Europe 2028: What’s Behind the Movement

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Cristian RUSSU
Similar to how the For Moldova platform emerged to unite the left-wing and centrist opposition groups, a new pro-European civil initiative has been created in the interests of those in power to rally the right-wing forces
The Europe 2028 movement, led by prominent businessman Vasile Tofan, came to public attention amid the parliamentary campaign on September 2, although signs of preparations for its launch had appeared much earlier. The name itself is telling: followers of the movement embraced a slogan coined months before by Maia Sandu, expressing the strategic goal of signing an EU accession agreement within three years. It’s clear that the foreign policy context was somewhat different back then. There was active debate within EU circles about separating Moldova’s application from Ukraine’s, and it was challenging for the authorities in Chisinau to avoid making bold promises to their electorate. The context is different now. Sandu herself no longer speculates on specific dates, yet the slogan has taken on a life of its own in Moldova. The scenarios have been outlined, and resources allocated. Naturally, the issue has become a central promise of the ruling party. In PAS’s election programme, it stands as the top priority framed as a guarantee of peace and a secure future. This commitment is even reflected in the party’s symbolism, including its presence on the ballot paper. It’s clear that the PAS programme, like those of many parties, is essentially pure populism, with catchy slogans and promises without concrete details. On some points, representatives of the ‘yellow’ party can be openly accused of dishonesty. For instance, their pledge to double the population’s income in four years directly contradicts the goal of just five percent annual economic growth. But no one from PAS intended to debate or argue during the election campaign. First, the risk of slipping up was too high. Second, the authorities had long since closed the chapter on listening to any opposing viewpoints. Current officials and MPs consider it beneath them to engage in arguments with their opponents. From a political marketing standpoint, it’s far safer to play on the population’s pain points and fears a couple of weeks before the election. Scary stories about Russian tanks might be dismissed as “total cringe”, but reminding people about the risks of federalisation or debts to Gazprom is a perfectly acceptable PR strategy. All would be well if not for the fact that the most active segment of the population, entrepreneurs, are increasingly noticing PAS’s glaring disconnect from reality. Those who know how to manage money and draft business plans cannot be satisfied with empty slogans and promises. That’s why, with backing from the authorities, the Europe 2028 civil initiative was launched. Vasile Tofan became its curator, a move anticipated well before the elections as a backup plan for replacing Dorin Recean in government. The ambitious businessman gained a platform to promote his ideas, while PAS secured a partner to communicate the substance of the government’s post-election action programme to its target audience. The programme must undoubtedly balance debits and credits, with clear rules of the game established in advance for the business community to take it seriously. Tofan hasn’t come up with anything new. He and other movement leaders openly voice the inevitable cuts to state spending on key obligations: education, social services, and healthcare. The core of the programme is administrative reform. In their current form, local authorities (some 900 town halls) are seen as a burden and an unaffordable luxury for big business. Consequently, plans include dissolving most rural administrations, transferring their powers to larger towns and district centres. It’s possible that even the districts themselves will be scrapped seen by the current government as a leftover from the Soviet era they’d rather leave behind. A return to the county system isn’t off the table. But these are just details. The real goal is cutting spending on local needs. That means not just shutting down town halls, but also dismantling village infrastructure – schools, kindergartens, community centres, sports clubs. This approach is already visible in the closure of institutions for children with special needs, followed by the rollout of inclusive education policies. It might be that everything has already been calculated, and that transporting students to larger schools, leisure centres, and sports clubs will indeed prove more cost-effective. Debates about the rationality of such decisions are already well underway. Supporters often point to the experience of other EU member states that have undergone the painful transition from Soviet-era models of local development. For example, Vasile Tofan sees no issue with taking his child to a sports facility in another city if it offers better conditions arguing that, after all, this is the European norm. It’s clear that no one in the PAS election campaign will bring up these issues. After all, they don’t align with the narrative of the European Village project. Instead, the party continues to make bold promises about comprehensive support for local communities and rural infrastructure. In recent years, it’s evident that, responding to the requests of villagers and local authorities, significant funds have still been directed toward renovating Soviet-era schools, kindergartens, and cultural centres. Infrastructure, after all, deteriorates over time. Even so, Tofan and his colleagues are urging the government to stop carrying this burden, despite the clear demands of rural residents and local administrations. Undoubtedly, even the civil movement cannot rely solely on policies that are unpopular with the public. That’s why its programme includes a broad set of priorities many of which largely echo the PAS slogans from five years ago: digitalisation, privatisation of remaining state assets, agricultural reform, free movement of capital, development of export-oriented industries, road construction, and the return of the diaspora. All the speakers and participants in the Europe 2028 initiative have either returned to Moldova for business or claim they will do so soon. We’ve heard all of this before from reform advocates like Natalia Gavrilița, Dumitru Alaiba, and other government figures who are now resting on their laurels. But the truth is no one has anything new to offer. If Tofan’s project gains traction, we’re likely to hear his name echoed by the country’s leadership and the ruling party before the parliamentary campaign concludes. For now, the civil movement, or more accurately – the business movement, serves as a unifying force for right-wing and so-called pro-European factions and their electorate. Its central message is clear: full support for a pragmatic action plan backed by European partners and its inevitable implementation after the elections. Moldovan voters are well acquainted with the blatant deception of power-hungry politicians. Five years ago, Maia Sandu and her team triumphed in the elections on promises of unity and an end to geopolitical hostility. They are now closing their term in the worst tradition of dividing the society and fueling propaganda-driven hysteria. One might hope this would be the last time but the lessons of our political history suggest otherwise.