How Can Nicusor Help Moldova and Ukraine?

Two weeks after taking office as President of Romania, Nicusor Dan began his Eastern European tour with stops in Chisinau and Odessa, where he is expected to offer full and unconditional support

Immediately after being elected to the high office of head of state, Nicusor Dan found himself in the position of a debtor, forced to fully serve the foreign policy agenda of all the partners who contributed to the continuation of Romania’s so-called ‘pro-Western course’. First in line, of course, was the persistent Maia Sandu, who left the new tenant of Cotroceni with no choice but to pledge his readiness to return the favor in the upcoming parliamentary elections this fall. The biased press practically forced him to make this statement publicly at the very moment he was declared the winner of the vote in the capital. A week later, at the Bucharest Nine (9) Summit in Vilnius, the new Romanian leader was already compelled to voice the common position of NATO’s eastern members, agreeing to strengthen joint support for Ukraine and Moldova as part of the effort to counter Russia, as well as to increase military spending to 5% of GDP. It was clear that the outgoing Polish president, Andrzej Duda, was no longer suitable for such statements given the results of the election in his country, whereas the newly minted ‘Romanian victor’ turned out to be just what was needed. However, the role of a talking head was assigned to Nicusor Dan not only at the Vilnius summit but also at a number of similar events. His cautious attempts to temper the wave of inflated expectations – given the fragile situation in his own country – are being deliberately ignored. In Lithuania, the former mayor of Bucharest stated that he does not currently plan to discuss military supplies to Kyiv, but Volodymyr Zelensky’s open invitation to Odessa left him no chance to avoid such a challenging conversation. On June 10 in Chisinau, Nicusor Dan appeared visibly confused, especially in contrast to the self-assured host. The problem was not only that the guest’s desire to stick to general statements about full support for Bessarabian Romanians clashed with a long and specific list of demands from Maia Sandu. The Romanian president was practically bombarded by the media, who reiterated the same demands – only publicly. Naturally, the issue goes far beyond reciprocal support in the upcoming autumn elections. In Chisinau, there is an expectation to simplify border crossing procedures over the Prut River, as long queues at the checkpoints have become one of the pressing issues of late. Another ‘request’ is the maximum possible reduction of bureaucracy in the process of issuing Romanian passports to Moldovan citizens. How Nicusor Dan is supposed to fulfill all these demands without a newly formed cabinet and amid Romania’s obligations as a Schengen Area member remains unclear. But that’s far from all. Bucharest is also expected to make decisions on funding energy integration projects and providing basic subsidies for energy supplies. The newly elected president is expected to make these promises despite the inevitable need to cut spending due to the economic crisis at home. On the other hand, a win-win option for Dan was to persuade the Moldovan public of the need to increase military spending – even at the expense of education and healthcare. Since Chisinau is striving for integration into Euro-Atlantic military structures and has officially aligned itself with Western partners in terms of long-term confrontation with Russia, there is no way to avoid the responsibility of contributing more to this common cause. Moldova’s previously stated goal of reaching 1% of GDP in military spending by 2030, let’s be honest, no longer impresses anyone and now seems rather feeble. After Chisinau, Nicusor Dan, together with Maia Sandu, was already awaited in Odessa by Volodymyr Zelensky. For the latter, this was an excellent opportunity –not only to host the fourth Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit but also to revive the trilateral cooperation format between Kyiv, Bucharest, and Chisinau, which had previously operated at the level of foreign ministers. Although the aggressive tone of the Ukrainian leadership’s rhetoric remains unchanged, in recent times it has felt an acute need to return to the top of the international news agenda. Any occasion serves that purpose. Amid strained communication with Hungary, Slovakia, and even Poland – not to mention Washington – political support from Romania and Moldova was more than welcome for Kyiv. According to official statements, the leaders in Odessa discussed regional and energy security, countering hybrid threats, cross-border and military-technical cooperation, European integration, and so on. From Dan, they essentially got what they wanted: formal expressions of support for Moldova’s and Ukraine’s EU membership, agreement to strengthen anti-Russian sanctions, and joint actions against Russia. It is very likely that the meetings included discussions on the energy component, given Odessa region’s urgent need for Romanian electricity, as well as the improvement of transport logistics between the three countries, including rail and road transit. In the military sphere, Kyiv is seeking assistance in enhancing its air defense capabilities, joint patrols of the Black Sea coastline, and coordination in the use of infrastructure for conducting various operations – and it seems that corresponding promises, albeit without concrete commitments, were given. For Maia Sandu, any PR is never superfluous. Formal solidarity with Kyiv and stern speeches directed at Russia have never been a problem for her. But most importantly, she has secured recognition from key neighbors that maintaining her regime in Moldova is a matter of special importance. Nicusor Dan’s situation is far more complicated. Yes, he can claim to have restored the trust of Romania’s main partners – except the US – and made the Romanian factor relevant again on the regional agenda. But that’s likely where it will stop for now. Practical steps will only follow if Brussels deems it appropriate to allocate new funds for this purpose. So it turns out to be a small campaign with one big secret: Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova will be united against Russia, and that friendship should be enough for each to manage their pressing problems, at least to some extent.