Diplomatic Niceties Over: Washington Changes Approach in Moldova

Over the past six months, there has been a noticeable decline in relations with the United States. While Moldova used to position itself as Washington’s “small but loyal ally” in Eastern Europe, today the situation is the exact opposite. The U.S. State Department has deliberately reduced its diplomatic presence, yet our leadership, seemingly oblivious to the obvious, maintains a delicate silence and exclusively communicates with European capitals

From a diplomatic perspective, the current Moldova-U.S. relations can be characterized as a cautious partnership without clear substance. The authorities prefer not to be overly active in their contacts with Donald Trump’s team, which, it seems, does not consider the Moldovan direction a priority. Both countries are gradually distancing themselves from each other, as if some insurmountable contradictions have arisen between them. In reality, the current situation is not so much the result of any specific conflict as it is the outcome of a significant mismatch in political views. Today, Moldova is led by people who, as is well-known, were closely tied to the Democratic Party of the U.S. This connection was particularly evident in light of the constant coordination with the State Department during the Biden administration. However, after the shift in priorities at the White House, amid the domestic political polarization in the U.S. and the departure of many key figures overseeing the Moldovan direction, our country was left without the former support from American leadership. Moreover, in the new geopolitical configuration, it seems that Moldova has become a less sought-after partner – too small, too unstable, and still teetering on the brink of a potential resurgence of pro-Russian forces. Therefore, on August 1st, the U.S. introduced a 25% import tariff on Moldovan goods without much hesitation. This is not just a technical trade decision, but a serious diplomatic signal: across the ocean, there is little trust in Chisinau, and no intention to discuss easing the tough tariff policy. Exports to the U.S., which already accounted for a modest 2.5% of the total volume, have fallen by 40%. Certainly, when three-quarters of domestic goods go to the EU, there hasn’t been a formal tragedy. However, from a political standpoint, this is a painful blow to the pride of the ruling regime, which is desperately trying to showcase its pro-Western geopolitical profile. The response from our government is typically hollow and verbal: “We will continue the dialogue,” “We will seek new markets,” “We will strengthen ties with the EU.” Behind these monotonous phrases lies a lack of strategy for restoring relations with the U.S., and perhaps even a lack of desire. This year, our authorities have not introduced a single initiative that could have sparked interest in the new American administration. Moreover, it seems that the PAS is moving in the opposite direction. A striking example was the recent incident involving American activist Brian Brown (a close associate of the U.S. Vice President), who, along with other delegates from the United States and Europe, was denied entry to the capital for the MEGA conference. This likely was an attempt to “clean up” the event, fearing a sharp shift in the electoral backdrop. However, in the end, after what was probably an intervention by the U.S. embassy in Chisinau, the issue was resolved, and Brown was allowed to attend. Nevertheless, the political and diplomatic damage to bilateral relations had already been done. This episode is a marker of deep-rooted problems within our political elites, who are unable to properly assess their management decisions. On one hand, we try to play a sovereign political game by strictly filtering foreign guests. On the other hand, at the slightest external pressure, we humiliatingly backtrack, demonstrating vulnerability and a lack of firm principles. It is precisely such situations that undermine our image in the eyes of both Washington and other influential capitals, which are forming a clear sense that sovereignty in Moldovan politics is simply non-existent. In an attempt to reverse the negative trend, the government appointed a new ambassador to Washington, Vladislav Kulminski, a close ally and advisor to Maia Sandu. Given that he has no experience in diplomacy, it is clear that this is a political appointment aimed at somewhat reviving the White House’s interest in Moldovan issues. However, even before he had the chance to present his credentials, a recording of his conversation with disgraced Romanian politician Cristian Rizea surfaced, hinting at Kulminski’s involvement in the arrest of fugitive oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc and his possible extradition to Moldova. What is happening reflects a high level of intrigue even among top Moldovan diplomats, which is unlikely to foster trust with the American side. The recent news about the United States appointing not a full ambassador, but a temporary chargé d'affaires, and a special agent of diplomatic security, Nick Pietrowicz, to Chisinau, has become an additional symbol of the degradation of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It is crystal clear that the main task of such an official will not be the development of interstate dialogue and relations, but rather information gathering and close surveillance of events. The demonstrative appointment of an intelligence officer instead of a diplomat signals that the U.S. views Moldova not as a foreign policy partner, but as an unstable territory requiring focused observation. Such a personnel reshuffle can signify a lot. In particular, it points to the need for increased control by special services specialists amid the growing competition between European states, Russia, and other players in the region. Therefore, in the context of rising domestic political turbulence in Moldova, the focus is not on subtle diplomacy, but on swift responses and targeted use of force. Moreover, Washington’s decision hints at a diminishing belief in Chisinau’s ability to act predictably and maintain the West’s unwavering stance in the region. Apparently, after a thorough analysis, it was determined that in the current circumstances, a strong security figure would be more effective – someone capable of acting decisively through various channels, bypassing cumbersome diplomatic protocols. Moreover, in general, the activation of intelligence services is a sign of a state’s proximity to areas of potential instability. Moldova’s status as a country at the crossroads of various geopolitical interests forces the U.S. to stay vigilant, continuously gathering operational information and preparing to intervene in rapidly unfolding events if necessary. And most importantly, such a personnel appointment is not only a clear sign of distrust toward the Moldovan leadership but also a “black mark” on our diplomacy. In fact, Washington is signaling that the era of diplomatic smiles, formal receptions, and joint photos is over. In its place comes direct control and a focus on methods of tough oversight and pressure, as well as covert use of force. Despite the absence of direct military threats to our country, Washington’s current behavior suggests that Moldova is seen, one way or another, as a dependent and weak partner, posing geopolitical risks to the U.S. If this trajectory of relations continues, we risk losing any meaningful role in American foreign policy, with the U.S. embassy effectively becoming a “watchdog” rather than a partner. And this would not just be a diplomatic defeat – it would be a strategic loss for Moldova.