Moldova’s Major Diplomatic Failure

The authorities are missing the opportunity to accelerate the country’s European integration by decoupling it from Ukraine. As a result, both states will continue their path toward the EU in a tandem that has already become burdensome for Moldova

Semyon ALBU, RTA: Some rather peculiar things are happening in Moldova’s European integration process, where the promises made are so tremendous that they no longer have anything to do with reality. At first, we were promised Europe by 2030, now they say that the accession treaty will be concluded almost by the end of Maia Sandu’s mandate – that is, essentially, in just a few years. The goal is, to put it mildly, highly ambitious. Any serious expert knows perfectly well what the opening and, especially, the closing of negotiation clusters for EU accession entails. It is a true bureaucratic hell, involving the harmonization of countless legal norms, of which the EU has an overwhelming number. Still, the decision to fast-track Moldova’s application clearly has little to do with the country’s actual compliance with the criteria for candidate states. Everyone understands that this record pace is driven solely by the current international environment and purely geopolitical considerations. After all, there is hardly any light at the end of the tunnel of the ongoing “Russia-West standoff”. Even if hostilities in Ukraine stops a new iteration of the ‘cold war’ will continue: both sides will bristle with larger armies, new weapons, fortifications, and so on. In the face of the threat of a major war, pushing one’s borders farther away from the so-called “heartland” is both a pressing and entirely natural task, just as it is to maximize the sphere of influence and the number of allies and satellites. In this context, the EU’s desire to stake its claim to Moldova and Ukraine is obvious, offering them unusually generous advances and concessions on European integration that no one else has ever enjoyed. Hence the accelerated granting of candidate status and the decision to open accession talks: once the conflict erupted in 2022, it became clear that there was no time to lose and that the EU had to delineate its own “vital space” as quickly as possible. At the initial stage, it was Ukraine that acted as the driving force. Its successful resistance to the Russian invasion made that breakthrough possible, while Moldova merely joined in as an additional carriage – something that was publicly noted with some irritation by then-Foreign Minister Kuleba. Be that as it may, since then Moldova and Ukraine have steadily moved forward in tandem, consistently projecting full mutual understanding and solidarity. However, the European integration process came to an abrupt halt when it became clear that Hungary was firmly blocking the opening of the first negotiation cluster for Ukraine. The two countries have long-standing disputes, primarily concerning the rights of the Hungarian minority living in Ukraine’s Zakarpattia oblast. Attempts to resolve these issues ended in failure. Since then, tensions between the two states have only escalated, and are now close to their peak, especially in light of Ukrainian strikes on the Russian pipeline that supplies oil to Hungary. For Moldova, this situation is extremely unpleasant for one simple reason – it is also blocking our own progress. For almost a year now, the start of substantive talks on accession terms has been stalled, with deadlines constantly pushed further into the future. Budapest, despite all the pressure from Brussels, remains firm and refuses to lift its ban on Ukraine’s application until Kyiv meets its conditions. And Ukraine has no intention of doing so, expecting Hungary to eventually “capitulate” under pressure from the leading Western powers. Against this backdrop, the idea emerged to separate the previously unbreakable Moldova-Ukraine tandem, leaving our country to navigate its path alone. The reasoning is quite clear. Unlike Ukraine, our EU membership raises no strong objections. The Hungarians have repeatedly stated that they don’t oppose opening negotiations with Chisinau and have even publicly insisted on decoupling us from our eastern neighbor. Moreover, Ukraine’s fate remains uncertain, while Moldova can be “taken” right now, by accelerating its path along the European track, permanently closing off alternative options, as there will be no turning back, even if personnel and parties change in our government. Brussels also recognizes that even once negotiations begin, Ukraine’s application will face far more difficulties and objections. In this context, Moldova’s small territorial size and limited population become significant advantages – for a large union like the EU, “absorbing” a country like Moldova is manageable, unlike Ukraine. There, just the agricultural sector alone, which European farmers fear, poses serious challenges. Moreover, Moldova is not at war and does not require massive funds to rebuild lands devastated by hostilities. As for the presence of an uncontrolled territory and Russian troops, Brussels has already officially agreed to the “Cyprus model”, allowing accession initially only for the right-bank territory. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the idea of separating Moldova’s and Ukraine’s applications quickly gained traction and began to be discussed at the official level. Moldova now has an excellent opportunity to make a fresh leap toward the EU, once again leveraging the international context to swiftly navigate one of the most challenging stages of integration. However, achieving this required foresight, courage, and a readiness for unconventional and swift moves – qualities we have never observed in the PAS leadership. Instead of seizing such a highly advantageous initiative, they found nothing better than to… immediately reject it and repeatedly insist tenfold that without Ukraine, we are, of course, going nowhere. Evidently, the government’s unwaveringly pro-Ukraine stance remains firm, even when it comes to the sacred cause of European integration. Meanwhile, Kyiv did not remain idle. It goes without saying that even the mere discussion of such an idea caused considerable displeasure there. In some ways, the Ukrainians’ reaction is understandable, given to whom the countries of the “Association Trio” owe the successes of their European integration in recent years. On the other hand, our authorities should primarily act in the interests of their own country, not Ukraine, that was completely ignored. Kyiv, in turn, stepped up its activity. Narratives were circulated in the public space suggesting that separating the applications would reveal divisions within the EU, while attempts were made to link this issue to the currently highly relevant question of security guarantees. Moreover, Kyiv is actively discouraging EU member states from breaking up the Moldovan-Ukrainian “tandem”. And it has been fairly successful, apart from, of course, the Baltic states, Denmark, currently holding the EU Council presidency, and Ireland, which will do so next year, have also expressed opposition. As authoritative Western media insiders report, under pressure from Ukraine, Brussels will ultimately not detach Kyiv from Chisinau. As a consolatory gesture for us, we were told that the initial phase of negotiations should proceed in sync, but afterward, each country’s progress will depend on its own efforts. At the same time, Budapest will continue to face heightened pressure, reportedly even involving Trump. Well, well. In the end, the opportunity to get ahead seems to have been completely missed, which, in my view, constitutes a major foreign policy setback for Moldova. Of course, one can debate whether this opportunity ever truly existed, but the fact remains that our leadership made no independent efforts whatsoever, merely passively observing the actions of Kyiv and Brussels while awaiting the outcome. It’s easy to imagine that the mindset of “Ukraine above all” remained entrenched here, driven by fear of retaliatory measures. And such measures were indeed a real possibility, since Kyiv generally treats our country and its sovereignty in a very peculiar way, sometimes taking overtly unfriendly actions behind a façade of benign rhetoric. Recall how EU countries, one after another, imposed national bans on the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products to protect their own producers. Yet when Moldova even hinted at a similar protectionist measure, Kyiv immediately threatened to block all our exports, while not making such threats to anyone else. Instances such as kidnappings on our territory, sabotage in Transnistria, and worsening environmental issues on the Dniester are not forgotten either. Had Moldova been able to join the EU before Ukraine, it would already have had the opportunity to impose its own terms and advance national interests. But, as we can see, that is unlikely to happen. So, for now, we and our eastern neighbor will continue moving together in the same Euro-integration harness, forced to make stops every time Ukraine hits yet another obstacle. Needless to say, this situation carries serious risks. Yet the yellow government seems to lack the political will to pursue any alternative course.