Why PAS Is Undermining Efforts to Prepare for the Heating Season

The government’s roadmap for the upcoming heating season has been reduced to mere monitoring of the energy situation, without outlining possible scenarios and response measures

Yesterday, the Minister of Energy announced that the government had approved an action plan to manage the upcoming fall and winter period. The official confidently stated that the document includes 48 measures, four more than last year, designed to ensure safety and mitigate potential risks. However, in practice, the plan boils down to the continued monitoring of gas and electricity supplies based on the conditions established earlier this spring. Unlike previous programs, it contains no alternative scenarios, no operational response mechanisms, and no measures reflecting current market dynamics. Much of the so-called “plan” reads more like a historical overview of the country’s energy sector (or rather, its degradation) under extreme external pressures rather than a functional roadmap. While such a retrospective might serve to justify certain decisions the population would have to accept, the document instead offers sterile language about organizational, technical, and financial prerequisites for the upcoming heating season. This has led to the growing perception that the authorities may be deliberately halting preparations, potentially anticipating an unfavorable outcome in the September parliamentary campaign. Similar to the tactics in the European integration process, the ruling party appears to demonstrate to all competitors and the electorate that it is the only political force capable of securing energy stability in the near future. As regards gas supplies to the right bank of the Dniester, the authorities note the need to continue regular gas purchases, linking this to the availability of a targeted loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. They also mention a peculiarity of the current situation on the gas market, namely the shortage of blue fuel and routes to deliver it due to rising demand both in the European Union and in Ukraine. The latter needs to pump at least 5 billion cubic meters into its storage facilities before winter. Therefore, our country, competing with Kyiv for gas resources, even had to revise the previously increased tariffs for gas transportation through its territory. The alternative import route to Ukraine via Greece remains largely unused, with the bulk of supplies still coming through Hungary and Slovakia. Yesterday, Dorin Junghietu announced that, unlike last year, EnergoCom has already secured 70%, or 500 million cubic meters, of the required volumes. Yet the minister offered no clarity on key details: the figures, the terms of the contracts, the price, the delivery timeline, or the method of supply. Whether to take his assurances at face value and set aside concerns about tomorrow is up to each citizen to decide. For the left bank, the framework of the current gas supply scheme has been formally preserved. Moldovagaz retains the right to transmit gas to the region, even specifying monthly volumes. While this may cover social needs, it is unlikely to sustain full economic activity. In the event of force majeure, an EU support mechanism worth €60 million allocated earlier this year has been mentioned. For now, no further organizational or legal adjustments to the gas market, which the authorities frequently resort to, are planned. But the key phrase is “for now.” The action plan for electricity is even more prosaic: completion by the end of the year of the “construction project of the century”, i.e. the Vulcanesti-Chisinau high-voltage power line, possible use of three old 110 kW power lines across the Prut River, a potential increase in the volume of flows at the border with Romania, and emergency supplies. It follows that the entire volume of missing electricity is planned to be delivered from across the Prut River. Imports from the Moldovan State Power Company are not planned, and the government does not appear to be willing to provide gas for such scenarios. A trouble-free summer might seem to inspire optimism about the coming winter, when our local thermal power plants will start operating. However, practice suggests that pessimistic scenarios are more likely. Not only experts, but also those responsible for distributing electricity to households are expressing concern about the superficial approaches of officials. For example, Premier Energy points out to the authorities that the restriction on the volume of gas supplied to the Transnistrian region from January 1, 2025, makes it impossible to produce and, as a result, purchase sufficient amounts of locally generated electricity. The lack of annual tenders for the purchase of cross-border capacity between Romania and Moldova, as well as Ukraine and Moldova does not add predictability and rules out the possibility of long-term contracts with neighboring states. Even the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau power line will not solve the problem of limited cross-border capacity of 315 MW on the Vulcanesti-Isaccea section. Simply put, the country’s main electricity distribution operator is openly dissatisfied with the situation where most purchases are made manually without the ability to predict the situation in advance. For large businesses, this means constant uncertainty and risks. The authorities, however, see the situation as an opportunity to strengthen their leverage. Ahead of crucial parliamentary elections, no one in the ruling party is likely to relinquish such an exclusive tool – on the contrary, plans are underway to expand it. Notably, the action plan says little about electricity imports from Ukraine, despite the fact that they covered around 10% of Moldova’s total demand between April and June. It is hardly a coincidence that the energy minister recently visited Kyiv to have detailed discussions on energy supply. Apparently, the Moldovan delegation requested that further cooperation be linked to the preservation of the PAS regime after the parliamentary elections. If this does not happen, Kyiv will not be bound by any obligations and may even complicate the situation with Moldova’s energy security. The purely political nature of the meetings is further suggested by Chisinau’s pledge to provide Ukraine with its repair crews of electricians – a service that was never officially offered even during the most critical periods for Ukraine’s energy sector. Such generous gestures from Moldovan officials are clearly not without reason. It is critically important for PAS not only to retain all internal levers of influence and control over the country’s strategic sectors but also to block any contacts with foreign partners should it lose power altogether. This may still be more of a show of intent than a concrete plan. Yet no one should harbor illusions that the ruling party is genuinely considering a scenario in which the powers are handed over voluntarily in a civilized and democratic manner.