Dmitry Kozak Resigns: Transition to a New Chapter in Russia-Moldova Relations?

Today is Dmitry Kozak’s last day in his role as Deputy Head of Vladimir Putin’s administration. In recent years, he was the official overseeing Russia’s relations with Moldova, which may now be poised for significant changes

Sergiu CEBAN, RTA: The news that Dmitry Kozak, Deputy Head of the Russian Presidential Administration, has left his post of his own accord has drawn reactions not only in Moscow but also in Chisinau. In the Russian media, the event is presented as a natural stage of personnel rotation, while foreign press outlets speculate about a weakening of the position of one of Vladimir Putin’s long-time allies. For Moldova, however, strangely enough, Kozak’s departure marks the end of an entire political cycle and the beginning of a period of uncertainty. Dmitry Kozak’s name is firmly etched into the political history of our country in the early 2000s. He is closely associated with the infamous federalization project, which was intended to reintegrate the Transnistrian region into the constitutional framework with a special status and formalize Russian influence over the internal structure of Moldovan statehood. The document was ultimately not signed by then-President Vladimir Voronin. Yet its content, even today, remains a subject of lively debate and historical “alternative scenarios,” including within the context of the current election campaign. For the second time, Kozak stepped into the “Moldovan river” after a decade and a half. In 2018, Putin appointed him as Special Representative for the Development of Trade and Economic Relations with Moldova. In practice, this role involved not only trade but also the political oversight of Moldova. The promises of then-President Igor Dodon to return to the ideas of the eponymous memorandum played a special role in this. This stance allowed Moscow to hope for a restoration of control over political processes in Chisinau, and Kozak ultimately became the de facto “curator of Moldova” in the Kremlin, shaping the nature of contacts and the framework of possible agreements. But ultimately, it all ended with his resignation, which coincided with several factors. First, the deterioration of Russia’s relations with most post-Soviet countries necessitated a reassessment of its foreign policy tools. Second, the reliance on personalized contacts, where the fate of an entire direction depended on a single official, revealed the limited effectiveness of Russian policy. Finally, the situation in Ukraine and the overall transformation of regional security required an update of personnel and a fundamental rethinking of approaches. For Chisinau, strange as it may seem, Kozak’s resignation poses a serious challenge. Over the past seven years, the Moldovan political elite has grown accustomed to Kozak’s “style”– his way of conducting affairs, characteristic proposals, and threats. To some extent, this provided predictability and the ability not only to adapt but also to successfully counter Moscow’s attempts to influence Moldovan politics. Now, something new and completely unknown will take its place. It is highly likely that the Kremlin will revise its strategy toward Moldova, and as a result, the methods for achieving its goals will probably change. New channels of influence may be found, and many new officials are likely to appear among those responsible in the Kremlin administration. At the same time, one of the decisive factors in shaping Russian policy in the western outpost of the post-Soviet region will be the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Overall, Kozak’s departure should be seen as the end of another stage in Russian-Moldovan history and the beginning of a new chapter, the content of which remains not fully clear. Undoubtedly, Moscow has no intention of relinquishing its interests in Moldova. The combination of the country’s unique geopolitical position, its border proximity to Ukraine, and the frozen Transnistrian conflict makes our republic not merely a point on the map, but a significant strategic hub influencing the regional balance of power. Russia will certainly seek to take advantage of this in its own interests. Vladimir ROTARI, RTA: Today is Dmitry Kozak’s last day as Deputy Head of Vladimir Putin’s Administration – the key center of political decision-making in Russia. Once a powerful technocratic official, who had been part of Putin’s team since his appointment as Prime Minister in 1999, Kozak had visibly been losing influence in the upper echelons of the Kremlin in recent years. The clearest hint of his political future came at the end of August, when two departments directly subordinate to Kozak were disbanded and a new structural unit was created on their basis “under the wing” of Sergey Kiriyenko. For our country, Dmitry Kozak is undoubtedly a prominent figure, primarily associated with the famous plan to resolve the Transnistrian conflict. Moreover, upon returning to the Moldovan direction in 2018, he actively participated in the overthrow of oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc’s regime and the formation of the ideologically antagonistic PSRM-ACUM coalition, maintaining active contacts with both forces. At the time, many believed that Russia had largely succeeded in restoring its influence in Moldova and in slowing down the country’s pro-Western trajectory. However, subsequent events showed that this was far from the case. In my view, this reveals the main reasons for Kozak’s departure from the political scene, at least at the current stage. As is known, in recent years he was one of the main overseers of Russian policy in the post-Soviet space, particularly in Ukraine and Moldova. And despite certain tactical successes – such as the rise to power in Moldova of the so-called “pro-Russian forces” and the resumption of negotiations with Kyiv –strategically, the Kremlin suffered significant setbacks in both countries. Negotiations with Ukraine ended without results, and for the fourth consecutive year, a bloody conflict has been ongoing, entailing enormous expenditure of Russian resources and significant human losses. Kozak undoubtedly bears some responsibility for both the need to launch the so-called “special military operation” and the fact that this operation escalated into a full-scale war, even though, reportedly, he himself opposed a forceful scenario. As for Moldova, at present the ruling authorities exhibit the most anti-Russian and Russophobic stance in the country’s history. This situation was largely the result of failures in the 2020-2021 presidential and parliamentary elections, which were also overseen by Kozak. Overall, it can be said that the previous approaches characteristic of this official –backstage diplomacy, a reliance on personal networks, and the use of “resource” levers – have shown questionable effectiveness in the territories entrusted to him. Significant infusions of political and economic capital into one or another force or politician no longer yield much effect, especially in circumstances where authorities can simply “switch them off.” Russian soft power cannot compare to that of the West, and attempts to exert influence through energy resources have also failed to produce positive results. Of course, it would be wrong to attribute all of Moscow’s failures in the Moldovan direction solely to Dmitry Kozak. However, for example, the idea of halting gas supplies under the contract between Gazprom and Moldovagaz on the pretext of Chisinau’s failure to meet its obligations appears to have come from him. The plan, presumably, was to deliver a fatal blow to the ruling party, collapsing its approval ratings and handing the opposition a victory in the parliamentary elections “on a silver platter.” Yet the PAS government deliberately provoked this crisis and was prepared for it. The necessary volumes of electricity lost after the suspension of imports from MGRES were secured on external markets, while rising tariffs were mitigated for the population thanks to Western assistance. At the same time, Transnistria, considered a territory under Russia’s control, found itself on the brink of a humanitarian disaster – left in the middle of winter with rolling blackouts, no heating, and practically no functioning economy. Moscow had to make considerable efforts to restore gas supplies to the region, relying on unstable payment schemes and incurring additional costs. Nevertheless, even now the left bank remains in a dire economic situation. Thus, Kozak’s calculations proved to be completely detached from reality and once again led to significant reputational and financial losses. Against the backdrop of such failures, Kozak’s resignation, formally “at his own request”, seems quite natural. His portfolio has now been transferred to Sergey Kiriyenko, another well-known technocrat but of an entirely different type. He is much more “public,” highly energetic, unafraid to regularly travel to Russia’s “new regions,” and keeps his finger “on the pulse.” In recent months, there has already been considerable insider talk about how exactly Russia’s course toward Moldova will change under Kiriyenko. Some shifts in methods and tools are already visible, but the final conceptual content of the “new Russian policy” in Moldova will, of course, become clear later.