Wild Cards in Moldova’s Parliamentary Race

Two months ahead of the parliamentary elections, the main electoral niches have already taken shape, setting the stage for the frontrunners. Yet, the final distribution of seats could still be significantly influenced by a number of unresolved factors that remain up in the air

The strategy of the ruling party, which recently published its list of candidates, remains clear and predictable. It aims to mobilize its core electorate and bureaucratic apparatus through administrative leverage and budgetary handouts, weaken its competitors as much as possible, and secure external (Western) legitimacy for the electoral process. The latter is particularly important, as it provides cover for the expected violations: for instance, in how diaspora voting is organized or in restricting the voting rights of Moldovan citizens in Russia (where only two polling stations will be opened), Belarus, and the left bank of the Dniester. So far, this objective is faltering due to multiple scandals, though no one expected anything different from the current regime. The cooptation of a few individuals from the'Dignity and Truth platform, without forming an electoral bloc or changing logos, has little impact on the electoral layout. PAS currently enjoys the support of roughly one-third of the population and is counting on the diaspora vote to convert this into 51 seats or more. The key objective of the two main opposition forces – the Party of Socialists and affiliated political projects (assuming the pro-government Central Electoral Commission allows the leftist bloc formed around Igor Dodon, Irina Vlah, Vladimir Voronin, and Vasile Tarlev to participate in the elections) and the Alternativa bloc – is to secure enough votes to prevent PAS from ruling alone. In this regard, the Socialists and their newly allied partners have both stable approval and disapproval ratings, which allows them to count on a solid (though non-majority) presence in the 12th Parliament, provided no political “black swans” emerge. The situation around the Alternativa bloc is far more ambiguous. Alexandru Stoianoglo’s personal approval rating has dissipated amid the chaotic and often unsuccessful efforts of his bloc partners, failing to deliver the expected electoral boost. The political offensive launched by Chisinau and Bucharest against Ion Ceban has also weakened the bloc’s standing, while its complex (albeit intriguing) campaign platform remains largely uncommunicated to ordinary voters. The added value of having the Civic Congress led by Mark Tkaciuk and Ion Chicu’s Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova within the bloc has, rather unexpectedly, turned out to be close to zero in electoral terms. Moreover, these very bloc members are likely to become the next targets, after Ceban, of attacks from pro-government media, bloggers, and other regime-aligned figures. One potential opportunity for Alternativa to boost its standing lies in the publication of its candidate list, which is currently in the final stages of preparation. With just over two months remaining before the elections, the situation is shaping up in such a way that all major contenders risk being dissatisfied with the final outcome, unless they take additional measures. Neither PAS on its own, nor the Socialists in alliance with the Alternativa bloc, appear capable, based on dry polling figures, of securing the 51-seat majority in the next parliament. At the same time, a significant share of the electorate, those supporting other parties, wavering or still undecided, remains in limbo. In recent polls, the proportion of respondents unwilling to disclose their future vote in advance consistently exceeds 15%. This allows for the projection that certain X-factors, or their combined effect, will play a decisive role in determining the outcome of the vote and the configuration of power by mid-autumn. This is not to mention the highly likely scenario in which PAS refuses to acknowledge the loss of its majority and, relying on support from the European Commission, continues its power grab by resorting to blatantly anti-democratic methods. A key prospective asset for the regime is Renato Usatii’s Our Party, which, leveraging the personal ratings of its populist leader, is currently hovering around the electoral threshold. In previous years, the party was repeatedly stripped of its legal right to participate in elections. This time, however, the authorities appear to view Usaiîi as the only suitable client, one who could be easily “bought” in exchange for minimal access to resources and certain political guarantees. He has managed to avoid repression during the campaign, freely purchases political advertising space, and has even brought several popular Russian performers to Moldova (not affiliated with the “political émigré” clique). The fact that Our Party no longer presents itself as aligned with official Moscow is underscored by the departure of Dumitru Ciubasenco, known for his pragmatic view of Russia. That said, one cannot entirely rule out the possibility that Renato Usatii maintains contact with pro-Kremlin handlers. The Our Party factor, specifically, whether it crosses the parliamentary threshold and whom it chooses to align with, may significantly affect the post-election configuration. Another noteworthy point is the distribution of votes linked to the pro-Russian Victory bloc, administered by Ilan Sor. The Central Electoral Commission has already issued an automatic decision barring it from participating in the upcoming elections. By appointing Evghenia Gutul, who may face an actual prison sentence in the coming weeks, as the bloc’s front-runner, Sor could hardly have expected any other stance from the CEC. The Victory bloc and the Moldovan oligarch behind it, along with, indirectly, the Kremlin, now face the task of redirecting its voter base toward other opposition parties. This operation is likely to be sophisticated (given that Moldovan police are reportedly inspecting apps installed on many pensioners’ phones), costly, and adaptable in its execution. A share of votes, equivalent to 10–12 parliamentary seats, could drift either toward the left-wing camp or toward the Alternativa bloc. One scenario may involve boosting and helping another political project, such as Victoria Furtuna’s “Great Moldova”, cross the threshold. That’s rather a risky maneuver if the CEC again intervenes with politically motivated restrictions. Whatever decision is ultimately made in Moscow, a well-executed implementation could seriously undermine PAS, which will likely resort to every available tool to suppress the electoral will of the constituency that once backed Victory. In the event of a tight race, even independent candidates could theoretically play a decisive role. So far, five individuals have submitted documents to the Central Electoral Commission, with more likely to follow over the summer. However, the only contender currently seen as capable of surpassing the historically prohibitive 2% electoral threshold for non-party candidates is Olesea Stamate – a professional and principled figure who enjoys considerable support in urban circles. If the number of such candidates grows beyond just a handful (it may be time for the likes of Sergiu Stefanco, Veronica Dragalin, Victor Parlicov, Chiril Lucinschi, and Chiril Gaburici to take the stage), the political landscape could begin to shift in an unorthodox direction. A potential “black swan” in this race could be the long-forgotten Vlad Plahotniuc, who was detained yesterday by Greek police. Should his extradition proceed, the oligarch and former political operator would fall under the control of the current authorities and could then be wielded against their opponents through various means, from testimony to outright “re-acquisition”. In such a scenario, some would be “rubbing their hands”, while others “hold their breath”. Even now, Plahotniuc’s arrest is already overshadowing what should have been a major development: the formation of a leftist bloc uniting four parties.