The PAS-Era Parliament Ends in Disgrace and Disorder

The mandate of Moldova’s 11th Parliament officially ended following its final plenary session on July 10. In theory, this could benefit PAS’ electoral campaign, since parliamentarians’ increasingly erratic behavior will no longer irritate voters, and the left-wing opposition loses a crucial public platform

The legislature, elected in the 2021 snap elections, was one of the few in 21st-century Moldova to serve out its full term. Lacking broad popular support, it nonetheless played a decisive role in consolidating the authoritarian governance style of Maia Sandu and the ruling PAS. The disjointed closing speech by Speaker Igor Grosu, resembling post-ironic performance art, only reinforced the impression of a dysfunctional administration. Attempting to frame key failures as achievements was a fitting finale to a chaotic chapter in governance, as well as a final insult to the electorate. In true “mad printer” fashion, the outgoing Parliament rushed nearly 80 draft laws onto its final session agenda, approving them without proper review, public debate, or respect for procedural norms. Among these was yet another performative declaration in support of EU integration. The slapdash legislative process shocked even government-friendly civil society organizations such as Promo-LEX. Some hastily passed laws had immediate consequences. Amendments to the Law on the Legal Profession sparked outrage from the Moldovan Bar Association, which declared a strike. Emergency consultations with the Ministry of Justice eased tensions slightly after lawmakers admitted their mistake, but said it could only be corrected by the next Parliament. The situation now threatens to paralyze court proceedings unless a workable interim solution is found. While the spring-summer parliamentary session officially ends July 31, deputies still have time to adopt ordinary laws and carry out official duties (such as participating in international delegations funded by the state budget). Further “blunders” or rushed decisions damaging to the regime’s image remain a possibility. PAS’ problems aren’t confined to Parliament. Earlier this week, Chief of Police Viorel Cernauteanu stirred controversy by awarding a medal to blogger Eugeniu Luchianiuc, who turned out to be a vocal critic of the government. Under pressure from Prime Minister Dorin Recean, the award was hastily revoked. This is not the first time the top police official has managed to “find a puddle in the desert and drown in it”, dragging down the ruling party’s ratings in the process. Meanwhile, the police’s flurry of electoral corruption cases is collapsing one by one in court, further undermining PAS’ standing. Another blow to the credibility of both the executive and judicial branches is the case of Bolduresti mayor Nicanor Ciochina. Despite dubious election results and inconsistent rulings by the Central Electoral Commission and various courts, Ciochina retained his post, even though he’s facing a criminal case with little public doubt about his guilt. Surprisingly, the authorities, usually unafraid to pressure the judiciary, chose not to intervene. This was a missed opportunity: barring Ciochina from office due to criminal charges would likely have been welcomed by the public and could’ve set a useful precedent for disqualifying stronger political opponents. Currently, courts are reviewing high-profile cases involving Evghenia Gutul, Marina Tauber, Igor Dodon, and others. One possible reason for the governmentэs inaction? Some opposition figures under investigation may be viewed as convenient foils for PAS. Alternatively, PAS leaders might fear that they themselves could face criminal charges after the elections and are wary of establishing a precedent that could jeopardize their own future in politics. Either way, the authorities failed to resolve or even clearly address the scandal. The most outrageous manifestation of pre-election panic was the unprecedented personal agreement with newly elected Romanian President Nicusor Dan, who, notably, won with administrative backing from Maia Sandu, to impose entry restrictions into the Schengen Area on several political rivals of the regime: Ion Ceban, Natalia Morari, and possibly Vasile Tarlev. Had Austria and the Netherlands, long-time skeptics of Romania’s Schengen accession, known how Bucharest would wield its new status to take part in Moldova’s internal political settling of scores, they might have thought twice before giving their approval. In fact, this move may boost Ion Ceban’s popularity, allowing him to position himself as a victim of political persecution while focusing his campaign efforts on Chisinau. Over time, this legally dubious tactic could backfire, creating political and legal problems for Brussels and forcing a reevaluation of the decision. The government is clearly nervous, and the pressure isn’t just domestic. On Monday, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service released a statement clearly aimed at influencing Moldovan voters, suggesting that continued PAS rule, under obligations to the EU and NATO, could lead to the abandonment of constitutional neutrality and conflict with Moscow. As parliamentary elections approach, Maia Sandu and PAS are expected to tighten their grip, increase political repression, and make more strategic blunders. The only question is whether and how the opposition can seize the moment.