Moldova in World Affairs: Balancing Hope and Vulnerability

The September 28 vote firmly anchored Moldova within the geopolitical and foreign policy orbit of the West, which, however, offers no guarantee of absolute stability or confidence in the future

The parliamentary elections have opened a new stage of geopolitical challenges for our country. The victory of the ruling party has consolidated its Western orientation but at the same time sharpened old dilemmas – how to maintain the support of the EU and the United States without losing the ability to engage with Moscow, how to avoid being absorbed by the Ukrainian context while remaining independent. Let us take a critical look at what the election results mean for Moldova’s foreign policy, where hope and support coexist with threats and constraints. First: although the key foreign policy decisions in our country are made at the level of the president, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament, the practical effectiveness of international affairs largely depends on who directly heads the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With all due respect to Mr. Popsoi, the country has reached a stage where political appointees only weaken the state’s position. It is clear that our diplomacy requires a new type of leader: a professional “from within the system”, with experience, foresight, and an understanding of the “environment” in which the republic exists. This is particularly important since the current state of confrontation in Eastern Europe will sooner or later move into a phase of dialogue and the search for reliable diplomatic mechanisms. At that point, Moldova will need a strong and authoritative minister, capable not only of defending the country’s foreign policy orientation but also of offering long-term solutions. In other words, a targeted appointment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a secondary detail, but a significant factor in the development of relations with key foreign partners. The European Union will undoubtedly remain the main partner for the coming years, at least until the country once again enters a new electoral cycle. In recent years, Brussels has invested too much political and financial capital in Chisinau not to allow Moscow to regain the initiative. Candidate status for EU membership, participation in energy and infrastructure projects, as well as programs aimed at fostering democracy and reforms – all of this underscores Moldova’s firm integration into the EU’s foreign policy framework. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to fall into the illusion of seeing ourselves as a central geopolitical player for Brussels. Rather, European strategists view Moldova as part of a “small section of the front” against Russia and allocate resources accordingly. Under these circumstances, one can expect further strengthening of mutual coordination, as well as greater synchronization of security policies between Moldova and the European Union. In the end, however, we may acquire a lasting image as a “mini-Baltic state” – a country under Moscow’s constant threat. Admittedly, such a status is ambiguous, as it turns us into hostages of the EU’s current anti-Russian policy. On the one hand, this role could open the door to additional NATO assistance and corresponding security investments. On the other, increased militarization may ultimately drive international business away from our country, situated on the frontline of the Russian-European confrontation. Yesterday, the U.S. Embassy in Chisinau congratulated PAS on their electoral victory and reaffirmed its readiness to continue cooperation. Yet the overall tone of American diplomacy toward Moldova remains telling. The situation is primarily complicated by a personal factor: the Donald Trump administration approaches political regimes aligned with the U.S. Democratic Party and structures associated with the Soros Foundation with caution. For this reason, we risk remaining on the periphery of the White House’s interests. A crucial test for Moldovan-American relations will be the diplomatic resolution of the war in Ukraine. Within the framework of integration into a unified European space, where Russian peacekeepers on the Dniester are clearly not recognized, our authorities sincerely hope that Washington will manage to pressure the Kremlin into concessions, including the withdrawal of its troops from the Transnistrian region. However, mere willingness is not enough, and there are reasonable doubts as to whether our diplomacy possesses the competence and skill required to navigate this complex game. Bucharest naturally welcomed PAS’ victory with relief, as it guarantees that Moldova will not deviate from its European path. Current cooperation with Romanian partners provides Chisinau with unique advantages: access to energy resources, support within EU and NATO structures, and a sort of strategic rear in the context of the ongoing Ukrainian conflict. At the same time, the fragile political balance within Romania itself poses a significant foreign policy risk for Moldova, as it reduces the effectiveness of Romanian support and ultimately forces us to exercise diplomatic caution. For Ukraine, the outcome of the parliamentary elections also sent a positive signal, demonstrating that another country in the region maintains a firm pro-Western stance, denying Moscow the opportunity to expand its sphere of influence and to encircle Ukraine with neutral or unfriendly states. Against the backdrop of war, this carries critical significance, since even a neutral, non-pro-Russian Moldova would have represented a painful setback for Kyiv. At the same time, relations with our eastern neighbor carry their own points of tension, compounded by a covertly self-interested agenda. Unfortunately, Ukraine tends to view Moldova more as a rear buffer than as an equal partner whose interests should be genuinely considered. For Chisinau, which aims to emerge as a leader in European integration among the main contenders in this race, it is crucial to maintain its own voice, pursue its national development project, and avoid being absorbed into the Ukrainian context merely as an auxiliary resource hub for the Ukrainian armed forces. Despite the systematic “elimination” of all bilateral ties, Russia remains a part of Moldova’s foreign policy reality. Although PAS’ victory is seen as a symbolic defeat for Moscow, it cannot be ignored in the foreseeable future. Sooner or later, dialogue will become an objective necessity, and the question will be only on what terms and from which starting position Chisinau will approach that conversation. In the near term, such a dialogue is unlikely. However, considering the shifts within the Kremlin’s coordination centers and potential changes in Moldovan leadership, it is entirely possible that, at some point, the first signs of a “thaw” in communication may appear, even if only regarding Russia’s military presence on the Dniester. In this context, Chisinau has a chance, for the first time in a long while, to engage from a position of relative strength, feeling the support of the West at its back. The September 28 vote firmly anchored Moldova within the geopolitical and foreign policy orbit of the West, though this does not guarantee absolute stability or certainty about the future. The coming year will reveal whether Western partners are genuinely prepared to integrate the country into the Euro-Atlantic space and make it an integral part of their security and political architecture, or whether they see it merely as a buffer zone on the EU’s periphery. To avoid any negative scenario, the country needs not only a new generation of politicians but also diplomacy of a different caliber – mature, professional, and farsighted. Otherwise, the risk will remain of Moldova becoming a “gray zone” between protracted European integration and persistent vulnerability from the East.