Romania on the Brink: Fragile Stability or a New Round of Political Crisis?

Sergiu CEBAN

If the ruling elites fail to reach a compromise, the country will face yet another crisis, and AUR may transform from a protest movement into a real governing force. In such a scenario, the question will concern not only the future of Bucharest but also the political stability of the entire region

Back in May, immediately after Nicusor Dan’s victory in the presidential race, experts began to say that the ruling regime in Chisinau had gained a valuable geopolitical safeguard. A victory by George Simion, on the other hand, would have made the position of our authorities far more precarious, paving the way for the strengthening of opposition forces and, ultimately, for PAS’ defeat in the upcoming elections. Yet only a few months later, it has become clear that Bucharest itself is now even further from internal stability than expected. This week, Romania’s political landscape could change dramatically. Two key decisions are on the agenda that could effectively put an end to Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan’s career and lead to the collapse of the entire government. Against the backdrop of a stagnating economy and growing social discontent, forming a new parliamentary majority now appears far more difficult than it was in June, when coalition talks dragged on for an entire month. The Constitutional Court session scheduled for Wednesday, September 24, will play decisive role. The judges are set to rule on nine complaints against the so-called “Second Reform Package”, for which Bolojan’s cabinet assumed responsibility in parliament. This decision will largely determine the future trajectory of the country’s political process. An additional test for the cabinet has been the local government reform, which envisions cutting around 13,000 municipal employees. Initially, this measure was to be included in the “Second Reform Package”, but it was excluded due to sharp disagreements within the coalition. On August 31, Bolojan publicly threatened for the first time to resign if the reform package was not adopted. Two days later, he reaffirmed his stance at a press conference, stressing that he could not continue serving as prime minister without the support of his coalition partners and their adherence to the agreed governing program. The resignation of the entire government would mean renewed negotiations, a reshuffling of the coalition, and quite possibly the withdrawal of one of the parties from the ruling arrangement. Such a scenario, in turn, threatens a new political crisis, largely stemming from the protracted budgetary deadlock that forced the authorities to implement unpopular austerity measures. Specifically, Bolojan’s government resorted to raising taxes and limiting social spending in an effort to reduce the deficit and meet the European Union’s requirements. Since August, the standard VAT rate has risen from 19% to 21%, excise duties on fuel, alcohol, and tobacco have increased, public sector wages have been frozen, pensions have ceased to be indexed, and many allowances and bonuses for difficult working conditions have been cut. These measures are part of a multi-year plan coordinated with Brussels, aimed at gradually reducing the budget deficit and imposing stricter control over the growth of public spending. Formally, the program is designed to strengthen confidence in Romania among European institutions and international creditors, maintain access to EU investment funds, and prevent a further decline in the country’s credit rating. However, the flip side of the austerity policy has already become apparent. The increase in VAT and excise taxes has triggered a new wave of inflation, which economists estimate could exceed 7% by the end of the year. Rural areas and low-income families are particularly vulnerable, as a significant portion of their income goes toward food and utilities. Against the backdrop of frozen wages and pensions, household purchasing power is declining, directly affecting domestic demand and slowing economic growth. Thus, the current cabinet’s economic policy represents a fragile balance between the demands of the EU and societal pressure. While the deficit reduction is indeed becoming noticeable, it comes at the cost of rising inflation, declining consumer spending, and growing social tension. The longer this imbalance persists, the more room populists will have to maneuver, promising to “return money to the people” and abandon unpopular measures. After the annulment of the 2024 presidential elections due to suspicions of Russian interference, and the tense rerun in May 2025, where centrist Nicusor Dan narrowly defeated the far-right populist George Simion, the situation may seem to have stabilized at first glance. State institutions have strengthened their formal legitimacy, the foreign policy course remains unchanged, and the president enjoys trust in major cities. However, recent public opinion polls paint a far more alarming picture. Parties traditionally represented in parliament are losing ground, while the sovereigntists from the “Alliance for the Union of Romanians” (AUR) are rapidly gaining strength. Thus, according to Avangarde data, AUR, led by Simion, has emerged as the undisputed leader with 41% support among potential voters. Back in the summer, the party had 34-35%, but in just two months it managed to incorporate additional protest voters. Data from the CURS company also confirm this trend: AUR enjoys the trust of 38-40% of citizens, while the ratings of political formations from the ruling coalition are rapidly declining. Some of them would not even make it into parliament if elections were held now. AUR’s highest level of support, exceeding 50%, is observed among young people and residents of rural areas. This growth is also influenced by the “Calin Georgescu phenomenon”, as he continues to enjoy the highest level of public trust, with an approval rating of 40%. It must be assumed that, despite his announcement of ending his political career, clearly made under pressure, he remains a symbol of betrayed hopes. His electoral base is gradually shifting toward AUR, reinforcing the anti-globalist and anti-establishment narrative. The key factor driving growing discontent remains the economic situation. According to IMF data, the budget deficit in 2025 will reach 7% of GDP, inflation remains at 5-6%, and energy prices continue to rise. These indicators directly affect the social well-being of ordinary citizens. More than 4 million Romanians still work abroad, creating the phenomenon of a “diaspora economy”, while millions of families continue to live “packed up”. Public opinion polls name the economy as the country’s primary problem, with another 45% citing corruption among the elites. It is precisely for this reason that AUR’s radical rhetoric finds such fertile ground. The next parliamentary elections in Romania are officially scheduled for 2028, but an increasing number of factors point to the possibility of them being held earlier. Among the main reasons that could push the country into another electoral cycle are the deep fragmentation of parliament and a ruling coalition torn apart by internal contradictions. A significant catalyst for electoral trends could be the anticipated resignation of Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan. According to Romanian sociologists, the likelihood of early elections being held before the end of 2025 is estimated at 35%. If the elections take place during this period, AUR would undoubtedly emerge as the frontrunner. However, the main question lies in whether this majoritarian political force would be able to form a government if it wins. Most parties have already stated that they will not cooperate with the far right, which creates the risk of a political deadlock and yet another institutional crisis even after a parliamentary reset. Romania is walking a fine line. If the elites fail to reach a compromise, the country faces yet another crisis, and AUR could transform from a protest movement into a governing force. Under such a scenario, the question will no longer concern only Bucharest’s future, but the political stability of the entire region. This chain of events could trigger a ripple effect in relations with Brussels and Washington, lead to a reassessment of foreign policy priorities, and increase the risks for our country, whose vulnerability is directly linked to Bucharest’s stability.