Intensified Diplomacy Between Chisinau and Tiraspol: Where Is It Leading?

The recent uptick in activity from Ukraine, the EU, and the OSCE, along with occasional signals from traditional stakeholders and emerging power centers in European politics, suggests that groundwork may be underway for a potential relaunch of negotiations on the Transnistrian settlement as early as this fall

Despite the peak of the election campaign, this summer has unexpectedly brought renewed attention to an issue that, in recent years, has hardly been a priority for the Moldovan authorities: the Transnistrian conflict. Since the dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol essentially came to a standstill and Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Oleg Serebrian found himself, as some experts put it, “one foot in Turkey”, international actors have increasingly taken center stage. The absence of traditional negotiation formats has created a vacuum that external mediators are now actively moving to fill. These include Ukraine, the European Union, the OSCE, and, to some extent, Russia. A key moment was the visit of Ukrainian Foreign Ministry special envoy Marko Shevchenko. Together with the head of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission, he met with Oleg Serebrian to discuss the regional situation and opportunities arising from both countries’ EU candidate status. Kyiv reaffirmed its commitment to supporting Chisinau in the reintegration process and expressed readiness to strengthen coordination. The delegation then visited Tiraspol for talks with the Transnistrian leadership. It was the first visit of Ukrainian diplomats to the left bank of the Dniester since last year. The regional head reiterated concerns over the lack of dialogue and stressed that the 5+2 format remains the only acceptable one. Additionally, Tiraspol reaffirmed its willingness to continue providing humanitarian aid to Ukrainian refugees and its desire to maintain ties with Ukraine, despite the drastic reduction in economic cooperation. Ahead of the Moldova-EU summit, the EU special representative Dorota Dlouchy-Suliga also visited the country. On the right bank, she discussed the challenges surrounding the conflict, the energy and economic crises, while on the left bank, she once again heard appeals to revive the 5+2 process. Behind the scenes of press releases, one can assume a more complex agenda is unfolding, that involves Moldova’s EU integration and the dilemma of synchronizing that process with a reintegration strategy that has stalled. Although the visit of the French ambassador to Tiraspol on the day of the July 4th summit received little media attention, it appears to have been symbolically important, given France’s growing role in the region. Notably, around the same time, France resolved a long-running dispute with New Caledonia by signing an agreement to grant the territory a special status. While the contexts differ significantly, France’s diplomatic success in a comparable setting invites curiosity. Unofficial sources, which are difficult to verify, suggest that a group of Russian diplomats, including the ambassador to Moldova, also visited the left bank of the Dniester on the same day. Despite the lack of official confirmation, it’s worth noting that this coincided with a rare phone call between Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin. Alongside major international issues, it is entirely plausible that Moldova was also discussed. On July 8, the diplomatic relay continued with a visit from the OSCE Chairperson’s Special Representative, Thomas Lenk. He visited both Chisinau, where he looked into issues like freedom of movement, access to Romanian-language schools, and the rights of Dubasari district farmers, and Tiraspol, where he encountered accusations of feigned negotiation efforts and calls to support a genuine revival of dialogue. So, what explains this sudden diplomatic uptick? While the results of Moldova’s parliamentary elections are indeed significant for the region, the current wave of activity is likely driven by broader concerns than domestic political dynamics alone. This fall will mark a key internal reset, requiring a review of national priorities and of the strategic approach to the Transnistrian issue. More importantly, there’s a growing realization within the EU that frozen conflicts cannot be left in limbo, especially in today’s fragile geopolitical landscape across Eastern Europe. Though the 5+2 format remains effectively nonfunctional, the broader trend toward restarting dialogue, via bilateral and multilateral channels, is becoming increasingly evident. The actions of Ukraine, the EU, and the OSCE, combined with signals from both traditional and emerging players in European diplomacy, indicate that stakeholders may indeed be preparing the ground for a renewed negotiating track this fall. Several factors could be contributing to this shift: the conclusion of Moldova’s key electoral cycle and the beginning of a new political season, as well as the need to stabilize the regional situation ahead of winter, which in recent years has consistently brought a range of challenges and crises. The outcome of the elections will determine the possible format of consultations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, whether in an expanded or hybrid arrangement. That said, a full-fledged relaunch of the 5+2 format remains unlikely at this stage. Until the parliamentary campaign concludes, the authorities will act with caution, sticking to vague official comments that align with PAS’ election messaging. However, once a new political configuration is in place (provided there is no post-election crisis) a reassessment of the government’s strategy toward Tiraspol may follow, including early-stage political contact under Western guidance. Moscow, for its part, still hopes to remain a relevant regional player and will continue its efforts to reassert influence within the negotiation framework, seeking to curtail the growing involvement of other power centers. The renewal of high-level contact between the Kremlin and European capitals suggests a tentative return to discussions on “post-Soviet affairs”, even if only in the form of exploratory consultations. The OSCE, meanwhile, appears poised to maintain its moderating role, ensuring at least a minimal channel of communication between the parties and preserving the institutional infrastructure needed for more robust negotiations once the geopolitical climate improves.