Election-Season Extradition of Plahotniuc

It appears that the ruling party has not only managed to neutralize any potential negative effects of Vladimir Plahotniuc’s return to Moldova but has even turned this event into a campaign advantage

For a long time, experts speculated about what the return of the former “master of Moldova” would mean. Would he become a “Trojan horse” and a factor leading to the ruling party’s defeat, or rather its campaign trump card? Would his comeback dramatically reshape the course of the parliamentary race? How would it affect the country’s socio-political life in the medium term? As of today, however, the answers to some of these questions seem fairly clear. Let us look at how events surrounding Plahotniuc unfolded starting from July 22 when he was detained at Athens airport. The main intrigue, of course, centered on how quickly the oligarch could be brought back to Moldova. At first, it seemed that the pace was brisk: on the very same day, Interior Minister Daniella Misail-Nichitin announced the start of the extradition procedure. On July 24, the Prosecutor General’s Office sent an official request to the Greek authorities. Meanwhile, President Maia Sandu urged the responsible institutions to organize Plahotniuc’s extradition in an accelerated manner, stating that there was no reason to “delay justice”. It is difficult to say how sincere the head of state really was, as accusations of deliberately delaying the extradition process surfaced rather quickly. These came both from the opposition camp, which has been actively playing up the narrative of how dangerous the ex-PSDE leader’s return could be for the ruling party, allegedly due to his possession of large amounts of compromising material, and from Plahotniuc’s lawyer, Lucian Rogac. The defendant himself, on the contrary, appeared eager to speed up the process, formally agreeing to be extradited specifically to Moldova (Athens had also received a request from Russia), and according to Rogac, he did so almost immediately after his arrest. However, the Prosecutor General’s Office rejected this version, insisting that Plahotniuc’s consent to extradition had only been received on July 29 and that they had acted promptly. Going forward, state institutions would have to defend themselves more than once, though over time their arguments grew increasingly weak in the face of the facts. At the end of July, Plahotniuc’s lawyer speculated that the entire process should take between 12 and 30 days, meaning, at the latest, by the end of August, and once again urged Chisinau to act faster. This implied that the oligarch could return to the country in the midst of the election campaign and play the decisive role. At that point, theories began to spread suggesting that his arrest, and indeed his return, had been a carefully orchestrated operation. These conspiracy theories were “reinforced” by Plahotniuc’s sudden burst of activity on social media, one of whose pages, rather suspiciously, had been created just a few days before his arrest. For a time, Plahotniuc managed to keep the public engaged, promising to share “important information”. In his messages, he spoke of his desire to return in order to prove his innocence, hinted at “major events ahead”, and insisted that the authorities feared his comeback, which could “bring the truth to light” about the current political situation. At one point, he called on his supporters to unite to “bring back the good times”. And indeed, for the first time in a long while, they began to show signs of renewed activity, rallying around the reincarnation of the PSDE – the “Modern Democratic Party of Moldova”, which announced its readiness to take part in the parliamentary elections. Some mayors and local councilors began switching over to the party’s banner, which was hardly surprising, given that the Democrats once held the strongest positions in regional government. Recognizing the level of threat, especially given the potential inclusion of Plahotniuc himself on the PDMM candidate lists, the ruling party took decisive measures to neutralize the possibility of an unexpected competitor entering the race. Ultimately, the CEC voted by majority to reject his registration as a participant in the elections. Around the same time, it also became clear that the authorities were reluctant to see Plahotniuc back in Moldova too soon. The oligarch himself had already made it unmistakably clear that he would be “in the country soon” if official Chisinau wished it. However, according to him, the Greek side was asked “not to rush”. This fact was difficult to contest, given that even at the beginning of August the Ministry of Justice had still not formalized the extradition request. It was only submitted on August 4. Nine days later, an Athens court approved Plahotniuc’s extradition, and he recorded a voice message with the “see you soon” mood. The Minister of Justice seemed to confirm this, stating that the procedure could take a few days, while his lawyer, Lucian Rogac, suggested that extradition might happen around the 20th of the month. Nevertheless, the process was once again prolonged due to the authorities, who exploited various legal finesses. According to Rogac, instead of submitting a single consolidated request, as is usually done in such cases, the relevant officials split the criminal cases into several parts, sending separate requests for each. This necessitated holding multiple court hearings rather than just one, resulting in several judicial decisions. The final extradition verdict could only be issued after all the requests had been considered. Although this maneuver was entirely legal, it exposed the authorities’ true intentions. It was therefore unsurprising that when the Greek Court of Appeals issued its decision on Plahotniuc on August 28, new delays emerged. The head of the General Police Inspectorate, Viorel Cernauteanu, alternately cited difficulties in arranging the flight and the intention to select the most budget-friendly option. Again, formally, none of this constituted a violation, but the desire to stall the process at this stage was undeniable. Recently, Renato Usatii revealed insider information: Plahotniuc would be brought in the day before the end of the election campaign, with tickets for September 25 already purchased. This date was later confirmed by the Minister of Internal Affairs. Thus, the once all-powerful puppeteer will finally return to Moldova, but evidently much later than he could have, had there not been deliberate efforts to artificially delay the event. Many theories had surfaced about whether Plahotniuc’s capture was a gift to PAS ahead of the elections. Regardless of the answer, in fact, it could very well turn out to be just that. Although the former Democratic leader and his supporters tried to turn circumstances to their advantage, the ruling regime managed to neutralize potential threats and successfully transform the extradition into a political ace, to be presented to the public just a couple of days before the elections. This not only maximizes electoral impact but also removes all uncertainties related to Plahotniuc’s presence in Moldova, where he still has plenty of “reserves” left. It is clear that by September 28 he is unlikely to significantly interfere with PAS, and anything that happens afterward will be far less consequential. As the saying goes, “there’s no use crying over spilled milk”. Moreover, he may not only refrain from interfering but could even lend support, sending the right signal to his followers. According to Usatii, such an offer will be presented to Plahotniuc immediately upon his return. I would not venture to claim that the likelihood of refusal is anywhere near certain. After all, it is evident that the extraditee’s media activity has virtually ceased recently, which is also quite telling.