PAS Confronts an Unpredictable Risk Factor

The mother of the former head of the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office has returned to Moldova and, on the eve of parliamentary elections, launched a flurry of activity that has sparked irritation and even fear within the ruling party.

This week, the Dragalin surname once again made headlines in Moldovan media. Surprisingly, the primary focus is not the return of the former anticorruption chief herself, though she has been giving interviews to opposition-aligned journalists about her past clashes with the authorities, but rather her mother’s unexpected arrival in Moldova. For any normal parent, defending their children from hostile attacks is a natural priority. Moldovans, largely committed to traditional family values, are no exception. Even prolonged separation does little to dull that instinct. It is thus not entirely surprising that Elena Dragalin has thrown herself so fervently into the fray on her daughter’s behalf. However, her actions seem driven not only by a thirst for justice or personal revenge, but also by political ambition and a readiness for prolonged struggle. Moldova has been without a formally appointed U.S. ambassador for over a year that has affected bilateral relations. The recent transfer of Vladislav Kulminski to Washington offers hope for restored engagement, but only in the longer term. For now, the most influential “American” to arrive with a political message is none other than Elena Dragalin herself. She has openly criticized the current government and is actively positioning herself within the pre-election battleground to work toward PAS’ defeat. The ruling elite now faces a direct and ill-timed challenge to which it has no easy response. Dragalin’s extensive network makes overt confrontation a risky proposition for many. Her arrival is clearly linked to settling scores and demanding redress from PAS for its abrupt removal of her daughter from influence. The decision to declare Veronica Dragalin as having failed the vetting procedure, along with efforts to exclude her mother from organizing the US-based voting during the last presidential election, appear to have been the final straw. Initially, PAS officials and leadership conspicuously ignored the prolonged stay of the Dragalins in the country. But having seemingly exhausted more discreet avenues, Elena Dragalin has now taken off the gloves. In various districts, she has reactivated ties with figures connected to diaspora engagement programs – local officials, opinion leaders, and others who have benefitted from her initiatives in the past. All signs suggest she aims to seriously undermine PAS’ traditionally strong support among overseas voters. Her statements, accusing the authorities of rolling back democratic progress, undermining the rule of law, restricting free expression, intimidating citizens, and misinforming the diaspora through state-friendly media, have dealt a heavy blow to the ruling party and its media apparatus, many of whom had also previously enjoyed Dragalin’s support. While she has so far refrained from attacking Maia Sandu directly, this likely reflects a tactical decision to avoid alienating potential allies. Efforts are already underway to portray the US visitor as “toxic” or politically dangerous, though these attempts have so far come across as clumsy. Dragalin, a seasoned operator, continues to forge ties with influential business leaders and respected public figures. For many Moldovans who still look to Washington, her reputation and connections may carry more weight than those of the newly appointed Ambassador Kulminski. While she cannot replace the full scope of USAID assistance, she is still well-positioned to facilitate selective support, and possesses compromising information on several figures within the ruling establishment. Notably, Elena Dragalin has publicly positioned herself as open to cooperation not just with business, but also with political actors. Her presence in the electoral landscape introduces a wildcard that could allow a rival force to directly court the PAS electorate. Until now, polling has shown relative stability in PAS’ ratings, with voter shifts confined largely to left-centrist constituencies. But should Dragalin, for instance, appear on the electoral list of the “Alternativa” bloc, we may witness dramatic changes in polling trends. At present, her moves appear to be a political invitation, perhaps a prelude to behind-the-scenes bargaining with the government. Yet the longer this invitation goes unanswered, the greater the chance of electoral surprises. Of course, there are risks for Dragalin herself if she formally affiliates with a political party – risks to both her standing as a representative of the Moldovan-American diaspora and to any would-be partners. At the same time, formal alignment may not be necessary. In Moldova, informal arrangements and backchannel deals often suffice to create major political headaches. As both mother and daughter have indicated in interviews, the best outcome for the country would be the end of PAS’ political monopoly. Their message is not so much a call to support someone else as it is a call to vote against the “yellows”. The logic is clear: a shift in power and a return to coalition-based governance would elevate the role of emissaries like Dragalin once more. Restoring the family’s prestige may well be the underlying mission. Regardless, the continued presence of the Dragalins in Moldova now constitutes a tangible risk factor for the ruling party that cannot be ignored. And the threat is not limited to shifting US-based voter sentiment. A strategic campaign abroad could very well influence the broader European Moldovan diaspora as well. One plausible scenario: voters abroad simply boycott the elections out of disillusionment with PAS and lack of appealing alternatives. Whether the authorities can compensate for this lost support through electoral manipulation remains an open question.