A Scorching September 2025: The Turning Point for Moldova

It won’t be long before Moldova’s strategic course becomes clear – whether it will stick with its pro-European trajectory or veer toward a “third path”, once again seeking balance between the West and the East

Last Friday marked the official launch of the parliamentary election campaign scheduled for September 28. Over the next month, Moldova will enter a phase of heightened political mobilization, with every move by the government, the opposition, and external actors viewed in terms of the upcoming vote. It is no coincidence that these elections are described as decisive – the stakes extend beyond determining the individual makeup of the next parliament to defining the country’s broader geopolitical trajectory. Maia Sandu opened the campaign with a fiery address, framing the elections as a battle for the republic’s future. “The fate of Moldova is at stake,” she declared, urging citizens to “safeguard peace and prosperity through collective wisdom”. Her speech centered on external threats, accusing certain actors, particularly those linked to Russia, of attempting to interfere through “dirty money”, disinformation, and destabilization efforts. Meanwhile, the Central Election Commission reminded all participants that until September 26 they must operate within the established constraints. Parties and candidates are prohibited from using administrative resources, bribing voters, or misusing state symbols and public funds. In practice, however, the line between lawful campaigning and Moldova’s “gray electoral zone” has always been notoriously blurred. As of today, 15 parties, 4 electoral blocs, and 5 independent candidates have been allowed to run in the elections. Some of those whose applications were rejected intend to challenge the Central Election Commission’s decisions in court. Particular attention has focused on former members of the Democratic Party, whom experts view as a genuine threat to the ruling team’s electoral blueprint, in which everything has long been mapped out, leaving no room for the revanchist forces linked to Vladimir Plahotniuc’s inner circle. The CEC’s verdict came swiftly: after internal consultations, the commission rejected the PSDE’s application. The ruling party, closely associated with the president, is entering the elections with a clear objective: to maintain its dominant position in parliament. However, recent sociological surveys indicate a worrying trend for PAS. While not long ago it led the polls with relative confidence, its ratings are now fluctuating and pressing against the lower threshold under the weight of multiple negative factors. By several indicators, the Patriotic Bloc, which brings together a number of opposition forces, is gradually moving into the leading positions. Over the summer, there were few official sociological publications. Most parties rely on their own internal surveys, the results of which rarely become public. Nevertheless, leaks in recent weeks indicate some shifts in voter preferences. An additional risk factor for the ruling party is the high proportion of undecided voters. According to the latest polls, more than a quarter of citizens have not yet decided whom they will support. At the same time, around 56% intend to make their choice only during the campaign or even on the eve of election day. All of this makes the final outcome of the elections highly unpredictable. A significant development was the temporary resignation of seven ministers included on PAS’ electoral list. By law, government members participating in elections are required to suspend their powers to avoid conflicts of interest. In practice, this means that the country is left without a substantial part of the cabinet during a period when the political and socio-economic situation demands prompt decisions. For example, the Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration does not have a designated deputy, leaving it uncertain how the government will manage this crucial area. Thus, the issue of voting for Transnistrian residents, with only 12 polling stations set to open, continues to stir the information space. Judging by the fact that the CEC decision has been challenged in court, this story is far from over. It is quite possible that with each passing week, the situation surrounding this category of voters will turn into yet another conflict zone, with the government striving by all means to limit the influence of left-bank residents, while the opposition seeks to mobilize as many Transnistrian votes as possible. The overall distribution of polling stations has provoked no less controversy. A total of 2,274 stations will be opened across the country and abroad, yet it is the international component that has become a particular source of tension. For the diaspora in Russia, only two polling stations are being organized, sparking sharp discontent among both the opposition and ordinary citizens. By contrast, in several European countries, the number of polling stations will be dozens of times higher, despite hosting far fewer Moldovan nationals. The key foreign policy event preceding the launch of the campaign was the visit to Chisinau by the leaders of France, Germany, and Poland, nominally timed to coincide with Independence Day. From a domestic political perspective, however, the arrival of such high-ranking European guests goes far beyond ceremonial protocol. German media explicitly described the trip as a demonstration of support for Maia Sandu and her party. The European Union, for its part, makes no secret of the fact that its main priority is preserving a loyal regime in Chisinau. Following setbacks in Georgia and growing uncertainty over Europe’s broader outlook amid the war in Ukraine, further compounded by the political maneuvering of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, Brussels appears intent on keeping at least Moldova firmly within its sphere of predominant influence. Thus, the upcoming elections are becoming not merely an internal contest among parties but also a test of the EU’s ability to maintain its grip on neighboring states and of Moscow’s capacity to push European influence out of the post-Soviet space. For Moldova, this means the campaign will extend far beyond purely domestic concerns, with the vote itself viewed as a component of a much larger geopolitical gamble. Let us refrain from making long-term predictions about the outcome of the parliamentary elections. For now, it is enough to note that the main intrigue of the newly launched campaign revolves around three key questions. First, will PAS manage to retain its majority? This is critical for Maia Sandu and her team, as losing it would spell the end of the “European integration at any cost” project. Second, can the opposition consolidate its efforts? The Patriotic Bloc and other forces have at times acted in a disjointed manner, but even a modest improvement in coordination could seriously undermine the ruling party’s position. Third, what role will undecided voters play? These questions make the 2025 electoral cycle arguably the most tense in recent decades. Nearly a full month remains in which the country’s trajectory will be decided – whether Moldova will continue along its pro-European course or turn toward seeking a “third way”, once again attempting to balance between West and East. In this sense, the upcoming vote will determine not only the composition of the next parliament, but the very future of Moldova itself. In a political landscape torn between pro-Russian and pro-European narratives, voters will face mounting pressure from competing models of the country’s future. Ultimately, what may prove decisive is not so much the numerical outcome of the vote as the perception of its legitimacy. The recognition or contestation of the election results could ignite an acute domestic political crisis, capable of spilling far beyond the electoral framework itself.