The Chisinau “Historic Summit”: Issues and Interpretations

Another “historic” step toward European integration, at least according to our authorities, took place in the form of the first bilateral “Moldova–EU” summit in Chisinau. Yet behind the ceremonial speeches, EU flags, and carefully worded declarations remain complex questions for which, it seems, no one has clear answers

On the eve of the summit, the European Commission, through its representative Guillaume Mercier, delivered a rather explicit message: Moldova’s application to begin EU accession talks will not be separated from Ukraine’s. “We are not calling for Moldova’s decoupling. This is a decision for EU member states,” said Mercier. In essence, despite Chisinau’s efforts to convince European partners of its readiness, we were once again told that progress in dialogue with the EU will remain unlikely without Kyiv. This statement only reinforced what many experts have long believed: Moldova and Ukraine will continue to be perceived as part of a “single Eastern package”. Ironically, Hungary, while actively blocking Ukraine’s application, would be quite open to seeing Moldova advance separately. These are diplomatic nuances for now, but behind them lie Moldova’s future domestic political dynamics and Brussels’ ability to advance its broader geopolitical agenda. Formally, the summit reaffirmed unwavering EU political support for Moldova or, more precisely, for the ruling regime led by Maia Sandu and the “Action and Solidarity” Party (PAS). In fact, however, the summit’s elegant wrapping conceals a familiar message of “postponed decisions”: genuine accession talks will begin only after the 2025 parliamentary elections and only if the PAS wins and Ukraine avoids further destabilization. This ambiguity was especially evident in the summit’s final language. The EU expressed support for opening the “first cluster” – the foundational block covering justice, fundamental freedoms, human rights, public procurement, and financial oversight. But while this cluster opens first, it is closed last. In other words, anyone in Chisinau who expects an accelerated process is deluding themselves. The road ahead will be long and subject to rigorous oversight from Brussels, which, just like Moscow, believes no tears. No “advance credit” will be given. Moldova must not only promise reforms (a national tradition), but actually demonstrate tangible progress under the EU’s watchful eye. Domestically, the promise of a “European life” is increasingly met with skepticism. A recent IMAS poll, published just days before the summit, shows that over 60% of citizens view PAS and the president’s performance as unsatisfactory. Support for EU integration has dropped to 47%, with an equal share opposing it – a historic low for Moldova in the past decades. The opposition, reasonably, has pointed out that the summit served as a campaign tool for the ruling party. More broadly, it reflects how the EU has shifted from being a primarily economic project to a geopolitical bloc striving to fill the void left by weakening transatlantic cohesion. In this light, Ursula von der Leyen’s remark that Moldova reminds her of “Miorita and stuffed cabbage rolls” is symbolic: Brussels is eager to offer poetic metaphors, yet these do little to address citizens’ real problems: rising prices, high utility bills, and mass emigration. The biggest “elephant in the room” remains the Transnistrian issue, which everyone seems keen to avoid discussing publicly. And yet the string of recent visits to Tiraspol by diplomats from Kyiv, Brussels, and Paris suggests otherwise. It is an open secret that no real EU membership is possible without a resolution to this long-standing conflict. At the same time, a fast-tracked EU course may only deepen the divide across the Dniester. Whether Moldovan citizens are prepared to accept ambiguous compromises on this issue in exchange for EU membership is an open question. Experts have not ruled out a potential decoupling of Moldova from Ukraine’s accession dossier. If such a decision were made before the elections, it could theoretically offer Maia Sandu’s team a powerful political advantage, but also risks provoking a sharp response from Kyiv. In any case, Moldova’s European trajectory is no longer fully in its own hands. It is now tied to developments in Ukraine, EU internal politics, and Brussels’ ability to reach a deal with Budapest. Meanwhile, a large segment of the Moldovan public is growing weary of endless debates about EU integration and war. People want results: jobs, fair courts, safe streets, and lower prices, none of which were central topics at the summit. Instead, the leaders gathered in Chisinau spoke of “resilience to hybrid threats”, “digital transformation”, and “space partnerships”. Moldova pledged to expand its contribution to EU defense and security missions, to cooperate with the European Defense Agency, and to participate in programs like Copernicus and Galileo that offer access to satellite technologies. Its inclusion in the “Security for Europe” initiative will allow joint arms procurement. But for the average Moldovan, all of this feels distant and alien. In the end, the Chisinau summit revealed that Moldova continues its thorny path toward Europe, but without a clear calendar, without guarantees, and without robust domestic consensus. The political class exploits EU integration as an electoral tool, while Brussels increasingly uses it as a geopolitical lever in its confrontation with the Kremlin. The only question is: how much longer will the Moldovan public be willing to listen to these promises in the absence of real reforms, a clear accession plan, and confidence that Moldova is not being drawn, unwittingly, into someone else’s defense policy under the guise of integration? Looking ahead, the EU accession process is likely to remain largely symbolic and highly dependent on external factors. Despite all the summits and warm receptions, Brussels is not prepared to give Chisinau the green light without simultaneous progress in Kyiv. Meaningful negotiations may not begin until autumn 2025 and only if PAS performs well in the elections. Unless the government offers voters a realistic European roadmap with measurable outcomes, the integration narrativeб long used to mask its failuresб may lose public relevance. And then, far less convenient questions will move to the forefront, for which, let’s be honest, the ruling party has no convincing answers.