Can Hungarian Referendum Jeopardize Moldova’s EU Prospects?

Anton ŠVEC

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who persistently opposes Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, wants to back up his political stance with the results of the popular vote. Finally blocking the accession of a neighboring country to the EU may put Chisinau in a fragile situation

The applications of Ukraine and Moldova for the EU membership are known to be considered in a common package. This fact came in handy at the stage of our country’s obtaining candidate status in June 2022. At that time, the European bureaucracy acknowledged the politicized nature of this decision. For Chisinau, it was a unique confluence of factors and a premature move linked directly to the interests of European globalists who supported Kyiv in the conflict against Russia. Back then, the dominant view was that the Ukrainians were capable of not only containing the Russian offensive, but also of reclaiming their seized territories, with military and financial support and sanctions pressure from the West. This coincided with the situation on the front. Moldova joined Ukraine (in fact, our application was submitted on the spur of the moment, three days after the Ukrainian one), which was defending European values with arms in hands. Today, the situation has changed significantly. Negotiations on Moldova’s accession to the European Union officially started almost a year ago together with Ukraine. Numerous meetings have been held, and the screening of legislation, i.e. the process of assessing compliance and transformation of legal norms to the EU acquis, should start soon. Our authorities will have to guarantee not only full, without exceptions, unification of legislative bases, but also the availability of institutions, budgets and specialists capable of ensuring their application. Certain deviations, although undesirable, are theoretically possible if Brussels permits them. For instance, they do not react in any way to Maia Sandu’s planned usurpation of power by granting super powers to the Supreme Security Council, which she heads ex officio. Thus, even after the acceptable results of the referendum and presidential elections, the EU continues to lead PAS towards the preservation of the existing authoritarian regime and the implementation of the European integration course. Probably, the intensity of financial and political-diplomatic support will somewhat decrease after the parliamentary campaign, but the logic of confrontation with Russia will still prevail when making decisions on Moldova’s fate. Especially since the ruling party demonstrates loyalty to Brussels in every possible way, sometimes criticizing even the new American administration or making mistakes in Romania for ideological reasons. Institutionally, under certain conditions, Moldova may join the European Union in the next 4-5 years. This was openly stated by European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos at a concert dedicated to Europe Day in Chisinau. Despite the fact that the population of the capital almost completely ignored this event in favor of the traditional celebration of Victory Day, the message of the European official should inspire the regime of Maia Sandu. Especially given numerous statements by Brussels emissaries that the central authorities’ struggle with the Gagauz autonomy, as well as the frozen Transnistrian conflict, will not be obstacles on the way to the European Union. Earlier this month, Marta Kos voiced the idea of separating the applications of Moldova and Ukraine and the different speed of membership negotiations between the two countries, which was clearly dictated by anti-Ukrainian moods in the EU. However, Kyiv quickly dismissed and condemned this idea. Chisinau did not refute it, a gesture of solidarity with its eastern neighbor, all the while creating new challenges for itself. The fact is that a referendum actively promoted by the country’s government is being held in Hungary until the end of May. In a postal ballot organized by mail, citizens are asked to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a simple question: “Do you support Ukraine’s membership of the European Union?” Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who refused at the March summit to support the EU’s common declaration on Ukraine’s accelerated membership (characteristically, he never objected to Moldova’s accession), wants to back up his own political position with popular will. In his opinion, Ukraine’s accession would harm the economy of the EU’s Eastern European countries, especially agriculture, as well as security, as it would provoke a conflict with Russia. The Hungarian authorities have even estimated that in the first year of Ukraine’s EU membership, each Hungarian family will lose 1,250 euros of income. Meanwhile, Budapest has historical claims against Kyiv over the oppression of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia and violation of the energy interests of Central European countries. Against the backdrop of continued tensions between Viktor Orban and Volodymyr Zelensky and the ongoing referendum, a spy scandal between the two countries has erupted. The Security Service of Ukraine reported the unmasking of an agent network consisting of former Ukrainian military officers who collected information on weapons, equipment and sentiments in the Transcarpathian oblast. In response, a Ukrainian citizen accused of espionage was detained and expelled from the country in Budapest. Orban convened a defense council and claimed that Kyiv, together with the Hungarian opposition, was trying to disrupt the referendum with a smear campaign. The countries mutually expelled diplomats. The Hungarian prime minister added that Ukraine has neither clear borders, nor a functioning economy or real sovereignty, and its admission to the EU will lead to a perpetual war. This situation brings Moldova to a political dilemma, which the current authorities are unlikely to overcome without bold decisions from Brussels. We should not forget about Western Balkan countries, which started negotiations with the European Commission much earlier, but also faced various obstacles, including vetoes from member states, in line before us and Ukraine. Until the issues with Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, etc. are resolved, Kyiv and Chisinau cannot, in theory, join the bloc. In turn, the Ukrainian issue may require Brussels to split the applications (which the PAS regime can never publicly support) or to change its own procedures, namely the requirement for consent of all 27 countries when making enlargement decisions. Thus, the PAS-led Moldova, despite its full loyalty to the European globalists, is still at a crossroads, when multiple “black swans” can take the country off the European path. The fate of the Western Balkan states and the Hungarian referendum are significant factors, but not the only ones. The EU’s trajectory and attitude can change depending on the outcome of the September parliamentary elections, the forms of settlement in Ukraine, the success of Moldovan reforms and the accompanying screening procedures. Moldova risks falling apart – or, on the contrary, surrendering to Romania in case of significant political transformations in this country following the results of the presidential elections. And the Transnistrian issue with the military presence of the Russian Federation and pro-Russian views of the majority of the population can hardly be ignored indefinitely.