PAS Stumbles Through Its Pre-Election Campaign

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Anton ŠVEC
The ruling party entered the election campaign burdened with numerous violations of electoral laws, flaws, and scandals. With such baggage, even strong support from Brussels and opposition mistakes may not be enough to secure victory
The clumsy campaigning and controversial attempts at rebranding PAS this summer increasingly resemble panic, causing potential partners to turn away and fueling opposition sentiments even among wavering supporters. The steadily rising negative ratings of Maia Sandu’s protégés sociologically indicate the impossibility of maintaining an outright majority in the new parliament through fair voting. The recent departure of two parties from the pro-European and pro-government “Together” bloc, including the relatively successful League of Towns and Municipalities, which performed well in local elections two years ago, effectively excludes the bloc from parliament and, consequently, deprives PAS of an organic partner for the future. According to some leaks, it was the ruling party’s intransigence that was the main reason for the bloc’s dismantling; it was offered only three mandates in the new legislature – fundamentally fewer than the original number of its participants. This tactic seems mistaken, as PAS faces numerous problems filling its own electoral list. The idea of uniting the entire right flank was rejected on the strange assumption that it would lead to fragmentation of its core electorate and reduce party discipline and control in the future parliament. Instead, the party’s candidate list is being managed through crude PR. Yet the authorities’ political technologists have failed to attract people with unquestionable authority, if such even exist in the country. Each new name is met with waves of criticism of varying degrees. Moreover, the premature publication of the candidate list has already led to a complaint to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) by the “Alternativa” bloc for violating election laws. PAS’ justification that the candidates presented by Igor Grosu are not yet official and will be further considered casts doubt on the adequacy of processes occurring within the “yellows”. Of course, the CEC, controlled by PAS, will not sanction the regime since it would be self-destructive, but this stance inevitably affects the legitimacy of the electoral process and voters’ perceptions. PAS’s lists already include university rectors and creative intellectuals who previously cooperated with other pro-European projects, with Vlad Plahotniuc, and even with the communists. The lists also feature representatives of the LGBT+ community (which, in our realities, is more of a liability for the authorities) and a businesswoman from Gagauzia who is unknown in Comrat or rather, now known but in a negative light. Recent scandals arose amid a “sports injection” into the ruling party’s positioning. Footballer Maxim Potirniche, who by age 36 scored only one goal in his professional career (and that in the Belarusian championship) and played for the national team only four times, hardly fits the star status – likely he just knows someone from PAS. Wrestler Anastasia is indeed a titled athlete but also faced criticism for refusing to help her mother after an accident and for receiving an apartment from Vlad Plahotniuc’s regime – the keys personally handed over by then-Prime Minister Pavel Filip. There is a clear sense that PAS’ political technologists are unable to conduct proper verification of biographies and anticipate public reaction to the presentation of new party members. As a result, every move is a misstep. The party congress, held hot on the heels of the first Moldova-EU summit, did nothing to boost Sandu’s party rating, despite her personal appearance, yet she seems to neglect tight control over her colleagues’ autonomous actions, especially Speaker Grosu. In addition, the ruthless scrutiny of the ruling party’s list inevitably leads to internal splits, as dissatisfaction among current parliamentarians may eventually become public. This is especially likely given the presence on the right flank of figures who actively criticize the authorities and could attract PAS members placed on losing spots, from the Dragalin family to Vlad Filat and the unionists. Meanwhile, PAS manages to divide society with nearly every political move. Another negative example was the commemorative event for victims of Soviet-era deportations (which, notably, included a time frame starting in 1943, when Moldova was still occupied and Stalinist repressions could not have occurred here). During the laying of flowers at the memorial, images of crimes committed by German Nazis in territories unrelated to Moldova were used. The topic of deportations and repressions, which fuels conflict and distrust in society, is nonetheless aggressively promoted by PAS with stubborn persistence. The “Victory” bloc, affiliated with Ilan Sor and operating with Russian support, would have had every chance to get representatives into parliament. But sociology in this case is almost meaningless, as the regime will not allow the bloc to participate in the campaign. The fact that the “Victory” congress was held in Moscow in the presence of Russian officials and Ilan Sor, and plans to appoint Evghenia Gutul, who is awaiting trial and is a subject of a political criminal case, as the bloc’s head only makes it easier for the authorities to remove a competitor from the elections. Brussels will undoubtedly support and recognize these actions since the oligarch is on the EU sanctions list. A separate mistake by Sor was his statement about Moldova’s need to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a purely military alliance led by Russia, which contradicts Moldova’s promotion as a neutral state (a position supported by the vast majority of the population). However, the plan may be that such statements strengthen the positions of the Socialist Party and other leftist forces, who plan to adopt more moderate slogans. In this sense, the mistakes of PAS and “Victory” play into the hands of the main competitors– the “Alternativa” bloc and the cooperation of left-wing parties that still need formalization, as well as hypothetically “Our Party” of Renato Usatîi, who recently pleased Chisinau with a concert by Russian rapper Basta and threatens to become a destabilizing factor in the upcoming electoral campaign. The current balance, considering administrative and external resources, does not yet look critical for PAS, but the regime cannot afford further mistakes.