Moscow-Chisinau Relations on the Brink of a Freeze?

Russian-Moldovan relations continue to deteriorate rapidly, reaching their lowest point in decades. Amid geopolitical upheavals caused by the conflict in Ukraine and Western expansion in Eastern Europe, Moldova finds itself at a crossroads, where its future is increasingly determined by the choice between two geopolitical poles. The results of the parliamentary elections on September 28 are likely to solidify the country’s shift towards a long-term anti-Russian direction

As of today, Russian-Moldovan relations are virtually paralyzed. Diplomatic barbs have become a routine matter, and former channels of cooperation have either been destroyed or minimized. Russia still seeks to maintain historical ties with Moldova, support the Russian-speaking population, and engage in dialogue with the Moldovan leadership: these priorities were recently outlined by Russian Ambassador Oleg Ozerov in an interview. However, he also criticized the current authorities, who, in his opinion, are pursuing an openly pro-Western policy, ignoring the interests of a major part of the population. At the same time, Ozerov stated that Russia does not seek confrontation but expects steps towards reconciliation from the Moldovan elites, such as revising decisions on the expulsion of Russian diplomats and reducing the number of voting stations for Moldovan citizens in Russia. Such statements can, to some extent, be interpreted as a willingness to compromise, but with a firm consideration of Russia’s own geopolitical interests. The parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of September will likely become a key event that will determine the future trajectory of bilateral relations. Moscow probably sees them as the last chance to steer Moldovan politics towards a more or less neutral or even loyal direction. Otherwise, Moldova will firmly establish itself in the Western orbit, and Russia’s room for maneuver will virtually disappear. Against this backdrop, the Kremlin is increasingly sending electoral signals. Through loyal politicians and media resources, it indicates that a change in power could lead to a return to mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation. One of the key levers Moscow is using to restore its influence in Moldova is energy. In recent years, our country has faced serious problems in this sector, especially after the reduced gas supplies from Russia and the rise in energy prices. Given Chisinau’s vulnerability, Russia is signaling the possibility of resuming the import of cheap energy resources, provided there is “political maturity.” The calculation is that energy stability remains one of the main concerns of the Moldovan population. Therefore, these reassuring messages from Russia are expected to resonate strongly with our voters, especially in light of the economic difficulties caused by inflation and rising energy prices. A powerful tool for influencing public opinion in Moldova has always been the concessions made by Russian authorities towards our migrant workers. Last week, Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing Moldovan citizens working in Russia to legally work without a patent until October 2026. This decision has a clear political subtext, especially against the backdrop of stricter residency rules for citizens of unfriendly countries and the expulsion of migrants from nations that have entered into confrontation with Moscow. Thus, such an amnesty appears as a “gesture of goodwill”, appealing to hundreds of thousands of Moldovans and their relatives back home, who continue to view Russia as a primary source of income. Against the backdrop of growing pressure from both the East and the West, public sentiment in Moldova reflects a clear desire for balance. According to a survey conducted in early July by the sociological company IMAS, 77% of respondents expressed support for maintaining good relations with both Russia and the European Union. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of respondents expressed a desire to improve ties with Russia. This is evidence of a significant electoral resource that Moscow is diligently trying to mobilize for the upcoming election campaign. However, the hopes of the population sharply contrast with the position of the country’s leadership. Maia Sandu has repeatedly emphasized that Moldova’s priority is integration into the European Union, and relations with Russia should be built on terms that exclude any influence from Russia on Moldova. In one of her recent interviews, the president stated that she would do everything possible to ensure that Russia cannot use Moldova as a tool in its foreign policy, as, in her opinion, this would turn the country into a base for a hybrid attack against the EU. These words, addressed to both external partners and the domestic audience, effectively rule out the chance of restarting relations with Moscow if the current regime remains in place after the parliamentary elections, which will be held under the slogan “EU Membership in 2028.” Thus, the vote for citizens essentially becomes a traditional geopolitical choice between the West and the East. This only confirms the controversial but highly symptomatic decision by the subservient Central Election Commission to open only two polling stations in Russia for voting in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Despite harsh criticism from the opposition and Moscow itself, this move reflects Chisinau’s deep mistrust even towards its own citizens temporarily residing in Russia, let alone the country they are staying in. Regardless of the Commission’s justifications, in the logic of the current political course, it appears as part of a broader strategy to limit Moscow’s influence on internal, including electoral, processes in Moldova. In conclusion, it must be acknowledged that the relationship between Russia and Moldova is currently on the brink of a final break, which could be formally sealed after September 28. Recognizing these risks, Russia will expand its efforts to influence the Moldovan electorate, using the full range of available tools: from energy initiatives to supporting loyal politicians and measures to win over public support. However, objectively speaking, its capabilities are limited by sanctions and isolation from the West, so the Russian electoral scenario is highly unlikely. If the opposition does succeed, partial thawing of relations with Moscow is not ruled out. However, the current regional and international context is so complex that even a change in the power structure is unlikely to lead to the restoration of Moldova’s pragmatic neutrality model. In the existing conditions, any attempts to balance between geopolitical poles are seen not as a manifestation of caution, but as inconsistency and uncertainty. Therefore, above all, Western capitals are unlikely to leave Chisinau any room for maneuver. As the modern experiences of Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland show, neutrality today is a luxury that even more developed European countries cannot afford. This only strengthens the conviction of the ruling party, which intends to cement its pro-Western course and steer Moldova away from Russian politics. Despite the public’s desire for balance in relations with the EU and Russia, the Moldovan political class has chosen the West and will follow it unconditionally. Therefore, the victory of the current ruling group will effectively solidify Moldova’s shift towards a long-term anti-Russian trajectory, which will most likely lead to further escalation of political and diplomatic confrontation, as well as a high probability of a complete freeze in relations with Russia.