sustainable integration processes. It is more important than ever for Brussels to adopt a fresh approach to its policy in Eastern Europe. It needs a clear, long-term development plan that would take into account the interests and views of all EU member states. However, there is still no certainty that European leaders are ready to seriously consider revising their place and role on the continent. Without this, strategic uncertainty in our region will only intensify.