“Crushed by Eurointegration”. The Future of the Moldovan Orthodox Church

The authorities view the Moldovan Metropolis as a potential channel of Russian influence and are taking concrete steps to shrink its “living space” with a possible outright ban looming in the future

In recent years, the religious question in a number of post-Soviet states has shifted from a secondary, purely internal matter to one of the key indicators of foreign policy orientation. Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia have all gone through or are currently experiencing processes in which faith becomes increasingly intertwined with politics. In Moldova as well, a series of high-profile episodes suggests that the Church has become a battleground in the political struggle between pro-Russian and pro-European forces. At the heart of the church conflict lies the existence of two Orthodox metropolises – the Moldovan and the Bessarabian. The former is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, while the latter aligns with the Romanian Orthodox Church. Although both metropolises are legally recognized and operate in parallel, the confrontation between them has long gone beyond a purely canonical dispute. The current authorities are increasingly viewing the Moldovan Metropolis as a potential channel of Russian influence. This has led to heightened surveillance of priests, as well as more frequent inspections and pressure on parishioners. One of the most striking episodes was the detention of Bishop Marchel, who in April was not allowed to travel to Israel to collect the Holy Fire. This incident reflects the authorities’ general distrust of “Moscow Orthodoxy”, which is accompanied by their evident support for the Bessarabian Metropolis. Passions are gradually intensifying. In mid-June, the country’s leadership seemingly deliberately allowed a confrontation between two opposing groups, when supporters of traditional values , many of them Orthodox believers, took to the streets in a counter-protest during an LGBT march in the capital. These protests escalated into clashes with the police, with members of the traditionalist camp suffering the brunt of law enforcement actions, while participants of the march got off with mere administrative fines. An even more scandalous incident took place in the village of Grinauti, Riscani District, where, according to eyewitness reports, several dozen representatives of the Bessarabian Metropolis, including Romanian priests, attempted, with police support, to seize a church belonging to the Moldovan Metropolis. The local priest and hundreds of residents stood in defense and managed to prevent the takeover. This event may serve as a “test run”, drawing parallels with the Ukrainian scenario. Pressure on the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), subordinate to Moscow, began in neighboring countries as early as the 2010s. The peak came in 2018 with the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), supported by then-President Petro Poroshenko. This sparked a deep division within the country and a series of conflicts related to the transfer of parishes, forcible seizure of churches, and persecution of clergy. In Moldova, according to some experts, there are signs indicating a general movement in the same direction. For example, last year, PAS ruling party deputy Vasile Soimaru openly spoke about the intention to “separate from the Moldovan Metropolis” and even about its imminent ban. After a public scandal, the ruling party hurried to distance itself from their colleague, citing it as his “personal position”. However, subsequent actions by the authorities, as we can see, create a completely different impression. It is evident that the religious issue in our country is, to some extent, becoming a tool for the ruling regime’s foreign policy positioning. Essentially, the still relatively mild but persistent pressure on the Orthodox Church, similar to Ukraine, is being used to consolidate the pro-Western segment of society and marginalize those who advocate for preserving cultural and spiritual ties with Russia. However, such a policy risks deepening societal divisions even further, especially given that citizens are already divided by numerous other historical issues. Consequently, additional pressure on the church will only widen this split. PAS likely recognizes the risks inherent in confronting the canonical church, particularly in light of the upcoming elections. This is why the official rhetoric remains restrained, even though concrete measures are being taken to narrow the Moldovan Metropolis’ sphere of influence. The bet is placed on the fact that, for general public, the church remains an authoritative guide as the last major institutional entity wielding significant socio-political influence. This influence extends, among others, to loosely pro-Russian social groups. Therefore, neutralizing this resource is critically important for the strategy of “cleansing” the spiritual space from external influence coming from Moscow. Here arises a key question: won’t the struggle against the church become the very trigger that provokes a backlash and mobilizes a significant part of the population? It should be taken into account that for the majority of Moldovans living in provincial and rural areas, Orthodoxy is not merely an aesthetic or symbolic aspect of spiritual tradition, but an integral element of cultural and national identity. This phenomenon has deep historical roots and is closely intertwined with the socio-cultural fabric of society. Similar processes are taking place not only in Moldova and Ukraine but also in several Eastern European countries, where efforts are being made to establish a new model of relations between the state and the church under the pretext of combating “Russian influence”, while blatantly disregarding the rights of believers and freedom of conscience. In Moldova’s case, the religious issue has unexpectedly become part of the broader “European integration program”, within which the authorities seek to eliminate anything that might be perceived as an obstacle on this path, including the “inconvenient” church. Thus, the religious issue in Moldova is becoming an additional factor in the geopolitical confrontation, dividing the country into two camps. The recent history of the post-Soviet space, particularly in Georgia, clearly demonstrates that pressure on religious institutions does not promote social consolidation. On the contrary, such attempts often produce the opposite effect – they deepen polarization, provoke protests, and contribute to radicalization. In an already significantly divided Moldovan society, exposing religious conflicts may trigger widespread tension. Before the elections, the authorities will undoubtedly continue to navigate between demonstrating loyalty to the Western course and the need to maintain the support of a significant portion of the population oriented toward traditional and spiritual values. However, thereafter, a controlled escalation cannot be ruled out, aimed at obtaining a legal pretext to resolve the religious issue once and for all in favor of one of the Orthodox churches. Under pressure from circumstances, the Moldovan Metropolis may shift from its previous restraint to a more active public and even political stance. As a result, tensions between the state and the church risk sharply increasing, and among believers, distrust toward the political regime may strengthen. Ultimately, this creates a threat of long-term destabilization both at the level of individual parishes and across the entire country.