Is Moldova on the Brink of Change? Election Race Reaches Its Final Stretch

The September 28 elections will be a historic turning point for Moldova, setting the stage for the country to either maintain its current trajectory or embark on the formation of a new political reality

With just one week remaining until the vote, Moldova has entered the decisive and most intense phase of the election campaign. The political landscape is evolving rapidly: public opinion polls are shifting, political actors are employing increasingly aggressive tactics, and the information space is gradually becoming overloaded with fake news, rumors, and damaging disclosures. This Sunday, Moldova will choose its next parliament, and consequently its political future. Let’s explore which forces are poised to cross the threshold and what strategies their headquaters are betting on. The past week has essentially turned into a battle of opinion polls. Voters were bombarded with a wide variety of data that not only differed, but sometimes contradicted each other. Some polls gave a clear lead to the ruling party, others to the Patriotic Bloc. And a few painted an electoral landscape that raised a lot of questions even among the most undemanding analysts. Obviously, this isn’t about objective sociology but about ‘shaping” tools designed to influence public sentiment. Of course, such methods do not strengthen voter confidence, but it is in this atmosphere that the leading political forces are trying to gain an advantage for themselves. Internal political struggles are increasingly entangled with external influences. Over the weekend, Ukraine imposed sanctions against 11 Moldovan public and political figures, following similar moves by the EU and Canada. These generous sanctions from foreign partners have become a convenient pressure tool for the ruling regime, making it easier to sideline competitors from the electoral race under the guise of international measures. In this context, particular attention is now focused on Irina Vlah, whose potential disqualification is widely seen as an attempt to weaken the Patriotic Bloc. At the same time, fake news campaigns are in full swing working to provoke emotional reactions from the public. Last Saturday, a document circulated on social media, allegedly revealing a CEC decision to completely block residents of the Transnistrian region from voting. Although the claim was promptly denied by the authorities, the spread of such information coupled with ongoing repair work on bridges across the Dniester suggests that left-bank voters are likely to face significant obstacles to accessing the polls. PAS remains the frontrunner in the election race, backed by administrative resources, substantial funding, strong media support, and international legitimacy. However, the situation for the party is far from rosy. First, it may fail to secure a single-party majority in parliament forcing it to seek coalition partners, which would inevitably dilute its control over the legislative agenda. Second, its apparent “victory at any cost” strategy marking a shift away from fair play risks becoming even more visible this week, further cementing PAS’s image not as a party of reform, but as a party of total power. The Patriotic Bloc is still the second main contender for victory, bringing together PSRM, PCRM, Heart of Moldova, and Future of Moldova. Its key tactical goal is not only to secure a place in parliament but also to assert leadership domestically as proof of its prevailing legitimacy and broad voter desire to reshape the current power structure. Igor Dodon remains the bloc’s prominent figure, despite his mixed political reputation. While he is well-known and rallies much of the left-wing base, his long history of scandals and political track record continue to cast a shadow. Vladimir Voronin remains a symbol of stability and “strong leadership” when Moldova was associated with order and development. He is particularly appealing to older voters. Irina Vlah is seen as a successful regional leader capable of injecting fresh energy into the bloc and attracting support from local elites across cities and districts. Meanwhile, the Future of Moldova party, led by Vasile Tarlev, plays more of a supporting role for creating media noise. “Alternative” is teetering on the edge of entering parliament, gathering 7–8% support. The main problem of this political formation is its blurred identity. On the one hand, the bloc tries to present itself as pro-European; on the other, as a neutral political force. As a result, voters perceive a sense of vague ambivalence in “Alternative’s” electoral strategy, which reduces trust and electoral appeal. Experts believe that the Kremlin views “Alternative” as a tool to siphon votes away from PAS, creating confusion among the pro-European electorate. Nevertheless, for PAS it’s a convenient target, which is why the authorities have recently been actively stigmatizing the bloc and its leaders, pushing it into the list of Moscow’s projects.” Renato Usatii and his “Our Party” this time have fairly good chances of finally entering parliament. The 6–8% support level is a stable indicator, while further expansion of their voter base is unlikely due to the very specific profile of this political formation. Usatii’s electorate consists of people disillusioned with politics as a whole and skeptical toward any parties or foreign policy orientations. This category of voters has a demand for “revenge against the system,” and they see Usatii as the most suitable candidate for the role of a political showman, capable of transferring his flamboyant style and activism into parliament – where he will become a source of chaos and conflicts, but is unlikely to contribute to constructive work. Perhaps the most enigmatic force in the upcoming elections is Victoria Furtuna’s “Great Moldova” party. Its chances are considered uncertain, but this very factor makes it a potential surprise of the campaign. The main emphasis is placed on national orientation and patriotic imagery. Furtuna is presented as a “new face” untainted by the past, which sets her apart from the old guard of politicians – and for part of society, this could prove decisive. The main trump card of “Great Moldova” may turn out to be Shor’s notorious network. If it is fully mobilized, the party could make a sharp breakthrough and not only enter parliament but also seriously shake up the future balance of power there. In the coming week, one should expect the peak intensity of the electoral battle and, at times, sharp twists of events that may result from the release of compromising materials, unexpected decisions, and moves by both the authorities and the opposition. Each political force will seek to mobilize its own electorate while demoralizing that of its rivals. Particular attention should be paid to the dynamics of growth or decline among undecided voters. They remain the key factor capable of reshaping the current balance of power and making the outcome of the vote as unpredictable as possible. Based on this basic picture, three tentative scenarios can be outlined for how Sunday’s upcoming elections may conclude. The first is a victory for PAS and the formation of a fragile yet factional single-party majority. In this case, the course toward European integration is maintained, and the country continues to serve as a geopolitical outpost of the EU in the region. The second scenario is a strong result for the Patriotic Bloc, sufficient to form a coalition majority with one of the “like-minded” political forces. Under such a model, the European trajectory would be frozen, accompanied by increased external pressure from the EU and neighboring states. The third scenario is a fragmented parliament of four or five parties. Such a configuration threatens to paralyze the system due to the inability to form a stable governing coalition. In that case, early elections would likely become the outcome. As has been repeatedly stated, the September 28 elections will mark a historic turning point for Moldova, after which the country will either continue its current course or enter a new phase of “upheaval” in parliamentary architecture and the formation of a new political landscape. Despite a week still remaining, it is too early to make concrete forecasts. Yet one thing can be said with full certainty: whatever scenario unfolds, after September 29 Moldova’s political reality will no longer be the same. The only question is how profound the change will be, cosmetic or fundamental.