What PAS’ New Term Will Bring?

Sergiu CEBAN

The official election results secure PAS full control over power for the next four years. However, this does not guarantee the ruling party an easy or trouble-free path ahead

Yesterday marked the end of a protracted three-year electoral cycle that carried the full weight of geopolitical expectations, domestic disputes, and public hopes. The parliamentary elections were framed as decisive, meant to determine whether the country would stay on its European course or whether Russian influence would gradually resurface alongside a reshaping of the political landscape. Official results give PAS a commanding lead, edging close to an outright majority. The party secured just over 50% of the vote, while its nearest rival, the Patriotic Bloc, garnered around 24%. The Alternativa Bloc, Renato Usatii’s Our Party, and Vasile Costiuc’s Democracy at Home also managed to clear the electoral threshold. The latter, notably, turned out to be the real dark horse of the race, as no polling had given it any realistic chance of entering the new parliament. Thus, under the proportional formula for seat redistribution, PAS has secured a relatively comfortable majority of 55 out of 101 mandates, giving it the decisive edge to unilaterally form a government and shape the entire power structure in the country. For comparison, in the 2021 elections PAS won 63 seats with a turnout of around 49% and with a smaller absolute number of votes. The defining feature of yesterday’s elections was their extreme toxicity. This was most evident in the Left Bank districts, where the harshest measures were applied to minimize the Transnistrian electoral factor, steps that, unsurprisingly, do little to inspire trust in Chisinau among residents of the country’s eastern districts. From an objective analytical standpoint, PAS’ anomalous result requires thorough sociological and political scrutiny. Above all, it raises the question of how the absence of any meaningful ratings for the leaders of the ruling party, including the prime minister, nonetheless enabled PAS to secure national-level figures that exceed the president’s own approval rating. On the one hand, Maia Sandu represents a strong brand and a symbol of “breakthrough” into the EU for voters. Thus, the transfer of a portion of her personal rating to the party is plausibleб yet by no means limitless. One way or another, from the standpoint of mathematical logic, result by PAS is formally legitimate, and if the opposition recognizes it, power will cement in its current configuration for the coming years. Yet despite this dominance, it hardly guarantees stability or unanimity, since within the party a hidden but important stage is beginning – the redistribution of personal, positional, and power-related balances. After the elections, the most pressing issue is the distribution of key positions: first and foremost, the speaker of parliament, the prime minister, major ministers, and the heads of parliamentary committees. Given that PAS now presents itself not merely as a majority party but as a political force with an important historical mission, it will be crucial to see who gets which share of the pie, and in what proportions. It is well known that within PAS there are clans shaped by external, regional, ideological, and personal factors. Entering a new political cycle will inevitably trigger a reshuffle and, consequently, fresh internal tensions, that poses a challenge in the context of a relatively fragile parliamentary majority. The left-wing and pro-Russian forces suffered a serious blow, as their result turned out worse than expected, even compared to the previous elections. As in 2021, one can only once again recommend that they reconsider the format and strategy of their opposition agenda. These parties have long needed a rebranding – new faces, new messages, and new ideas. From a geopolitical perspective, Moldova’s trajectory appears crystal clear – deepening its relationship with the European Union. Yet even PAS’ decisive victory does not guarantee a smooth path to Brussels, as the European vector encounters several constraints and challenges. Chief among them are the reform requirements: the EU’s previously soft approach, dictated in part by electoral considerations, may soon give way to a more demanding policy, with financial assistance tied to genuine progress in justice reform, anticorruption measures, and the rule of law. Thus, there will be no ideal pro-European course. Moldova’s path to the EU will most likely be a long road of cold, pragmatic negotiations which, as the experience of other candidate countries shows, can drag on for years. Finally, one should not underestimate Russia’s role as a restraining factor, since even having lost the means of direct political control, it will continue to use available instruments to influence Moldova and its European integration process. In this sense, the prospects for Moldovan-Russian relations appear extremely limited. The victory of PAS and the preservation of the pro-European course effectively mean that the space for diplomatic rapprochement is minimal, since the Kremlin views developments in Chisinau as yet another link in the chain of “loss of influence” across the post-Soviet space. To some extent, the further dynamic will depend on the specific personnel choices of the old-new government. If the post of foreign minister is filled by a figure with a narrowly pro-European orientation, and the parliamentary committee on foreign policy is headed by a representative of the “hardline wing”, one can expect an almost complete freezing of contacts with Russia. However, if these positions are taken by more pragmatic politicians, a small window for selective negotiations between the two countries could slightly open. The situation surrounding the Transnistrian region will remain one of the main sources of mutual tension, especially given that Moscow is unlikely to relinquish this territory as an instrument of influence. But is Chisinau prepared to take the initiative toward Tiraspol? Despite the direct link between European integration and reintegration, the Transnistrian issue still remains shrouded in uncertainty. Judging by the signals received, a quick settlement is hardly to be expected. Moreover, there is reason to believe that, having lost a number of positions in the region, the Kremlin will concentrate on the left bank of the Dniester, holding this enclave as its “bastion”. In the end, the parliamentary elections confirmed PAS’ retention of full control over power for the next four years, yet this does not guarantee an easy or trouble-free path ahead. Of course, the Party of Action and Solidarity secured a confident majority, but its fragility lies in deep-seated contradictions: regional disparities, public mistrust, the toxic nature of the campaign, and a weak institutional culture of consensus. Outwardly, Moldova will continue moving toward Europe, but this course will be accompanied by trials – from the implementation of painful reforms to countering Moscow, which will not vanish from Chisinau’s political landscape and will continue employing various instruments of influence. Thus, in the medium term, the forecast for the country is a balance between PAS’ unchallenged hold on power and domestic challenges, a slow and pragmatic integration into Europe, and the restraining influence of Russia. At the same time, every miscalculation or mistake by the ruling party will be acutely felt by society and will inevitably intensify the demand for new figures and political alternatives.